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ABSTRACT 
 
By 
 
Bhekithemba Richard Mngomezulu 
 
 
The process which culminated in the establishment of the East African 
Community (EAC) in 1967 started in the early 1920s. The idea was first 
conceived in Britain. Initially, East Africans vehemently opposed this idea 
fearing that it would sustain British hegemony in the region, but their resentment 
did not prevent the establishment of the East African High Commission (EAHC) 
in January 1948. 
 
It was only in the 1950s and 1960s that East African leaders embraced the idea 
due to political and economic reasons. In 1961 they converted the EAHC into 
the East African Common Services Organisation (EACSO) and in 1967 they 
established the EAC. 
 
Nationalism and sub-nationalisms in the region cast a spell on the EAC. The 
coup, which took place in Uganda in 1971, strained relations between Idi Amin 
and Presidents Nyerere and Kenyatta thus making it impossible to hold regional 
meetings. Eventually, the EAC collapsed in June 1977. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
 
Voll (1973:1) once made the observation that “in recent years the subject of 
regional integration has received considerable attention, both in theoretical terms 
and in studies of specific experiences.” He went on to say that in regional 
integration not only are the more concrete factors such as cohesion and 
communications important, but that the psychological function of the ideal of 
regional unity itself must be considered. In other words, one has to establish the 
commitment of political leaders on the ideal of regional unity as well as their 
willingness to push it through. Implicit in Voll’s utterances was that the decision 
to agitate for regional integration must be grounded on concrete and tangible 
reasons amongst potential member states and their communities, in part because 
there is more public interest in regional activities and their envisaged benefits.  
 
It has become fashionable in the historiography on regional integration to over-
emphasize the economic factor as the driving force behind bringing together 
different countries in a specific region. The general argument made by proponents 
of this trajectory is that countries with ailing economies are more prone to 
embrace the idea of regional integration so as to boost their regional economy – 
something they cannot achieve if they continue to operate as separate political 
entities (Agyeman, 1997; Thomas, 1996; Kirkhood, 1965). But it should also be 
noted that in certain instances some strong economies would be more willing to 
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invest their time and effort in promoting regional integration so that they could 
subsequently dominate the regional markets thereby gaining political influence 
too in that particular region.  
 
The view that small economies are more prone to support regional integration is 
also held with regards to the East African case study discussed in this dissertation. 
There is vast literature in this regard (Gappert, 1968; Robson, 1967; Söderbaum, 
(2002); Tanganyika Standard, 6 June 1963; The People, 2 December 1967; 
Uganda Argus, 2 December 1967, Report by the Conference on British Caribbean 
Federation. Cmn.9733, 1956; Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol. 
172, Cols.351-353, to name but a few).  
 
In a way, the view that the economic factor plays an instrumental role in regional 
integration cannot be refuted out of hand. However, other commentators see 
politics as the salient factor behind regional integration (Churchill, 1908; Mazrui, 
1967; Southall, 1974; Bell, 1986; Mngomezulu, 2004a and 2004b). They argue 
that smaller countries in a region sometimes decide to rally behind one another in 
order to secure political independence from a foreign dominant power. According 
to Rothchild (1968:3) for example, the latter view can be sustained because inter-
territorial organizations “are political in their inception, termination, and basic 
arrangements even if the conflict factor is minimized in their daily operations.” In 
other words, while there is general consensus that the economic factor is crucial in 
discussing regional integration, there is an acknowledgement of the fact that the 
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picture of politics also looms large in any discussion on this subject, both at the 
local (regional) and international levels. It is in this context therefore that regional 
integration is sometimes seen as “a major process and a key factor of evolution in 
internal and international politics” (Bach, 1999:1). Thus, it would be a very big 
mistake to ignore the importance of the political factor in regional integration. 
 
To be sure, both these trajectories cannot be summarily dismissed since there is a 
plethora of evidence to buttress them as demonstrated by the few sources 
provided above. However, the aim of this dissertation is not to make a case for 
either of these evidently antithetical positions. Instead, the dissertation discusses 
both trajectories under the rubric of a totally different premise: the role played by 
personal relationships amongst the East African leadership in the rise and 
subsequent demise of the East African Community (EAC) and how nationalism 
and sub-nationalisms influenced some of the important decisions they took on 
regional matters. The phrase personal relationships in this regard, refers to the 
relationships the East African leadership had both at national and regional levels. 
The argument is that positive or negative relationships amongst East African 
leaders (mainly Presidents Julius Nyerere, Jomo Kenyatta, Milton Obote and, 
later, Idi Amin) determined how they related to one another and that this had an 
impact on the establishment and survival of regional institutions like the EAC. 
 
The dissertation argues that to have a better understanding of regional integration 
in East Africa one needs to do a close analysis of these relationships because they 
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shaped both the thinking and actions of different East African leaders at different 
political moments over many years. For example, it was through personal and 
political relationships (especially in the 1950s and early 1960s) that East African 
leaders embraced the idea of regional integration to which they had been opposed 
for more than two decades. Later, changes in these relationships amongst certain 
leaders, coupled with personal and nationalists interests (the rise of sub-
nationalisms) culminated in the eventual collapse of the EAC in 1977. For that 
reason, it is imperative to analyze these relationships and establish their efficacy 
in the rich history of East Africa’s regional politics up to the late 1970s. The 
resurgence of new regionalism since the late 1980s and the revival of the EAC in 
January 2001 make the need for such a study even more expedient.  
 
Some of the existing literature argues that the history of East African co-operation 
started with the construction of the Uganda Railway Line, which was completed 
in 1901.1 This view is premised on the fact that the railway line which went up to 
Kisumu near Lake Victoria was built in order to serve as a link between Kenya, 
Uganda and Tanganyika (Mnjama, 1998; EAC Handbook, 1972). But this was an 
early experiment. Britain had only been in East Africa for about six years at this 
time and there was already a realization that the area of 1.8 million square 
kilometers called East Africa had to be brought together somehow.  
 
In a nutshell, the history of the EAC could be divided into three main phases. The 
initial phase started in earnest in the 1920s when the idea of uniting East Africa 
                                                 
1 Delupis (1969) mistakenly states that this railway line  was constructed in 1902. 
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was conceived, or at least publicly articulated by British authorities. In 1917, 
there was a Customs Union between Kenya and Uganda. Tanganyika joined this 
Union in 1927. During this time, the idea of bringing the three territories closer to 
one another was still a colonial strategy geared towards continued European 
domination, more specifically Britain’s domination over East Africa. The primary 
goal was to centralize administration thus making the lives of British appointees 
in the region (especially the Governors) easier. The exit point of this phase was 
the establishment of the East African High Commission (EAHC) in January 1948.  
 
The second phase covers the 1950s and 1960s when the East African leadership 
embraced the idea of regional integration for a variety of reasons and goes all the 
way to the official constitution of the first2 EAC in December 1967. Some may 
argue that, in fact, the period from 1948 to 1961 constituted a separate phase 
whereby the three East African territories operated under the EAHC and consider 
the period from 1961 to 1967 as a separate phase whereby the East African region 
operated under the rubric of the East African Common Services Organisation 
(EACSO). But in this study, both periods are considered as one phase because 
unlike the first phase, by this time East Africans demonstrated an overt interest in 
regional integration and made concerted efforts to ensure that it became a reality.  
 
The third and last phase is the period from 1967 to 1977, which marks the lifespan 
of the EAC. In June 1977, a confluence of factors necessitated the disintegration 
                                                 
2 It is imperative to stress that this was the first EAC because there is currently a new East African 
Community that is operational in East Africa. It was revived by former Presidents Daniel arap Moi 
and Benjamin Mkapa together with the current President Yoweri Museveni in 2001. 
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of the EAC, as shall be seen later in this dissertation. From that date onwards, 
East African territories operated as separate and independent political entities. 
Following the collapse of the EAC, all the three Member States subsequently 
negotiated a Mediation Agreement for the Division of Assets and Liabilities. They 
eventually signed this Agreement in 1984 (http://www.eac.int/history.htm).  
 
But what is a little bit unsettling in treating the decade from 1967 to 1977 as a 
separate phase in itself is that, in fact, the EAC started falling apart as it was being 
constituted. In other words, by the time this regional organisation was officially 
constituted at the end of 1967, more cracks were already discernible. Therefore, it 
was a foregone conclusion that the EAC would not last. The question is: what 
caused those cracks? This question is addressed in the present study.  
 
1.1 Problem Statement 
The establishment of the EAC is one of the most important episodes in the history 
of East Africa. However, there are still a few lingering questions regarding the 
eventful history of this organization. The two questions to which the present study 
seeks to find answers are the following: (1) Who should be credited for the 
establishment of the first EAC in December 1967 and who is to blame for its 
subsequent demise in 1977? (2) What role did personal relationships amongst the 
East African leadership, as well as nationalism and sub-nationalisms play in the 
rise and fall of the EAC? Finding answers to these questions will make it possible 
to extrapolate on the future of the current EAC.  
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1.2 Literature Review 
The literature on regional integration on the African continent in general, and on 
East Africa in particular can be divided between pessimists – those who argue that 
earlier attempts to bring certain African countries together failed and therefore 
any similar attempt is bound to fail – and optimists, that is, those who identify 
specific factors that led to the failure of earlier attempts and thus argue that if 
those factors are addressed there would still be a chance for regional institutions 
to survive. Others simply write about this subject in a descriptive narrative form. 
Their aim is to provide factual information on how the process unfolded without 
necessarily doing any in-depth analysis.  
There is vast literature by both African and Africanist scholars which 
paints a dark picture about the prospects of getting it right in terms bringing 
together different countries in a specific region in Africa. Dieter (1997:7), for 
example, writes: “In Africa, attempts to create regional integration projects have a 
long, albeit discouraging history.” Odhiambo (1981:139), writing specifically 
about East Africa, shares the same view by arguing that: “When it comes to the 
question of African attempts at territorial politics, the experience is one of failure, 
or alternatively of inability.” There are a few other scholars who concur with this 
trajectory (Bell, 1986; Boahen, 1990). Hentz (2005:4) writes:  
Thus, schemes in Africa such as the Economic Community of West 
African States and the East African Community (EAC) adopted a 
blueprint from a very different place and time, and, like other such 
schemes in Sub-Saharan Africa, they failed.  
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These views are credible and can be substantiated with facts. For example, West 
and Central African states tried to form regional organizations soon after gaining 
their political independence from European colonizers but all those attempts 
failed. The French colonies of Mali and Senegal formed a Federation. But a few 
months later, Senegal seceded from the Federation and declared itself as the 
Republic of Senegal. In September 1960, Mali declared itself as another Republic. 
In another example, Ivory Coast, Dahomey and Niger formed the Council of the 
Intente but this too collapsed (Melady, 1961). Patrice Lumumba of present-day 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Kwame Nkrumah once contemplated 
combining Congo and Ghana (Agyeman, 1997), an idea that never materialized. 
Some of the post-independence regional organisations include the West African 
Economic Community (WAEC) and the Central African Customs and Economic 
Union (CACEU), which were established in the 1960s but later disintegrated too. 
Even the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East, Central and Southern Africa 
(PAFMECSA) did not survive due to ideological differences amongst African 
leaders and their excitement about their newly found freedom from colonial rule. 
Thus, the argument by the pessimists is tenable and can be substantiated. 
 
Interestingly, in spite of all these failures, the spirit of regional integration did not 
die out amongst Africans. Consequently, when East African territories gained 
their political independence in the early 1960s, they also tried to follow the same 
route by establishing the EAC. Unfortunately, like its predecessor organizations, 
the EAC’s life was also ephemeral as it collapsed only after a single decade. It is 
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in this context therefore that the view expressed by those scholars who state that 
the African experience with regional organization or territorial politics is one of 
failure cannot be summarily refuted.  
 
However, it would be wrong to over-generalize and argue that all attempts to 
establish regional institutions in post-colonial Africa failed because some of those 
regional organizations are still operational even today. Amongst those that have 
survived to-date is the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 
which was established in 1976 combining the former French and British 
territories. Although ECOWAS is primarily an economic regional body, it also 
tackles political issues whenever such a need arises. For example, ECOWAS got 
involved in the political crisis in Cote d’Ivoire when it became clear that the gulf 
between President Laurent Gbagbo and Prime Minister Charles Banny had 
widened significantly in 2006.  
 
It is remarkable that despite their many failures Africans have been indefatigable 
in their attempts to establish regional institutions. This serves as an indication that 
African politicians fervently believe that they could achieve a lot by working 
closely with one another than they would if they operated as separate political 
entities. This view is given substance by the fact that although earlier attempts to 
bring Africa (or its regions) together failed, some of them survived. Besides 
ECOWAS, the African continent still boasts about the existence of other regional 
institutions such as: Southern African Development Community (SADC), which 
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was established in 1992, changing from what used to be called the Southern 
African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) that was established in 
1980, and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), to 
name but a few. 
 
In February 2007, Nigeria, Togo and Benin signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) on the establishment of a Joint Prosperity Zone (JPZ). The 
aim was to work towards a joint economic platform that would harmonize the 
national economic policies of the three countries. Even the EAC, which was 
defunct for more than two decades, was revived in 2001. Building on these 
regional institutions, African leaders have proceeded to establish continental 
bodies such as the African Union (AU), which was initiated by the Lusaka Treaty 
of 2001 and was subsequently inaugurated on 9 July 2002 in Durban, South 
Africa. 
 
One of the most intriguing questions is the following: why did Africans insist on 
forming regional institutions? Schraeder (2007:169-70) provides two reasons for 
that. First, he states that African leaders have a firm belief that there is strength in 
numbers. Second, he writes: “inspired by the success of the European Union (EU) 
and encouraged by the UN-sponsored Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), 
based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the first generation of African leaders sought to 
create regional entities capable of promoting regional cooperation and 
integration.” This explains the Africans’ obsession with regional organizations. 
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With regards to East Africa and the EAC, the literature can be divided into two 
groups. First, there are those authors who mention the EAC in passing without 
necessarily having it as their primary focus. Second, there are those who have the 
EAC as their focus. Within this group are authors who present a descriptive 
chronological account on how the EAC was established and how it functioned as 
well as those who simply summarize different views by other authors on why the 
EAC collapsed.  
 
Those who mention the EAC in passing 
There are a number of African and Africanist scholars whose works make 
reference to regional integration in East Africa in general and the EAC in 
particular but without providing further details. For example, Hunter’s work 
(1963) focused on the examination of educational opportunities that were 
available for East African students in the early 1960s. This book is an assessment 
of manpower requirements in East Africa. Thus, Hunter discussed regional 
integration in East Africa from an educational point of view. He argued that all 
three East African territories needed educational facilities that would produce the 
necessary manpower needed in development projects throughout the East African 
region. But Hunter’s study does not go beyond 1964 and therefore only address 
regional integration in general, not the EAC, which had not yet been established.  
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Leys and Robson’s edited work Federation in East Africa (1965) has a promising 
title but it covers different themes without necessarily focusing on the EAC in 
particular. The authors covered in that book discussed integration from a 
theoretical point of view (Peter Newman’s chapter), from a legal point of view (S. 
A. De Smith’s chapter) or addressed one regional integration institution such as 
the Central Bank (B. van Arkadie’s chapter). Therefore, although this source 
provides valuable information on regional integration in East Africa, it covers a 
wide scope both in terms of themes and time but does not provide a detailed 
analysis of the factors that were responsible for the establishment and subsequent 
dissolution of the EAC in 1967 and 1977 respectively. There is conspicuous 
silence on agency in this history. For example, one of the big gaps is that nothing 
is said about the role played by personal relationships amongst East African 
leaders in the history of the EAC. Furthermore, the role played by nationalism is 
only mentioned in passing without providing any specific focus and detail.  
 
Southall (1974) discussed regional integration in East Africa but with a specific 
focus on higher education. He analyzed the politics behind the rise and fall of the 
Federal University of East Africa (UEA), which was established in June 1963 as 
part of the regional integration project and had campuses in Kenya, Uganda and 
Tanzania. The university was dissolved at the end of June in 1970 and gave birth 
to the first three national universities in East Africa (University of Nairobi in 
Kenya, University of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, and Makerere University in 
Uganda). In chapter 1 of his work, Southall only covered the steps leading to the 
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formation of the EAC. This is good background information but does not help the 
reader who wants to know a detailed history of the EAC and the intricacies that 
were involved in the process of its establishment. The fact that Southall’s book 
does not discuss the politics that characterized the ten years of the EAC’s 
existence means that it limits our understanding of some of the key themes and 
episodes in the eventful history of the EAC. 
 
Furley and Watson (1978) discuss regional integration in East Africa and include 
the EAC in their discussion. However, these authors discuss regional integration 
in East Africa specifically in the educational context. They look at what regional 
integration meant for the education sector and do not necessarily have the EAC as 
their primary focus. But it should be mentioned that this bias towards education 
had no sinister move except that there was a clear relationship between regional 
integration in education (especially higher education) and other forms of 
integration such as economic and political integration as discussed later in this 
dissertation. Iliffe (1998) too, writes about East African doctors and he mentions 
the EAC or discusses regional integration in East Africa in that context. 
Therefore, his work provides some contextual information about regional 
integration in general and the EAC in particular but is very thin on substance. 
 
There is also information about the East African Federation in Julius Nyerere’s 
speeches and writings. Freedom and Unity (1967) and Freedom and Socialism 
(1968) have a number of these speeches. Although they provide useful pointers 
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regarding the genesis, problems, and prospects for regional integration in East 
Africa, these speeches only give the reader a tantalizing view on why the EAC 
collapsed but lack the necessary detail. This is due in part to the fact that they are 
short. Moreover, they are written in a narrative form and do not provide an in-
depth analysis of the events that happened in the history of the EAC.  
 
Jomo Kenyatta, in his work Suffering Without Bitterness (1968) stressed the need 
for African Unity and saw the EAC as a means to that end. However, he, too, did 
not elaborate on the role played by personal relationships between himself and his 
Ugandan and Tanzanian counterparts in the history of the EAC. Neither did he 
address the role played by nationalism and sub-nationalisms in this history. 
Kenyatta’s earlier work, Facing Mount Kenya, first published in 1938 and 
reprinted in 1965, was his attempt to demonstrate to Kenyans that although he 
was living abroad, he had not forgotten about his roots. He still remembered what 
Mount Kenya meant to him. Although the book “remains one of the most 
important works on the impact of European influence in Africa from an African 
perspective” (Wiseman, 1991:109), it focuses on Kenya as a country, not East 
Africa as a region and is therefore limited in scope although there are some few 
references to the need for people to work as a unit.   
 
Those who focus on the EAC 
The authors who address the EAC or regional integration in East Africa directly 
focus on specific themes or use different approaches to document that history. For 
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example, Rothchild (1967) provides a wide range of documents about regional 
integration in East Africa taken from the archives located both in East Africa and 
London. The sources he uses include inter alia newspapers, commission reports, 
parliamentary debates in each of the three East African countries, debates that 
took place at the inter-territorial East Africa Central Legislative Assembly, inter-
departmental correspondence and dispatches in Britain as well as correspondence 
between the British government and its appointees in East Africa such as 
Governors like Philip Mitchell, Edward Griggs and Donald Cameron. By using 
these documents the reader gets a glimpse of some of the intricacies involved in 
the history of the EAC.  
 
Another author who provides a similar kind of material is Low (1971). His work 
comprises excerpts wherein the Baganda pushed sub-nationalism and expressed 
their resentment to regional integration in East Africa, in part because they 
strongly felt that their Kingdom was protected by the Buganda Agreement of 
1900, which was signed between the Baganda and British Government. By 
reading these excerpts, one is able hear the voices of different stakeholders in 
Buganda and get an understanding of how they responded to the idea of regional 
integration or the proposed EAC. 
 
Indeed, these two types of sources are very useful to anyone who is interested in 
the history of regional integration in East Africa. However they say very little 
about the collapse of the EAC, nor do they directly address the role played by 
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personal relationships amongst the East African leadership and by nationalism 
and sub-nationalisms in the history of the EAC. In fact, most of the archival 
sources contained in these works provide background information on the 
establishment of the EAC but say nothing about what happened soon after the 
independence of the three East African territories and Zanzibar between 1960 and 
1963 and between 1967 and 1977 when the EAC was in existence. 
 
There are also authors who use the above-mentioned sources and other types of 
information to write the history of the EAC directly. Sometimes they differ in 
their approaches. One such author is Delupis (1969). Her entire book is about the 
EAC and the Common Market. The approach she uses is that of a descriptive 
narrative. She describes how the EAC and its institutions operated. This is the 
strength of the book. However, its major weakness is that it is too shallow. Key 
episodes are mentioned in just one paragraph or in a few sentences. This is the 
case for example with the Kampala Agreement. Therefore, although the book 
covers the history of the EAC from 1900 right up to its disintegration in 1977, it 
only provides snapshots of each phase.  
 
The work edited by Potholm and Fredland (1980) titled Integration and 
Disintegration in East Africa covers a wide range of themes regarding the history 
of the EAC. As the title suggests, it addresses both the rise and fall of the EAC. 
For example, Springer’s chapter [Community Chronology] provides the historical 
perspective of the EAC. On the other hand the chapters by Fredland [Who Killed 
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the East African Community?] and Mazzeo [Problems of Regional Cooperation in 
East Africa] address the factors that led to the demise of the EAC. In that sense, 
the book is a useful source. However, the fact that each chapter covers a specific 
aspects of the EAC means that there is no systematic and consistent analysis of 
the EAC. It is here that the present study will make a contribution. 
    
Bethwell Ogot, one of East Africa’s prolific historians, has written on a wide 
range of topics, including the EAC. In his autobiography My Footprints on the 
Sands of Time (2003) Ogot dedicates a chapter to the EAC in which he regrets 
that this institution had to be dissolved in 1977. Although Ogot provides an inside 
account on the politics behind the demise of the EAC, his chapter has some 
shortfalls. For example, he only begins his discussion from 1975, not 1967 when 
the EAC was established. This leaves out most valuable background information 
that would be useful to the reader who is not acquainted with regional integration 
politics in East Africa. The present study seeks to fill this lacuna. It will begin by 
providing background information about the EAC and go on to demonstrate what 
the transition from colonial rule to independence meant to the three East African 
territories and how personal and national sentiments impacted upon the EAC and 
how all of that pre-determined the future of the EAC. 
 
There have also been some good articles in which authors argue why the EAC 
collapsed. Mugomba (1978:262) addressed this question by arguing that: “Part of 
the explanation lies in the fact that Tanzania has progressively ‘drifted’ 
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Southwards as the conflict in Southern Africa intensified.” Here, he was referring 
to the independence of Mozambique, arguing that it urged President Nyerere to 
work with other Frontline States to liberate more African countries such as 
Zimbabwe and Namibia. In his view, President Nyerere felt that his political 
interests would be best served by going to the South than investing his time and 
effort in sustaining the EAC. However, Mugomba does not see this as the only 
reason. For example, he also refers to the following factors: long-harboured fears 
of domination by one or the other partners; resentment by Kenya over the need to 
‘carry’ the poorer members; long-strained relations between Uganda and 
Tanzania over Nyerere’s refusal to recognize Amin’s military regime; different 
foreign policy concerns and approaches; and the concentration of foreign capital 
in the industrial and commercial ‘core’ [Kenya] (Mugomba, 1978:263). Such 
information illuminates our understanding of the EAC. 
 
Potholm (1979) read the different arguments presented by other authors as the 
reasons behind the collapse of the EAC and then summarized them under the 
following six perspectives: 
(i) Ideology influenced the outcome (Kenya followed the Africanised version 
of international capitalism; Tanzania followed ujamaa; while Uganda on 
the other hand moved from a mixed to a proto-socialist economy); 
(ii) The critical failure of political leadership (proponents of this view blame 
Presidents Nyerere, Kenyatta and Amin for being pre-occupied with their 
individual and/or national matters thus failing to address EAC problems); 
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(iii) Economic realities (Kenya was the wealthiest of the three countries); 
(iv) Exogenous forces destroyed the EAC (here the blame is put on the United 
States of America, Great Britain, various multinational corporations, 
Western capitalism, or some combination of these factors); 
(v) Changing times undercut the EAC (the argument is about incrementalism. 
It is argued that various factors accumulated over time and eventually 
brought the EAC to its knees); and 
(vi) Sub-national politics proved too powerful (this refers to in-fighting within 
each national government which affected the EAC negatively) (Potholm, 
1979:46-53). 
 
As shown above, various attempts have been made in the past to document the 
history of the EAC. But what is clear from the literature discussed thus fat is that 
each group of sources has a particular focus in terms of themes or phase in the 
history of the EAC. None of the authors discussed above provides a consistent 
and chronological analysis of the development of events around the EAC. Some 
(like Delupis) simply present a descriptive narrative, not a detailed analysis of the 
various events. It is this void that the present study aims to fill. The relationships 
amongst the East African leadership – which are mentioned in passing in some of 
the sources – will receive specific attention, together with the role played by 
nationalism and sub-nationalisms in the history of the EAC.  
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To be sure, the utilitarian function of this study cannot be concealed. Analyzing 
personal relationships amongst the East African leadership and the role played by 
nationalism and sub-nationalisms will enable current East African leaders to do 
things differently and deal with the factors that led to the disintegration of the first 
EAC. In other words, by discussing the factors that led to the demise of the EAC, 
the study will provide the current East African leadership something they could 
use as a source of reference in their resolve to take their region forward. 
Mugomba (1978:272) was on target when he stated the following: “Certainly, the 
hard lessons of this unsuccessful venture will need to be borne in mind in any 
future attempt at further regional unity and economic integration in Africa.” 
Former President Daniel arap Moi was guided by the same thinking when he told 
his two colleagues from Uganda and Tanzania that “we must be careful enough to 
avoid the pitfalls that led to the demise of the original EAC in 1977” (Daily 
Nation, 25 April 2001). About a year later, Moi opined: “those who understand 
their past have confidence to face the future.” (Kenya Times, 21 October 2002). It 
is in this context that the current study is considered important for East Africa as a 
region and for the African continent in general. 
 
1.3 Research Aims 
The conventional practice in the research community is that each and every study 
is guided by specific aims and objectives that give it both the direction and focus. 
In the same vein, the present study is guided by the following aims: 
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• To investigate the role played by personal relationships amongst the East 
African leadership in the establishment of the EAC in 1967 and its 
subsequent collapse in 1977. 
• To establish how nationalism and sub-nationalisms shaped the nature of 
those relationships before and after the EAC was officially constituted. 
 
1.4 Significance of the Study 
This study does not only have historical significance. On the contrary, it is timely 
for East Africans as they revive and expand the membership of the new EAC. By 
analyzing the role played by personal relationships amongst the East African 
leadership in the 1960s and 70s, the study will make current leaders vigilant and 
ensure that they are better prepared to preempt some possible schisms and act 
accordingly before history repeats itself. Also, the study provides African leaders 
with a source of reference in their relentless efforts to nurture the African Union 
(AU). To a large extent, the survival of the AU depends on the viability of 
regional institutions like the EAC. Therefore it is important to ensure that these 
regional institutions are kept intact. Lastly, students of African political economy 
stand to benefit from this study as they analyze the current EAC and try to 
understand the functioning of the AU. With that knowledge, they will better 
understand similar institutions that exist in other continents such as the European 
Union (EU). 
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1.5 Limitations of the study 
One of the limitations of this study is that it did not use interviews for practical 
reasons. First, for this research method to be effective one would have to 
interview informants in all three East African countries; that would need more 
time and financial resources. Also, most of the key role players in the history of 
the EAC are now dead – this includes the former presidents of the three East 
African countries who signed the Declaration for joint co-operation in East Africa 
in 1963 and the treaty that established the EAC in 1967. But the archival material 
used in this study will fill that void. The voices of potential informants were 
captured and retained in parliamentary debates (both at the national Assemblies of 
individual countries in East Africa and at the East Africa Central Legislative 
Assembly), correspondence documents and newspapers. All these sources were 
accessed and interrogated for the purpose of this study. 
  
1.6 Hypothesis 
The hypothesis guiding this study is that personal relationships amongst the East 
African leadership played a pivotal role in the establishment and subsequent 
collapse of the EAC; nationalism and sub-nationalisms shaped the nature of those 
relationships thus making it a foregone conclusion that the life of the EAC – once 
established – would be ephemeral. 
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1.7 Research Method 
This study used the qualitative research method. Although Neuman (1997) states 
that qualitative and quantitative research methods complement each other, he goes 
on to say that there are conspicuous differences between the two. For example, he 
writes: “Qualitative social research relies largely on the interpretive and critical 
approaches to social sciences” (Neuman, 1997:329). The rationale for using the 
qualitative research method in this study was that its emphasis is on the 
interpretation of qualitative data from a variety of sources, not just a dispassionate 
presentation of statistical data as would have been the case with the quantitative 
research method. 
 
Data collection 
Most of the data used in this study was drawn largely from archival sources 
housed at the Kenya National Archives (KNA) and at the library archives housed 
at Jomo Kenyatta Memorial Library at the University of Nairobi (UON) in Kenya. 
The researcher consulted reports of parliamentary debates that took place at the 
National Assemblies of the three East African territories of Kenya, Uganda and 
Tanzania and those that took place at the East Africa Central Legislative 
Assembly, a regional parliament of East Africa. Moreover, the study drew from 
information contained in newspapers published in the three East African 
countries. Correspondence documents between British officials based in East 
Africa and those stationed in Britain were also used to extract information for this 
study.  
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Regarding parliamentary debates that took place both in the House of Commons 
and in the House of Lords in Britain, the researcher consulted British 
parliamentary papers.3 Further information was drawn from secondary sources 
such as books, journals and academic papers that deal with the subject which is 
the focus of this study. Secondary sources in the form of books, articles as well as 
seminar and conference papers were also consulted to enrich the study. 
 
Data analysis 
Following Neuman’s (1997) observation that qualitative researchers organize data 
into categories on the basis of themes and concepts, information extracted from 
the different sources mentioned above was analyzed and discussed thematically.  
 
1.8 Organization of the study 
The present study is divided into seven chapters, five main chapters as well as the 
introductory and concluding chapters. The content of each chapter is as follows: 
 
CHAPTER 1: This is the introductory chapter. It sets the scene and introduces the 
entire dissertation. The chapter comprises the statement of the problem, literature 
review, aims of the study, research methodology, hypothesis, significance and 
limitations of the study.  
 
                                                 
3 I had access to these papers while I was working on a separate research project in America. Rice 
University Library in Texas has a huge collection of these papers, including the current ones. 
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CHAPTER 2: It is imperative to provide the theoretical framework within which 
the study is located so that it would be much easier for the reader to follow the 
discussion. Chapter 2 thus focuses specifically on this area. It provides a broader 
understanding of the key concepts used in the dissertation and demonstrates how 
different theorists have used such terms at different moments. It also provides the 
context in which each term is used in this dissertation. 
 
CHAPTER 3: This chapter provides a succinct overview of British agency in 
regional integration in East Africa from the early 1920s up until 1 January 1948 
when the EAHC was officially established to oversee a host of regional activities 
and institutions in East Africa. Such background information is very crucial in the 
analysis of what happened once the leadership of the three East African territories 
resolved to embrace the colonial idea of regional integration in the 1950s and 
1960s. 
 
CHAPTER 4: The main purpose of this chapter is to establish the role played by 
personal relationships amongst East African leaders in the establishment of the 
EAC. After a quick recap of the events that unfolded soon after the establishment 
of the EAHC in 1948, the entrance point of this chapter is Tanganyika’s self-rule 
in 1960 and the exit point is December 1967 when the EAC was officially 
constituted in Arusha, Tanzania. 
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CHAPTER 5: This chapter focuses on the demise of the EAC. It analyzes the 
actions and utterances of different East African leaders as a way of demonstrating 
how personal interests, nationalism and sub-nationalisms sounded the death knells 
for the EAC. The relationship between President Obote and the Kabaka in 
Uganda is used to illustrate this point. Also, the relationship between Amin (after 
the 1971 coup) and Presidents Nyerere and Kenyatta is given close attention to 
illustrate the point about the role played by personal and national interests in the 
demise of the EAC. Amin’s relationship with President Kenneth Kaunda of 
Zambia is also addressed to demonstrate that personal relationships even reduced 
the prospects of expanding the EAC to include other Eastern African countries. 
Other discussion points are derived from an analysis of parliamentary debates that 
took place both at territorial and inter-territorial levels, as well as those that took 
place in Britain in the two Houses of Parliament. 
 
CHAPTER 6: This chapter builds on chapter 5. It demonstrates the difficulty of 
trying to sustain the life of the EAC after the dissolution of the UEA in June 1970, 
which had been part of the regional integration project. The chapter argues that 
there was a direct link between the EAC and the UEA in that they were both 
regional institutions. It then advances the view that it would have been impossible 
to salvage the life of the EAC after the collapse of the UEA because the same 
factors that necessitated the dissolution of the UEA also haunted the EAC. The 
exit point of this chapter is June 1977 when the EAC was formally dissolved thus 
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allowing each of the three East African countries to operate as separate political 
entities. 
 
CHAPTER 7: This is the concluding chapter. It pulls together the entire 
dissertation by stressing the key points discussed in the previous chapters. Most 
importantly, this chapter provides a quick analysis of the current EAC and the 
nature of the relationship amongst its member states and then makes specific 
recommendations on what the current East African leadership needs to do in order 
to avoid the repeat of the past experience.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Theoretical Framework 
 
0. Introduction 
It is common practice in academic circles to begin a study by first providing a 
theoretical framework within which such a study is located. Although this could 
be perceived as a conventional practice followed by researchers simply as a 
matter of routine, the practice stems from the fact that people’s understanding of a 
particular concept or list of concepts is not always the same. Therefore, presenting 
the theory or theories about each of the key concepts used in the study provides 
the reader with a clear context within which such concepts are to be understood.  
 
However, not everyone likes theories as a mater of principle – be they social 
science theories or any other type. Among the reasons for this stance is that theory 
is one of the least understood concepts in academia, especially for students in the 
social sciences. Neuman (1997: 37) defines ‘social theory’ as “a system of 
interconnected abstractions or ideas that condenses and organizes knowledge 
about the social world.” He sees social theory as the compact way of thinking 
about the social world. The fact that social theory is associated with abstractions 
makes those who do not have a grip on abstract ideas detest it. Another difficulty 
with this concept is that not all theories are generally accepted as good – not even 
by those researchers who like to use them when conducting research and when 
presenting their findings. Therefore, whatever phenomena social science theories 
seek to explain and whatever forms they take, “they almost invariably attract 
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criticism for being deficient in important respects” (Nugent, 2003:485). Some of 
the deficiencies associated with social science theories include the following: 
focusing on only part of the phenomena under examination, being too general in 
scope and/or formulation, being excessively time-bound to allow generalization of 
the theory being presented, and being insufficiently empirically grounded.  
 
But the criticism leveled against social science theories does not necessarily mean 
that the word ‘theory’ should be discarded altogether from the list of concepts 
associated with research. For certain researchers, theory is indispensable and they 
use it for different types of research projects in order to meet specific objectives. 
One reason why researchers use theory with tenacity for example is because the 
general practice in the scientific community is to recognize theory as essential for 
clarifying and building scientific knowledge. It is unlike ideology, which the 
scientific community condemns as illegitimate obfuscation that is antithetical to 
science. Thus, the relationship between the word ‘theory’ and ‘data’ – which 
researchers always work with – is that in simple terms, “researchers interweave a 
story about the operation of the social world (the theory) with what they observe 
when they examine it systematically (the data)” (Neuman, 1997:37). 
 
Nugent (2003) makes the argument that concepts and theories as well as different 
methodological approaches based on them should be judged not only on their 
deficiencies but also on what they can contribute to knowledge. After all, it would 
be foolhardy to throw away the baby with the bathwater by dismissing theory off-
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hand. If an existing theory has deficiencies, the most prudent thing to do is to 
identify those deficiencies and then strive towards improving such a theory so that 
it could produce better results, that is, a better understanding of a concept or 
phenomenon being used at any given moment.  
 
Political theorists specify the objectives of the concept or phenomenon they are 
using so that these could serve as the criteria against which political action could 
be evaluated (Morrow, 1998). In fact, it should be noted that not all theories are 
complex, even to first-time users. Simple theories only have two variables, one 
dependent and one independent. Ideally it would be better to use such theories 
than the complex ones that contain more than two variables at a time with 
multiple independent, intervening, and dependent variables and thus confuse the 
reader. 
 
It is against this backdrop, therefore, that the present chapter discusses theories 
about some of the specific concepts associated with the EAC at different stages of 
its development over the years. To be sure, it would be too ambitious to think that 
the discussion of theories could be exhausted in a single chapter. The aim here is 
simply to provide a broad theoretical understanding of different concepts used in 
the dissertation, highlighting the ways in which various scholars have used each 
concept in the field and how such a concept is used in the present study. The 
concepts to which the present chapter will pay particular attention are the 
following:  
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(i) Integration  
(ii) Regionalism 
(iii) Community  
(iv) Nationalism and 
(v) Sub-nationalisms         
 
2.1 Integration 
In a very broad sense, the term ‘integration’ refers to the process of bringing 
together different elements or institutions for a particular purpose. Integration is 
driven by specific aims and objectives of all the stakeholders involved. This could 
be a temporal or permanent arrangement depending on whether the aim is short-
term or long-term. In other words, institutions (political, economic etc) do not just 
integrate unless there is a driving motive behind such integration. Before even 
contemplating the idea, there must be something they hope to achieve by 
embarking on this process. In that context, we talk about the utilitarian function of 
integration. Sometimes global, regional and domestic factors determine the 
sustainability of regional integration projects (Pere, 2004:103). 
 
When discussing this concept, there is a general tendency among scholars to talk 
about economic and political integration either as separate entities or as two 
phases in the chronology. According to economic integration theory, there are 
four distinct stages in the movement towards full economic integration as the 
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ultimate end. These are: the agreement among prospective members to set up a 
Free Trade Area (FTA), the move towards a Customs Union (CU), the 
establishment of a Common Market (CM) and the eventual creation of a full 
Economic Union (EU) (Marsh and Mackenstein, 2005: 28-29). 
 
In essence, according to the economic theory, integration is not an event as such 
but a process. For example, the European Union (EU) started as the European 
Economic Community (EEC). Its primary aim was to create a Common Market in 
Europe, but its overall aim was to move towards a closer union amongst different 
member states. That aim was achieved a few years later when the current EU was 
established. This shows that the process of integration could sometimes be long 
and tedious. It usually depends on the understanding and political will of all the 
parties involved. As shall be seen in the next chapter, in the case of East Africa, 
attempts to integrate East African territories took a very long time; it started in the 
1920s, during the inter-war period, but the EAHC only came into being after the 
Second World War on 1 January 1948. The EAC was not officially inaugurated 
until 1 December 1967. In both instances the delay was caused in large part by 
lack of a political will amongst different constituencies. 
 
The question could be phrased as follows: what is the relationship between 
economic integration and political integration? One of the international theories 
on integration states that economic integration is, in fact, a precursor to political 
integration. In other words, even if a region wants to form a political unit, it starts 
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by forming an economic unit before proceeding to establish a political unit. It was 
in line with this theory that the EEC followed the political ambition for political 
integration through economic integration. The same thinking determined the route 
East African politicians could follow in their quest for integration in that region. 
They had to strive for other forms of integration (including economic integration) 
before the envisaged political integration of East African states as the ultimate 
goal could be achieved. It follows from this theory that political integration is 
more difficult to achieve than economic integration, hence this chronology. As 
other theorists state, “close political co-operation comes in at a rather late stage in 
the integration process” (Ofstand et al, 1986:115). 
  
When it comes to East Africa, both the British and East African politicians had 
specific aims in mind for proposing that the three countries of Kenya, Uganda and 
Tanzania be integrated. To a large extent, the British promoted integration in East 
Africa mainly for economic and administrative purposes. They wanted to 
facilitate easy administration in the region and to ensure that the economies of 
these countries were linked. The actions of the East African leadership on the 
other hand were driven primarily by the political motive, although the economic 
motive was also there. They believed that integration was the best means through 
which they could get rid of Britain and run their affairs as East Africans. It should 
be mentioned that although the main driving force was politics, the economic 
factor also played a pivotal role in that the East African leadership wanted to 
 34
consolidate their regional economies so that they could compete better in the 
international markets while at the same time making Britain dispensable.  
 
In this context, a combination of economic and political factors necessitated the 
integration of the three East African territories. As argued in the last chapter of 
this dissertation, the same factors contributed to the resurrection of the current 
EAC in 2001. The phrase ‘regional integration’ in this study refers to the 
integration of the East African region. Although the ultimate goal was to have 
political regional integration, East Africans, like all other regions in Africa and 
abroad, started by focusing on economic regional integration.  
 
2.2. Regionalism 
In its broader sense, regionalism covers quite a significant number of phenomena 
to be useful as an analytical tool and therefore needs to be broken down into 
specific categories (Hettne and Söderbaum, 1998). But despite this weakness, 
regionalism is still one of the key concepts in understanding inter-state and inter-
regional relations, not only in Africa but globally. The intensification of these 
relations is referred to as regionalisation, which is said to lie somewhere between 
globalization and localization (Love, 2005). Regionalism and regionalisation 
interact with other processes such as globalisation, nation-/state-building and 
disintegration (Söderbaum, 1998). Regionalism “cannot be understood as a 
distinct alternative to national interest and nationalism, but is often better 
explained as an instrument to supplement, enhance or protect the role of the state 
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and the power of the government in an interdependent world” (Hettne and 
Söderbaum, 1998:9). 
 
Theorists perceive regionalism as a cognitive or state-centric project and see 
regionalization as a process that needs to be followed in order to successfully 
complete the project of regionalism (Grant and Söderbaum, 2003). These theorists 
usually argue that regionalization is not an incentive to the disappearance of 
existing boundary-lines or network of trans-state. Instead, it contributes to their 
formal preservation. It is also argued that regionalization entails the creation of a 
regional system or network in a specific geographical area or regional social 
space, either issue-specific or more general in scope. As a matter of principle, 
authors argue that there is no single model of regionalism, nor one predominant 
theoretical framework for the analysis of this concept (regionalism). This 
trajectory is premised on the understanding that regionalism is perceived in three 
senses or at least operates at three levels: 
 
a) It can be seen as a mechanism through which states and other groupings  
attempt to manage their involvement in the international arena. 
b) At another level, it can be seen as a means by which authority is 
transferred away from states and other groupings to regional bodies that 
are perceived to be better able to manage the problems that confront them.  
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c) Lastly, regionalism appears either as a contributor or an obstacle to world 
order and the management of the changing international arena (Smith, 
2001:71). 
 
Implicit in the third level is the view that regionalism could be perceived as a 
building block or a stumbling block to world order depending on the prevailing 
circumstances at each moment and place. Similarly, it could be seen both as a 
force for integration and also as a force for disintegration in international politics. 
Regionalism could promote and dissolve statehood depending on how it is used. 
As a result of these different levels of operation, regionalism is sometimes seen as 
a unitary force and sometimes it is perceived as a divisive factor. In this context, 
some scholars define this concept as “the awareness of togetherness among a 
people of a relatively large area within a state” (Jackson and Jackson, 1997:37). 
Others argue that it “refers specifically to the idea, ideology, policies and goals 
that seek to transform a geographical area into a clearly identified social space” 
(Grant and Söderbaum, 2003:22). It is due to these reasons that regionalism is said 
to be both divisive and uniting in its operation. 
 
What makes regionalism divisive is that it removes one area from the rest of the 
state and tries to develop it separately from the core – in this case, the state. 
However, it is uniting in the sense that the part that has been removed from the 
rest of the different units that form a political entity such as the state is kept intact 
as a single unit. Here, regionalism encourages the inhabitants of a particular 
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territory to demand a change in the political, economic and cultural relations 
between their region and the central powers within the larger state in which they 
are located. This was the case in Nigeria in the mid-1960s, an incident that 
culminated in the Biafran War of 1967. Here, different regions wanted to develop 
independently from the central government. The kind of regionalism they 
promoted was the divisive one but as a unit, they perceived themselves to be 
propagating the unitary form of regionalism. 
 
Other authors see regionalism as a generic term. They argue that in a narrow 
operational sense the term represents the body of ideas, values and concrete 
objectives that are aimed at transforming a geographical area into a clearly 
identified regional social space. They see it as an urge by any set of actors to re-
organize along regional lines in any given issue or area (Grant and Söderbaum, 
2003:7). The fact that regionalism is a generic term means that it might be open to 
abuse by leaders who want to pursue their own political agendas.   
 
Existing theories of regionalism show that it has a history and has been more 
dominant at certain times and places than in others. When it seemed to have 
disappeared from the public eye a few decades ago, it miraculously re-emerged at 
a later date due to a number of factors.4 Grant and Söderbaum (2003) state that 
regionalism is by no means a new phenomenon. They argue that cross-national 
and cross-community interactions as well as interdependencies have existed as far 
back as the earliest historical recordings. For White, Little and Smith (2001), 
                                                 
4 Some of these factors are discussed later in this section. 
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regionalism has been the focus of study and political action since the beginning of 
the twentieth century. In discussing the history of regionalism, scholars tap into 
the agents of this concept and build their arguments around that. For example, 
there is a view that nineteenth-century imperialism and white settler governance 
both forged regional coherence among formerly demarcated colonies in Africa, 
focusing more particularly on the political and economic domains (Love, 
2005:45). This is true. As shall be seen in chapter 3 of this dissertation, the idea of 
uniting East African colonies and dependencies in East Africa first came from 
British authorities, not the East African leadership. It was part of the overall 
British colonial plan about its Empire, according to which the colonies had to be 
brought together to ensure easy administration. 
 
Even in the broader African context, the unitary version of regionalism is not 
new. As discussed in the next chapter of this dissertation, attempts to unite East 
Africa started in the 1920s although East Africans only fully embraced the idea 
after the EAHC had been established in 1948. In West Africa, a number of 
regional integration initiatives were tried at different moments although for a long 
time these initiatives generally tended to be the exclusive affairs of competing, 
self-interested European styled states founded by colonial powers. From the 
1960s to the late 1980s, their regional organizations promoted collective self-
reliance in economic development, especially in the area of industrialization 
(Iheduru, 2003). 
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There are scholars of regionalism who discuss it by looking at the reasons for the 
establishment of regional organizations. Simon (2003) for example, argues that 
the original impetus to the formation of regional trading blocks after the Second 
World War derived from a mixture of economic and political-security issues 
framed by cold war rhetoric and strategic concerns. He argues that this form of 
regionalism was very state-centric; it was driven by and focused overwhelmingly 
on official inter-state relations and mechanisms for channeling private investment 
and trade.    
 
For unexplained reasons, regionalism seems to have lost its fame over the years. 
However, it made a resurgence in the 1990s. This was due in part to the fact that it 
is often linked strongly with regional organizations and institutions. As old 
regional organizations re-surfaced and new ones emerged, regionalism received 
new impetus around this time. But one of the main reasons for the notable surge 
of interest and activity in regionalism was the envisaged possibility of regional 
co-operation and institution-building. This was influenced by both local (African) 
and global developments. For example, there was an increased tendency in the 
global scene to search for some mechanisms of co-operation in the political and 
security fields with the hope of maintaining world peace. Another reason that is 
cited for this upsurge of interest in regions and regionalism in the 1990s is the fall 
of Russia as a super-power, the collapse of socialism and the emergence of many 
new states and new potential focuses for conflict and co-operation. All these 
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factors combined to make regionalism relevant once again. The revival of the 
EAC in 2001 should there fore be understood in this broader context. 
 
As a result of these new developments, Grant and Söderbaum noted that the study 
of regionalism and its many facets is enjoying a renaissance of sorts within the 
larger, overlapping context of international relations (IR) and international 
political economy (IPE). These authors maintain that in the past the theoretical 
orthodoxy when discussing regionalism has tended to focus on formal and inter-
state regional frameworks in Europe and, more recently, on North America and 
Asia-Pacific. According to their observation Africa has, to a very large extent, 
been neglected in the general debate on this concept. According to mainstream 
perspectives this is due to the fact that regionalism in Africa is still primitive and 
is characterized mainly by failed or weak regional organizations as well as a 
superficial degree of regional economic integration.  
 
Theorists have coined the phrase ‘new regionalism’ as a theory-building strategy 
in order to distinguish between old and new regionalism. They perceive new 
regionalism as a phenomenon still in the making and argue that it emerged in the 
mid-1980s. They contrast it with old regionalism that began in the 1950s and 
faded away in the 1970s (Hettne and Söderbaum, 1998). But the phrase “new 
regionalism” is problematic because even though differences exist between old 
and new regionalism, there are often strong continuities and similarities between 
these two forms of regionalism. This makes the distinction artificial and almost 
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irrelevant. One argument states that regions anywhere in the world are not formed 
in a vacuum; they are influenced by a wide range of factors, both local and global. 
In that sense, new regionalism theories are obliged to acknowledge the external 
dimension and the existing close relationship between globalization and 
regionalism. In other words, global developments have a direct impact on what 
happens in a region. This has been the case in the past and is still the case today – 
it is a reality that is hard to refute. 
 
In the case of East Africa, the ‘new regionalism’ that emerged in the 1990s only 
has relevance to the new EAC. As hinted above, the first EAC emerged under a 
different context; it was largely a product of the colonial legacy and was proposed 
by the British, not the East African leadership. In the broader African context, 
regional economic bodies failed to survive in the past. But what is important is 
not the fact that they failed but the fact that they ever existed in the first place. 
This shows that regionalism is not a new phenomenon in independent Africa, or 
even more particularly in East Africa. Sustaining current regional bodies like the 
EAC depends on understanding the factors that led to the disintegration of earlier 
regional organizations. That is the educative role of history in any given society. 
 
The question that arises is the following: is regionalism, in its broad sense, a good 
or a bad thing? To be sure, there is no single answer to this question. The reason 
is that regionalism has its own advantages but also has some challenges. For 
example, there is a view that regions and regionalism can act as a ‘lens’ through 
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which central issues of world politics are retracted and given particular shape. 
Another argument in favor of regionalism is that it contributes to the broader 
development of global order, and in the economic sense that it can be seen as a 
reflection of globalization  (Smith, 2003). The argument here is that by entering 
into regional agreements and organizations, states may be in a better position to 
achieve their national objectives – be it on prosperity or security.  
 
Theorists argue that regionalism manifests itself in different spheres of life 
including: economic, cultural, military, environmental and political domains. 
This, in part, provides the reason(s) why different countries form regional bodies. 
Bennet and Oliver (2002:237-238) provide the following reasons why regional 
organizations are formed:  
 
• There is a natural tendency towards regionalism based on the homogeneity 
of interests, traditions, and values within small groups of neighbouring 
states; 
• Political, economic, and social integration is more easily attained among a 
lesser number of states within a limited geographic area than on a global 
basis; 
• Regional economic co-operation provides more efficient economic units 
than smaller states and these larger units can compete successfully in 
world markets; 
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• Local threats to peace are more willingly and promptly dealt with by the 
governments of that area than by disinterested states at greater distances 
from the scene of conflict; 
• By combining states into regional groupings, a global balance of power 
will be maintained and world peace and security will be promoted; 
• Regionalism is the first step in gaining experience and building areas of 
consensus toward eventual intergovernmental coordination or integration; 
and 
• Universalists fail to take into account the heterogeneity of political, 
economic, social, and geographical factors throughout the world that 
militate against global unity. These differences can be more easily 
accommodated within a regional framework. 
 
Most of the points made here are relevant to the East African case study. For 
example, East African countries perceived themselves as a homogeneous 
geographical entity. The fact that they all used kiSwahili as a language of 
communication gave more impetus to the perceived homogeneity in the region. 
Point two above is also applicable to East Africa in that one of the reasons why 
the East African leadership wanted to bring their region together was because of 
their weak economies. They hoped that by integrating their national economies 
they would compete better in the global market if they moved forward as a region, 
not national compartments. Most importantly, when the East African leadership 
formed the first EAC, they argued that they were not opposed to the idea of a 
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united Africa propagated by nationalist leaders like Kwame Nkrumah. Their 
argument was that as a regional organization, the EAC was, in fact, a contribution 
to the broad idea of a united Africa. They continuously and assiduously argued 
that regional organizations in Africa had to precede continental unity because the 
latter could not just emerge from nowhere. As far as they were concerned, it 
would be easier for different regions to come together to form the envisaged 
continental body than simply expecting national states to surrender their 
sovereignty to a bigger body. The logic behind this argument was that national 
governments had to first get used to the idea of operating within a body whose 
jurisdiction goes beyond national boundaries before forming part of African 
Unity.     
 
However, theorists of regionalism argue that this concept has many challenges, 
which are then perceived to be its disadvantages. Some theorists emphasize this 
side of regionalism. For example, they argue that the processes of co-operation 
and integration are easier to carry out at the regional level but that regional 
conflicts can sometimes have a peculiar intensity and violence than a broader one. 
Another argument is that there are also instances when regionalism acts against 
globalization. According to this view, regional groupings do not always operate in 
a broad sense, they can become introspective and protectionist in their leanings, 
closing themselves off from the world economy. This view leads to the argument 
that: “perhaps the most significant problem posed by regionalism in world politics 
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centers on the linkage between intra-regional relations and the broader world 
arena” (Smith, 2003:62). 
 
According to Bennet and Oliver (2002:238), universalists challenge regionalists 
and attack regionalism on the basis of the following: 
 
• World interdependence has created an increasing number of problems that 
require global solutions. Political, economic, and social problems reach 
across regional boundaries; 
• Regional resources are often inadequate to resolve the problems of states 
within the region; 
• Since peace is indivisible only a world organization can deal effectively 
with threats to the peace that may, if unchecked, spread beyond local or 
regional limits; 
• Only a universal organization can provide an adequate check on the power 
of a large state that can often dominate the other members of a regional 
arrangement; 
• Sanctions against an aggressor are usually ineffective if applied on a 
regional basis because of sources of aid to the aggressor from outside the 
region; 
• Regions are imprecise and impermanent. No agreement can be reached on 
a system of regions into which the globe can be conveniently divided; 
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• Regional alliances provide the basis for rivalries and competition for 
military supremacy among regions leading to greater possibilities for 
major wars; and 
• The existence of numerous, moderately successful universal organizations 
demonstrates the desire of governments and peoples to co-operate on a 
global basis without the necessity of first using regional organizations as 
laboratories for gradually developing enlarged areas of consensus or 
community. 
 
The fact that each individual country has a responsibility to address the needs of 
its people while at the same time upholding the norms of the regional body to 
which it belongs means that there is a constant tension between the demands of 
statehood and the pressures for collective (regional) action. This tension manifests 
itself in different ways and creates three sets of problems: the problem of inter-
regional relations; the problem of relations between regionalism and globalism; 
and the problem of relations between regional orders and world order.  
 
When the EAC was established at the end of 1967 it was not immune to these 
challenges. According to current indicators, the newly revived EAC is also not 
totally immune to these challenges – except that the current leadership in East 
Africa is new and the political environment under which the present EAC is 
operating is a bit different from that of the 1960s and 70s. These factors have 
reconfigured the context thus making it slightly different from the one that 
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preceded it. But there is no doubt that regionalism remains an important issue now 
as it was some few decades ago. Smith shares the same view: “Inter-regional 
competition and collaboration between regions was an important dynamic in the 
world politics of the 1990s, and remain one into the new millennium” (Smith, 
2003:65). Therefore, regionalism remains a key concept in modern African 
politics as much as it was a few decades ago. It is in this context that a study on 
the EAC remains so relevant for a general historical understanding and in 
preparation for the continent’s future.          
 
2.3. Community 
Implicit in the concept ‘community’ is the idea of togetherness. Theorists of this 
concept usually associate it with another concept, ‘nation’, arguing that a nation is 
a deep, horizontal comradeship – an imagined community. This is because both 
concepts instill a sense of belonging, a sense of togetherness premised on shared 
values and practices. Theorists see a nation as being primarily a community, that 
is, a definite community of people living in a specific geographical area that 
separates them from other communities. They argue that in a world divided into 
particular communities, the general practice is that national identity tends to be 
associated and confounded with a community’s sense of uniqueness and the 
qualities that contribute to it (Greenfeld, 1979. Cited in Hutchinson and Smith, 
1994:166).  
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A community is assumed to have its own mode of thought which makes it distinct 
from others. Communities are generally thought to possess common cultures. 
Integration within a culture is perceived to be a prerequisite for any meaningful 
conception of what could be referred to as moral autonomy. Language is 
considered to be the property of that community because anyone who speaks such 
a language is automatically associated with that community and is accepted as one 
of its members. Similarly, dress, architecture, customs, ceremonial songs and law 
distinguish one community from the other thus making each of them distinct. 
 
In a way, ‘community’ is an abstract concept. It is arguably the sum total of the 
modes of expression listed above. The irony is that although the community is 
associated with togetherness, not all members of a given community know one 
another and yet they still perceive themselves as a single entity. Bennedict 
Anderson (1991), one of the widely quoted scholars on community and 
nationalism, talks about an “imagined community”. This stems from the fact that 
even if people do not necessarily live together or know one another, as long as 
they share the practices mentioned above they see or imagine themselves as a 
community.  
 
Therefore, “all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact 
(and perhaps even these) are falsity, they are imagined” (Anderson, 1991:6). 
Anderson makes the example that Javanese villagers have always known that they 
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are connected to people they never saw but they imagined themselves as one 
community with those people based on the practices they shared. 
 
Anderson draws a distinction between classical and modern communities. He 
argues that classical communities conceived of themselves as cosmically central 
through the medium of a sacred language, which was linked to an order of power. 
Unlike modern imagined communities, they had confidence in the unique sacred 
language which determined who was admitted into the community and who was 
left out. In a way, communities generally unite and divide people at the same time 
– depending on whether one is considered to be part of that community or not. 
Theorists of community argue that there are different types of communities and 
that each type is determined by one of the three factors: 
 
• The purpose for which the community has been established and the aspect 
of life it aims to focus on as its first priority. This type includes the 
following: religious communities, economic communities, political 
communities, cultural communities and religio-political communities. 
• The scope of their operation. Here we can mention territorial communities, 
national communities and regional communities. Each of these differs 
from the rest with regard to its scope. 
• The period in which a community was established. This group includes: 
historical or traditional communities (sometimes communities of 
biological descent form part of this group) and modern communities. 
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Although these are presented as different types of communities, there is in fact a 
relationship that exists amongst them. For example, a political community can be 
forced to start by working within a specific territorial homeland and then operate 
at a regional level at a later stage when the situation allows it to do so. Moreover, 
as mentioned earlier in this chapter, an economic community could be a precursor 
to a political community. With regards to the religious community, it could 
operate at the territorial, national and regional levels at the same time or move 
from one level to the next as it expands. The imagined religious community that 
Anderson talks about was determined by the pilgrimage people made. All those 
who made a pilgrimage to a particular place of religious importance automatically 
perceived themselves and were perceived by others as constituting a distinct 
religious community.  
 
In that context, we could add to the list of communities mentioned above a 
continental and an inter-continental community because people who make a 
pilgrimage to a religious site do not necessarily come from one country but from 
different parts of the world. The Muslims who make a pilgrimage to Mecca is one 
good example of a religious community. The bottom line here is that one type of 
community has a potential to change into another both in terms of scope and 
focus. Hechter and Levi (1979. Cited by Hutchinson and Smith, 1994:190) wrote: 
 
The preservation of rituals from the past promotes a sense of community 
not only for people whose social structural roles make them feel marginal 
within society as a whole, but also for those who wish to change the 
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allocation of societal resources. This sense of community can 
consequently become the basis for collective action of a political sort. 
 
The decision by the leaders from Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania to establish the 
EAC was premised on the general understanding that they together constituted a 
community, an East African community. This perception was based on a number 
of factors, the most important of which was their geographical location – all three 
countries share political borders and are all linked to Lake Victoria. The fact that 
they all speak kiSwahili made their case for a community even stronger. In other 
words, as far as East African politicians were concerned, establishing the EAC 
was simply a matter of making official a community that already existed 
naturally. But as discussed later in this dissertation the idea of an encompassing 
EAC was put into question when nationalism took center-stage.            
 
2.4. Nationalism 
Nationalism has played a more prominent role over the years in shaping the face 
of the modern world than any other doctrine one can think of. As a result, it would 
be difficult to come up with a general theory of nationalism since there is no 
shortage of theories of this concept in the literature. In the same vain, a universal 
definition of nationalism is not possible although people may have a common 
understanding of some of the characteristic features of a ‘nation’, the term 
associated with nationalism. Hobsbaum (1990) argues that nationalism comes 
before nations and that nations do not make states and nationalism but the other 
way round. Hobsbaum’s view (1990:9) that “concepts, of course, are not part of 
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free-floating philosophical discourse, but socially, historically and locally rooted, 
and must be explained in terms of these realities” reduces the chances of ever 
formulating a standard definition of nationalism even further.  
 
However, this is not to say the battle for defining and theorizing nationalism has 
been totally lost in academia. There are different versions of the definition and 
theories of this term. Attempts will always be made both to define and theorize 
this concept for different reasons, in different times, different contexts as well as 
different places. This is what the scholars of nationalism such as Gellner (1983), 
Hobsbaum (1990), Hutchinson and Smith (1994), Ozkirimli (2000), Said (2001), 
White and Little (2001) and many others have been doing over the years and 
some still continue to do so today. They do not necessarily have to agree on 
everything as far as this concept is concerned. However, they share a few broad 
ideas about nationalism and moving from that they come up with their individual 
definitions and theories.   
 
Gellner (1983:1) sees nationalism as “a theory of political legitimacy which 
requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones.” In his view, 
nationalism is first and foremost a political principle which holds that the political 
and the national unit should be congruent. This is not the view to which all 
theorists of nationalism subscribe. According to Jackson and Jackson (1997:36) 
the term nationalism in its modern sense is defined as “the collective action of a 
politically conscious group or nation in pursuit of increased territorial autonomy 
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or sovereignty.” This conception of nationalism is applicable to the present case 
study of East Africa in that East African politicians wanted to have territorial 
autonomy.  
 
The three East African countries of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania did not establish 
the EAC by default. They took a conscious decision to pursue increased territorial 
autonomy and sovereignty from British domination. That is why they resolved to 
embrace the idea of regional integration in the 1950s and 1960s – something they 
had vehemently opposed for many decades. They were well aware of the fact that 
nationalism has, in the past, been successfully used to justify economic expansion, 
protectionism and imperialism; to espouse supremacy of certain nations and/or 
peoples; and to justify the quest for emancipation from colonial rule. In other 
words, they acknowledged the fact that nationalism is not just a neutral term but 
can sometimes be perceived to be the highest form of allegiance, above church, 
class, tribe, or any other social group in society to the extent that some people 
could even be prepared to sacrifice their lives defending it. 
 
There is general consensus amongst theorists of nationalism that national feeling 
and the very idea of nationalism is basically a European invention and that the 
history of nationalism is relatively new; dating back to only about two centuries 
ago. According to this view, nationalism as an ideology and discourse became 
prevalent in North America and Western Europe in the latter half of the 
eighteenth century. In Europe, there was a conjunction of national identity 
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discourse with imperialism. As a result thereof, there was a very elaborate set of 
distinctions between Europeans and those referred to as Negroes, and between 
Europeans and Semites (Said, 2001). Shortly thereafter, nationalism then emerged 
in Latin America. However, the concept was not taken seriously by the social 
scientists immediately after its emergence in world politics. In line with this view, 
Hutchinson and Smith (1994:3) maintain: 
As an ideology and movement, nationalism exerted a strong influence in 
the American and French Revolutions, yet it did not become the subject of 
historical enquiry until the middle of the nineteenth century, nor of social 
scientific analysis until the early twentieth century. Sustained investigation 
of nationalism had to wait until after the First World War, and it is really 
only since the 1960s, after the spate of anti-colonial and ethnic 
nationalisms, that the subject has begun to be thoroughly investigated by 
scholars from several disciplines. 
 
Theorists argue that it was the injection of racism that brought nationalism to its 
mid-twentieth-century apogee. Authors such as Hobsbaum (1990) hold the view 
that nationalism underwent changes and transformations towards the end of the 
nineteenth century. He argues for example that the nationalism of 1880-1914 
differed from that of the previous years in three respects: (i) it abandoned the 
‘threshold principle,’ which was central during the liberal era. From that time 
onwards, all the people considering themselves as ‘a nation’ claimed the right to 
self-determination, which meant the right to a separate sovereign independent 
state for their territory; (ii) as a result of this change, ethnicity and language then 
became central, increasingly the decisive or even the only criteria of potential 
nationhood; and (iii) a sharp shift to the political right of nations and flag for 
which the term ‘nationalism’ was actually invented in the last decades of the 
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nineteenth century. To illustrate his point about the shift in the conceptualization 
of nationalism, Hobsbaum stated that in Ireland the number of ‘national’ or 
‘nationalist, newspapers rose from one in 1871 through 13 in 1881 to 33 in 1891.  
 
For much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries liberals and Marxists alike 
regarded nationalism as just a passing phase. According to this trajectory, it was 
only in the 1920s and 1930s that nationalism became a subject of sustained 
academic inquiry. Ozkirimli (2000) presents four stages, which, in his view, 
nationalism passed through. These are: 
 
(i) The eighteenth and nineteenth-centuries when the idea of nationalism was 
born; 
(ii) The years 1918-1945 when nationalism became a subject of economic 
inquiry;  
(iii) The period from 1945 to the 1980s when the debate on nationalism 
became more diversified with the participation of sociologists and political 
scientists; and  
(iv) The late 1980s to the present whereby there are now different attempts to 
transcend the classical debate and propose new dimensions in addressing 
this concept.  
 
There is a view that by 1914 mass nationalism triumphed against class-based 
socialism in world politics (Hobsbaum, 2000). As far as this view is concerned, 
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the years 1918 to 1950 marked the apogee or the climax of nationalism. It argues 
that few Third World anti-imperial ‘national’ movements coincided with a 
political or ethnic entity, which pre-dates the coming of the imperialists to these 
Third World countries. Thus, the development of nationalism in the nineteenth-
century European sense of the word occurred largely since de-colonization, that 
is, mainly since the end of the Second World War in 1945. After this period, 
colonial subjects rose against their colonial masters and demanded freedom. The 
independence of India in 1947 and the subsequent independence of many African 
states in the 1960s saw an unprecedented upsurge of nationalism.  
 
According to Ozkirimli, the 1980s marked a turning point in the whole history of 
nationalism in part because it was during this time that the debate on nationalism 
completed its adolescence. A new stage in theoretical debate started. He argues 
that during this period, the theories of nationalism became more sophisticated 
than had been the case before and then accounts for this change as follows: “The 
rise of new theories was precipitated by a more general transformation in social 
sciences, which in turn reflected the developments in the real world, notably the 
rise of a women’s movement, the writing of alternative histories which deny the 
homogeneity of national cultures and the changing nature of Western societies as 
a result of increasing migration” (Ozkirimli, 2000:191). 
 
The point about gender is that during this time, gender-blind, Eurocentric 
character of the mainstream literature was suddenly criticized. There was more 
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emphasis put on internal (within nations) and external (among nations) hierarchies 
of power. Moreover, the interaction of the studies of nationalism with such 
developing fields as migration, race, multiculturalism, diasporas and the like 
increased significantly. For the first time special emphasis was now put on the 
inter-disciplinary nature of nationalism as a subject of investigation (Smith, 1998: 
xiii). During this time, feminist scholars tried all they could to bring to an end the 
conspicuous marginalization of women in the discussions on nationalism and in 
society in general. They called for the creation of an inclusive society. Therefore, 
it would be fair to argue that one of the key changes that took place in the 
development of nationalism at this time was that various social groups were 
brought on board in nationalist projects. This marked a departure from past 
practices.   
 
Snyder (1954) presented a rather slightly different chronological typology of 
nationalism. Not only did he provide the dates when certain developments took 
place as far as nationalism was concerned, he also described the nature of 
nationalism that operated during each period. In the end, he came up with the 
following phases: 
 
1. Integrative nationalism (1815-1871) when nationalism was a unifying force 
that helped to consolidate states. 
2. Disruptive nationalism (1871-1890) whereby the success of nationalism in 
uniting Germany and Italy aroused the enthusiasm of subject or oppressed 
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nationalities in other countries of the world (minorities in the Ottoman Empire 
and Austria-Hungary as well as other conglomerate states) to sought to break 
out of their oppression. 
3. Aggressive nationalism (1900-1945), which was marked by the collision of 
opposing national interests and the explosive impact of the Second World 
War.  
4. Contemporary nationalism (1945 to-date) whereby nationalism has extended 
to a global framework. 
 
What is common between this and the previous typology is the fact that they both 
do not see nationalism as static; they demonstrate that it changed over time. Both 
typologies provide dates that serve as signpost in the development of nationalism, 
in other words showing when certain changes took place. Hayes (1955) presented 
his own typology but did not provide consistent dates when certain changes took 
place in the development of nationalism. Instead, he argued that there were six 
forms of nationalism that existed at different historical moments: 
 
1. Humanitarian nationalism, whose doctrines were based on natural law and 
was presented as inevitable and therefore a desirable step in human progress. 
2. Jacobin nationalism, which was based in theory on the humanitarian 
democratic nationalism of Rousseau. He argues that this form of nationalism 
was developed to safeguard and extend the principles of the French 
Revolution. 
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3. Traditional nationalism, which was aristocratic and evolutionary. The 
proponents of this form of nationalism focused on history and tradition, not 
‘reason’ or ‘revolution’. 
4. Liberal nationalism. This one fell somewhere between Jacobin and traditional 
forms of nationalism. 
5. Integral nationalism, which was characterized by its hostility towards the 
internationalism of humanitarians and liberals. It put national interest above 
individual interests and those of humanity, refusing co-operation with other 
nations. 
6. Economic nationalism behind which political considerations initially lay, but 
then a tendency developed to regard the state as an economic as well as a 
political unit. In fact, Hayes maintains that economic nationalism merged with 
imperialism and became one of the driving forces of contemporary history.  
 
This is a fascinating chronology in that it presents different forms of nationalism. 
But like the ones mentioned before, it also maintains that nationalism has never 
been a static concept; it has been changing over the years. 
 
Gellner (1983) did not focus on nationalism and its typology per se, but confined 
himself to the phases associated with the development of national movements. He 
presented the following phases: 
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1. During the nineteenth century Europe was purely cultural, literary and 
folkloric with no particular political or national implications. 
2. A body of pioneers and militants of ‘the national idea’ and the beginnings of 
political campaigning for this idea emerged. 
3. Nationalist programs acquired mass support, or at least some of the mass 
support that nationalists always claim they represent. 
 
Gellner argued that the transition from phase B to C was a very crucial moment in 
the chronology and the rise of national movements since more people got 
involved and the conception of nationalism was, in a way, reconfigured. 
 
The theories of nationalism discussed thus far are intriguing in many ways. Not 
only do they illustrate how nationalism evolved over time, they also present its 
different typologies. One of the most renowned authors who theorize on 
nationalism is Anderson (1991). He draws a link between the development of 
nationalism and two other concepts: technology and capitalism. According to 
Anderson, capitalism played a significant role in making nations popular 
especially through book publishing. According to this theory, as nations became 
popular, a sense of pride was instilled in their subjects and this promoted 
nationalism. Addressing this point and discussing nationalism in the global 
context, Anderson argues that print languages laid the bases for national 
consciousness in three very distinct ways: 
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• They created unified fields of exchange and communication below Latin 
and above spoken vernaculars. For the first time ever, people who spoke 
different versions of a language were now capable of understanding one 
another via print and paper. In the process, they gradually became aware 
of the hundreds of thousands, or millions of people in their specific 
language field and that these were the only people with whom they 
belonged together. 
• Print capitalism gave a new fixity to language, which in the long run 
helped to build that image of antiquity so central to the subjective idea of 
the nation. 
• Print capitalism created languages-of-power of a kind different from the 
older administrative vernaculars in that certain dialects dominated over 
others and thus featured in the final written form of the language. 
Members of each language group saw themselves as one. That instilled the 
idea of nationalism (Anderson, 1991:37-45). 
 
In a way, Anderson is not just imagining what might have happened in the past 
with regard to the formation of nations and the emergence of nationalism. 
Hobsbaum (1990:10) concurs that nations exist in the context of a particular stage 
of technological and economic development. He continues to say that most 
students today will agree that standard national languages – both spoken and 
written – could not emerge before printing and subsequently mass schooling. In 
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that sense the two authors concur with each other that there is a direct relationship 
between nationalism and technology. 
 
Anderson’s conception of ‘imagined national communities’ concurs with 
Hobsbaum’s (1990) argument that nationalism resides in the mind and requires 
too much belief in what is patently not so. Hutchinson and Smith, 1994:64-65) 
advance the same view: “Nationalism is not what it seems, and above all it is not 
what it seems to itself. The cultures it claims to defend and revive are often its 
own inventions, or are modified out of all recognition.” According to Smith 
(1991), nationalism is based on a number of assumptions: that the world is 
divided into nations; that the nation is the source of all political and social power 
and loyalty to the nation overrides all other allegiances; that human beings must 
identify with a nation if they want to be free and realize themselves; and that the 
nations must be free and secure if peace and justice are to prevail at all.  
 
In the theories of nationalism, the relationship between nationalism and ethnicity 
is said to be very complex because most people carry multiple identities. For 
example, if two people belong to different ethnic groups, are they one in the same 
way that people from the same ethnic group are? In other words, under 
nationalism, are certain people ‘more national’ than others? These are crucial 
questions to which there are no simple answers. 
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But the most intriguing question is the following: is nationalism a good or a bad 
thing? All theories considered, there is not single answer to this question. 
Moderate and reasonable nationalism could be judged as good, but immoderate 
and excessive nationalism is both unhealthy and dangerous because it could create 
animosity amongst people. When W.E.B. Du Bois wrote his book The Souls of 
Black Folk, he warned against indiscriminate nationalism and reverse racism, the 
insistence upon careful analysis and comprehensive understanding rather than 
either wholesale condemnation of whites or futile attempts to emulate some of 
their methods. He wrote: “In other words, awareness of nationalism from within 
the anti-imperialist camp requires that the whole matter of interpretation itself be 
raised” (Cited in Said, 2001:426). 
 
One of the disadvantages of nationalism is that it insists on imposing homogeneity 
on those populations that are unfortunate enough to fall under the sway of 
authorities possessed by the nationalist ideology. Another disadvantage is that 
most cultures as well as potential national groups enter the age of nationalism 
without even the feeblest effort to benefit from it themselves (Gellner, 1983:45).  
 
But on the positive side, nationalism is responsible for the general ordering of the 
political life of mankind. For example, in East Africa, regional nationalism 
organized different countries into a single entity. Later, sub-nationalisms united 
members of each nation against others and, in the case of Uganda, distinguished 
the people of Buganda Kingdom from those of Uganda Protectorate. In both 
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instances there was a political ordering of mankind. Gellner (1983:49) captures 
the complex nature of nationalism elegantly when he writes: “Nationalism, which 
sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and turns them into actions, sometimes 
invests them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures: that is a reality, for better 
or worse, and in general an inescapable one.” This is one of the realities about 
nationalism. 
 
2.5 Sub-nationalism 
Generally speaking, the term ‘sub-nationalism’ refers to a form of nationalism 
that is less encompassing than conventional nationalism as discussed above. It is a 
practice of uniting a smaller section of a nation so that it could develop as a 
separate entity. In other words, sub-nationalism is characterized by parochialism. 
In this dissertation, the term ‘sub-nationalism’ is used in two senses. First, the 
national consciousness of the people of Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania after 
independence is considered as sub-nationalism in the sense that it deviated from 
regional/territorial nationalism which had united the people of East Africa against 
their colonial rulers (the British). Second, the parochialism of the Kingdom of 
Buganda represents another form of sub-nationalism whereby the Kabaka of 
Buganda and some leaders from other parts of the Kingdom of Buganda did not 
perceive themselves as part of Uganda but as a separate political entity.           
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Chapter Summary 
The purpose of this chapter was to present the theoretical framework within which 
the present study is located. The chapter began by providing a justification for 
using theory in a research project and argued why theory is necessary for this 
study in particular. The chapter then went on to summarise existing theories on 
some of the key concepts used in this study as a way of presenting the broader 
context and framework within which the concepts should be understood. But most 
importantly, the chapter prepared the reader’s mind-set as far as the usage of these 
concepts in the East African case study is concerned. 
 
One of the key contributions of this chapter is that it provided the history of each 
of the concepts mentioned above. By so doing, the chapter demonstrated that each 
of the concepts has a history behind it and that this history is not static but has 
been changing over the past few decades and should be considered in the analysis 
of the EAC. The concepts defined in this chapter allude to the fact that in general, 
countries or territories come together for a specific reason or set of reasons, both 
economic and political. In the same vein (as discussed in the next chapter), the 
integration of the three East African territories of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania 
was triggered by a number of factors, which had both economic and political 
derivation. There is a direct link between the two factors in that they impact on 
each other regarding the consolidation and weakening of regional integration in 
certain regions. 
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It is worth mentioning at this juncture that although most of the key terms used in 
this dissertation have been defined above, the terminology used in official or 
correspondence documents in the East African case study is sometimes confusing 
to the reader. This confusion derives mainly from the fact that some documents 
and pronouncements by key role-players use certain terms interchangeably while 
others see those same concepts as separate entities that mean different things. For 
example, the terms: ‘closer union’, ‘integration’ and ‘federation’ are sometimes 
used interchangeably. However, in other instances the phrase ‘closer union’ is 
used to refer to the coming together of the three East African territories and then 
the other two terms refer to the type of closer union these territories would form. 
It is the latter line of thought that will be followed in this study. 
 
Another source of the confusion is the fact that at one point the East African 
leadership dreamt of establishing a single East Africa that would have one 
government and one president. But as discussions continued about closer union, 
they realized that this would be very hard to achieve. They then talked about 
‘regional co-operation’ as opposed to ‘regional integration’ or ‘federation’. As 
demonstrated in the next two chapters, when the EAC was constituted in 1967, 
more emphasis was put on regional co-operation amongst the three East African 
governments. However, there was a general agreement that there would be an 
integration of regional services in different fields. It was in this context that the 
idea of the Federal University of East Africa was conceived. The aim was to have 
regional integration in higher education. The EAC would then promote both 
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economic and, later, political integration. It was envisaged that integration in all 
three areas (economy, education and politics) would ensure complete unity in the 
East African region. 
 
The next two chapters specifically discuss the politics behind the history of 
regional integration in East Africa from the 1920s up to 1967 when the EAC was 
officially constituted. The chapters consider the role played by both whites and 
(East) Africans in this regard as a demonstration that agency in the rise of the 
EAC cannot be attributed solely to one racial group. 
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CHAPTER 3 
The EAC: Historical Background, 1924-1948 
 
0. Introduction 
There is an acknowledgement by different scholars that each and every era in 
history confronts its distinctive social and political dramas, which distinguish it 
from other eras (Inkeles and Smith, 1974). In East Africa, the period from the 
1920s to 1948 was full of its own dramas, the most important of which was the 
beginning of a long and tedious journey that would lead to the establishment of 
the EAHC in January 1948. But as stated in the introductory chapter above, this 
was not the first time that East African territories worked together under colonial 
rule. Territorial co-operation has deep roots in East Africa that date back to the 
advent of colonialism (Conover, 1960, Banfield, 1963). Before the onset of the 
colonial rule, East Africa was largely both politically and economically divided 
(Lonsdale, 1999). However, with the advent of colonialism some uncoordinated 
attempts were made to bring the territories of this region closer to one another.  
 
When Britain took over the administration of East Africa in the mid-1890s, the 
idea of a united East Africa was conceived. Kiano (1959:13) wrote:  
The federation of the East African territories of Kenya, Uganda and 
Tanganyika with the possible inclusion of the Central African territories of 
the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, has for many years been a goal constantly 
sought by the white settlers of these regions and the British Colonial 
Office.  
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British authorities wanted to bring the different East African territories into a 
single political unit to ensure easy administration. They felt that East African 
territories could benefit greatly from continuing and regular contact with one 
another and from the common administration of certain services than would have 
been the case if they continued operating as separate entities (Banfield, 1963; 
Report of the Commission on Closer Union of the Dependencies in Eastern and 
Central Africa, 1929).  In fact, writing in ‘The Rise of Our East African Empire’ 
as far back as 1898, Lord Lugard assumed that the entire East African region 
would be treated as a single unit (cited in Hughes, 1963:213). He subsequently 
proposed that a Governor should be appointed for East Africa and be stationed in 
Nairobi. According to his plan Commissioners would then be appointed in 
Uganda and Zanzibar.  
 
In 1899 Sir Harry Johnson was appointed as a Special Commissioner to Uganda. 
He left England with the instruction that he should bear in mind the possibility of 
amalgamating the East African territories. When he returned to Britain in 1901 he 
told his superiors that having been to East Africa, he was totally convinced that 
not only Uganda or the two East African Protectorates of Uganda and Kenya but 
also Zanzibar and British Somaliland had to be placed under one administration 
(Legum, 1967). In his proposed administrative structure there would be a capital 
with a central Supreme Court as well as military and administrative headquarters 
sited in the highlands (in Kenya). Moreover, there would be a single budgetary 
control for the whole East African region. 
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Sir Harry Johnson’s successors found his vision interesting and reasonable both in 
the economic and political sense. Therefore, when Sir Charles Elliot retired as 
Commissioner for the East African Protectorate in 1905 he wrote that it was 
generally agreed that it would be advisable to amalgamate the two Protectorates, 
“and if this is to be done it certainly should be done soon, for the longer they 
remain apart the more they tend to become different in administrative systems and 
regulations” (cited in Hughes, 1963:214). In line with this thought, a Customs 
Union comprising Uganda and Kenya was established in 1917 with the aim of 
bringing a semblance of synergy in the regional economies (Tanganyika joined 
this Union in 1927).  
 
By the time the Treaty of Paris was signed in 1919 officially ending the First 
World War, nothing tangible had been achieved yet. However, discussions were 
continuing at different levels and serious thinking was going on in the minds of 
different individuals who had vested interests in a federation project that would 
ease administration by bringing together three administrative offices in Kenya, 
Uganda and Tanganyika. This project was also deemed to have great economic 
advantages in two ways. First, if the plan materialized, the British government 
would then pay one administrator instead of three. Second, it was envisaged that 
the three countries would be more economically viable if they worked together 
because they would complement one another instead of operating individually and 
competing with one another.  
 71
 
Britain also felt that through the envisaged federation of these territories, she 
would be better able to coordinate her policies in all three East African territories. 
This thinking instilled a great sense of optimism amongst British authorities at the 
time. For example, in 1922 Winston Churchill, British Colonial Secretary of 
State, dreamt of ‘a great East African federation, almost an Empire.’ This vision 
shows that the economic ties being forged amongst East African territories also 
had a political agenda, which was not always overtly articulated. Bringing these 
territories together would strengthen the British Empire in East Africa and thus 
enhance Britain’s political image in the global scene by demonstrating that Britain 
was able to run its Empire in East Africa as a unit. 
 
It should be stated that although Britain wanted to see all East African territories 
coming closer to one another, she did not accord them the same status. For 
example, Hatch (1976:117) writes: 
To be frank, neither the Colonial Office nor British members of parliament 
were really concerned with Tanganyika. It was a very poor country, with 
few British settlers and no prospect of becoming important to any aspect 
of British policy. Thus much of their policy discussions on the territory 
concerned not the future of Tanganyika itself, but its effects on other 
territories which interested them more.   
 
As British authorities became so enthusiastic about the prospects of regional 
integration in East Africa, white settlers in the region and the black majority 
viewed the whole project from a rather totally different angle; they were opposed 
to the whole idea for a number of reasons that revolved around power dynamics. 
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The white community feared that such a move “would bring increased Colonial 
Office control, particularly over native policies” (Hughes, 1963:214). They found 
this disturbing because it would tamper with the already existing power relations 
between East Africans and white settlers whereby the latter had a dominant voice. 
In other words, white settlers in East Africa were specifically concerned about 
their power that would be eroded when the British government imposed its 
policies that would govern East Africa as a region. 
 
In Uganda and Tanganyika, white settlement was not as pronounced as in Kenya, 
which was a settler colony. Thus, Africans in the latter two territories feared that 
such a move would increase British hegemony in the region and interfere with 
their freedom (Kiano, 1959; Hughes, 1963; Low, 1971; Odhiambo, 1981). In fact, 
East African leaders such as President Nyerere had opposed the Central African 
Federation for the same reason. Nyerere had opposed the idea, not because of any 
antipathy towards federation as a concept but simply because the proposed 
federation was designed to perpetuate white domination (Hatch, 1976:129). The 
same thinking guided President Nyerere and other East African leaders on how to 
react to the proposed East African federation to which they were not direct 
participants. The federation issue was much more relevant to Tanganyika. The 
concept of federation in East Africa had been prejudiced by the efforts made by 
Europeans, especially those from Kenya, to form some kind of federation which 
would have entrenched white power before the Africans could even mobilize their 
potential. 
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Just like their white counterparts, the comments made by these East Africans were 
characterized by egotism. In a nutshell, both white settlers and East Africans did 
not embrace the idea of bringing the three East African territories together. It was 
in this context therefore that even though the idea was not necessarily new in the 
1920s, a thorough investigation into the possibility of establishing regional 
integration in the region became expedient. 
 
3.1 Regional Integration in East Africa from 1924 to 1926 
The first phase in the process of regional integration in East Africa began in July 
1924 when the British Colonial Office in London decided to appoint a four-
member Commission and tasked it to look into the matter very closely and make 
concrete recommendations that would take the process forward. The chairman of 
this Commission was the Hon. W. G. A. Ormsby-Gore, a Conservative M.P. in 
the British Parliament. Other members of the Ormsby-Gore or the East Africa 
Commission were: Major A. G. Church (Labour MP), Mr. F.C. Linfield (Liberal 
MP) and Mr. J. A. Cadler who represented the British Colonial Office, and also 
served as the Commission’s secretary. 
 
The Commission was tasked to consider and report, amongst other things, on the 
measures to be taken in order to accelerate the general economic development of 
the British East African Dependencies and the means of securing closer co-
ordination of policy on a variety of services in the region. The East Africa 
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Commission left England on 15 August 1924. On arrival in East Africa, it 
conducted a number of lengthy interviews with different constituencies in the 
region and returned to Britain on 23 December the same year. The Commission 
presented its report to the Colonial Office in 1925. Amongst other observations, 
the Commission reported: “we found little, if any support in East Africa for the 
idea of federation and in some quarters we found definite hostility” (Report of the 
East Africa Commission, 1925). Furthermore, the Commission reported that 
Africans in Uganda, European settlers in Kenya, everyone in Zanzibar and the 
majority of the Indian community in the East African region were all opposed to 
the idea of regional integration for a variety of reasons already mentioned above. 
 
However, the Commission did not totally rule out the possibility of proceeding 
with the regional integration project in future. Consequently, it recommended a 
gradual process of regional integration whereby there would be periodic 
conferences of Governors and the officers of the various departments from all 
three East African territories. One of the main observations made by the East 
Africa Commission was that as long as the idea of amalgamating different 
territories in East Africa came from outside, the entire enterprise was doomed to 
fail because it would be perceived as an imposition on the local people and British 
settlers by the central government in Britain. Thus, the Commission stated that 
they were satisfied that any further development in the direction of federation 
“will come, if it comes at all, as a result of local discussion of local needs and 
common problems. Federation cannot be imposed from without” (Report of the 
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East Africa Commission; Hughes, 1963:214). Implicit in the Commission’s 
recommendation was that local Governors would spearhead the process of 
amalgamation, not by merely implementing policies drawn up in Britain, but by 
assessing the local situation to which they were familiar and acting intuitively and 
advisedly.  
 
The tone of the report showed that the envisaged amalgamation was going to be a 
bottom-up as opposed to a top-down process which would make no sense locally. 
It would be bottom-up in the sense that the Governors of Kenya, Uganda, and 
Tanganyika – not British administrators in London – would drive the process. 
 
Indeed, there was a move towards the implementation of the recommendations of 
the East Africa Commission. One of the major steps was that the Conference of 
East African Governors (chaired by Kenya) was officially instituted in 1926 as an 
advisory body. It brought together the three Governors of Kenya, Uganda and 
Tanganyika, as well as the British Resident of Zanzibar. Its aim was to provide a 
platform where matters of mutual regional concern could be discussed at a 
regional level. Amongst the various issues addressed at these conferences were 
the following: customs tariffs, railway rates, and scientific research activities. It 
was agreed that the Conference of East African Governors would meet once a 
year and that its meetings would rotate amongst all member states in order to 
maintain the Conference’s regional context. In each case, the Governor of the 
hosting territory would automatically chair the meeting.  
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Apart from directing the work of the East African Meteorological service, the 
Statistical Department, the East African Inter-territorial Language (Swahili) 
Committee, the Conference of East African Governors convened a number of 
technical and scientific conferences in the region. It also kept in touch with the 
work done in the neighbouring countries in fields such as legal procedure and 
railway development so as to see if different stakeholders in the region could 
benefit from one another in future as far as these and other areas were concerned. 
 
As stated above, the first Conference of East African Governors was held in 
Kenya in 1926. It was dubbed as the first step taken towards securing better co-
operation between the administrations of territories “whose boundaries are in the 
main the result of historical accident rather than the expression of ethnological 
and geographical facts” (Report. Future Policy in Regard to Eastern Africa. 
Cmd.2904, 1927:4). In attendance at this Governors’ Conference were the 
Governors of Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia), 
Nyasaland (now Malawi) and the British Resident from Zanzibar. 
 
What could be discerned from this representation is the short-term and long-term 
vision of British authorities. If amalgamating Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika and 
Zanzibar was an immediate goal, Britain’s long-term goal was to unite eastern 
Africa but could only move in phases, hence the decision to start off by working 
towards the amalgamation Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika. It is also worth 
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mentioning at this juncture that initially British authorities were talking about co-
operation, not federation and not integration. By the 1940s these concepts were 
either used interchangeably in official documents, or certain individuals preferred 
one concept over others. As shall be seen later in this dissertation, when Africans 
joined the debate in earnest in the 1950s and 1960s, this lack of consistency in the 
terminology continued.     
 
By the time the first Governors’ Conference was held in 1926, Edward Griggs had 
been appointed Governor of Kenya and he had a good working relationship with 
British settlers in Kenya. In fact, he played an instrumental role in persuading 
these white settlers to embrace the idea of uniting the East African territories. The 
colonial report published soon after the first Governors’ Conference noted that 
His Majesty’s Government considered, as a result of discussions between the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Representatives of the territories in 
British Central and East Africa who attended the first Colonial Conference, that 
“some form of closer union between the territories of Central and Eastern Africa 
appears desirable….” (Report. Future Policy in Regard to Eastern Africa. Cmnd. 
2904, 1927:6) 
 
It is evident from the discussion thus far that the first Governors’ Conference of 
1926 marked a new epoch in the very long history of regional integration in East 
Africa. Certain areas of co-operation were identified. These would be used as a 
starting point. If successful, other areas of co-operation would be added and more 
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countries in Eastern Africa would then be included. Subsequent developments 
that took place from 1927 onwards built on this solid foundation. For this reason, 
the year 1927 remains one of the major signposts in the long history of regional 
integration in East Africa. 
 
3.2 Attempts at Closer Union, 1927-1948 
By 1927 the quest for regional integration in East Africa was starting to gain 
momentum. Following the recommendations of the East Africa Commission that 
regional integration should be initiated locally the British government reluctantly 
conceded and allowed its Governors in the region to play a somewhat leading 
role. However, it still could not give them total freedom to do as they deemed fit. 
In 1927 the British government issued a White Paper in which it stressed the 
importance of closer union in East Africa. The paper called for more investigation 
on how to practically proceed with the process of bringing together these East 
African countries. Therefore, in December of that year the British Government 
appointed another Commission of Inquiry under the chairmanship of Sir Hilton 
Young. The terms of this Commission were stated as follows: 
 
• To make recommendations as to whether, either by federation or some 
other form of closer union, more effective co-operation between the 
different Governments in Central and Eastern Africa could be secured, 
more particularly, in regard to development of transport and 
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communications customs tariffs and customs administration, scientific 
research and defense; 
• To consider which territories could either now or at some future time be 
brought within any such closer union; 
• To make recommendations in regard to possible changes in the powers 
and composition of the various Legislative Councils of the several 
territories; 
• To suggest how the Dual Policy recommended by the Conference of East 
African Governors (i.e. the complementary development of native and 
non-native communities) can best be progressively applied in the political 
as well as the economic sphere; 
• To make recommendations as to what improvements may be required in 
the internal communications between the various territories so as to 
facilitate the working of federation; and 
• To report more particularly on the financial aspects of any proposals 
which they may make under any of the above headings (Report of the 
Commission on Closer Union of the Dependencies in Eastern and Central 
Africa.  Cmnd. 3234, 1929:5-6). 
 
A close analysis of the terms of the Hilton Young Commission shows that at this 
stage nothing was final yet. For example, it was still not clear as to the kind of 
union that would be feasible for the region. Secondly, there was still uncertainty 
about the countries that would form part of the envisaged union. But what is even 
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more important is the fact that there was no doubt that some form of closer union 
would be found. The problem area was simply on the logistics. This is what the 
Hilton Young Commission was tasked to make recommendations on.  
 
When the Commission presented its report in 1929 it drew three conclusions: 
• There was an urgent need for the co-ordination of policy on ‘native 
affairs’ and all matters concerning the relations between natives and 
immigrants; 
• There was a need for the co-ordination, and, as far as possible, central 
direction, of specific services of common interest to the three territories; 
• Some arrangement of the constitutional position in Kenya was 
immediately desirable. 
 
The tone of these conclusions suggests that the Hilton Young Commission 
worked from the premise that it was looking at the possibility of bringing together 
three territories in East Africa, that is, Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika. This 
narrowed the focus a bit and gave some direction to the entire process. Therefore, 
this Commission moved the regional integration process one step forward. 
 
Amongst the recommendations of the Hilton Young Commission was the creation 
of a Central Authority for Eastern Africa. This Central Authority would supervise 
and co-ordinate policy for all the dependencies on matters affecting the relations 
between the communities and to ensure that the scales of justice were held even 
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between them. It would also secure imperial interests and the proper discharge of 
the responsibilities of His Majesty’s Government (Report of the Commission on 
Closer Union, 1929:107). Although in favour of a Legislative Council in which all 
three East African territories were represented, the Commission felt that this was 
not an opportune time to transfer all legislative powers from the territories to a 
central body. Just like the East Africa Commission, it proposed a gradual process. 
The Commission recommended that for the time being the Governor-General with 
full executive powers would have to preside over Joint Advisory Councils for 
different services.  
 
In a way, the Hilton Young Commission reiterated some of the recommendations 
made by the East Africa Commission. Both Commissions agreed that there was a 
need to move towards a closer union of the three East African territories. They 
also agreed that it would be foolhardy to rush the process because any change that 
came in such haste could not be sustained. It was in this context that they 
proposed a gradual process.   
 
In 1929, L. S. Amery, the Colonial Secretary of State, dispatched Sir Samuel 
Wilson to East Africa with an instruction to report on the practical possibilities for 
closer union arising from the report of the Hilton Young Commission. Wilson 
embarked on this trip and did as tasked by the Colonial Secretary of State. When 
presenting his report later, Wilson confirmed the idea of appointing a High 
Commissioner whose duties would include legislating on customs, railways, posts 
 82
and telegraphs, research and defense in the East African region as a whole. These 
were the areas in which the colonial authorities had interest at the time. 
 
As the issue of federation was under discussion there was a change of government 
in Britain; the Labour Party won the general elections. However, this new 
development did not affect the process of uniting East African territories. Lord 
Passfield, a Member of the new government issued a White Paper on Closer 
Union in which he emphasized the need for a High Commissioner who would 
exercise control over African Affairs in the various territories. To test the waters, 
the Labour Government appointed a Joint Select Committee of both Houses of 
Parliament and tasked it to investigate the issue of closer union of the three East 
African territories and submit recommendations to parliament for consideration.  
 
The Joint Select Committee toured East Africa collecting submissions and 
conducting interviews with different stakeholders in the region. It then submitted 
its report to the government in 1931 in which it recommended that there should be 
no radical move towards political federation – or even economic union for that 
matter. This recommendation was informed by the opposition of African 
respondents from Tanganyika and Uganda to closer association with Kenya – 
which was dominated by white settlers – and the general feeling of Africans in the 
region against the perceived intrusion of any further authority between them and 
the British Government (Report of Joint Select Committee on Closer Union in 
East Africa, 1931; see also Hughes, 1963:218 and Low, 1971:87-98). 
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But overall, the Committee did not totally rule out the possibility of closer co-
operation amongst the East African territories. For example, it proposed an 
extension of the cohesion already begun by the Governors’ Conference in 1926. 
Thus, “for the next few years the Governors’ Conferences and the meetings of 
officials provided a useful means of achieving practical co-ordination” (Hughes, 
1963:219). 
 
This is how the situation remained in East Africa until 1939. It should be 
mentioned that by this time East African Governors were still trying hard to 
identify some of the areas where regional co-operation could be attempted. In 
doing so, they had to preempt some problems that were likely to arise and try to 
circumvent them as much as they could. According to the minutes of the 
Governors’ Conference held in Dar es Salaam in June 1939 an agreement was 
reached to the effect that steps should be taken to co-ordinate the air survey 
requirements of the East African territories “with a view to placing at the disposal 
of the Governments equipment available for use in various territories as and when 
required” (Confidential Minutes of the Conference of Governors of British East 
African Territories, 23 and 24 June 1939). In the same meeting it was agreed that 
the East African Veterinary Research Institute was to be established at Kabete 
(Kenya) on the first of September 1939. It was further agreed that the 
governments of Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda would all make contributions to 
the funding of this regional institute. 
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In previous meetings, other areas of co-operation had been identified by the 
Conference. For example, one of the conclusions of the Fourth Meeting of the 
Governors in June 1938 was that a Joint East African Examining Board in 
Veterinary Science would be formed, comprising the Directors of Veterinary 
Services of Uganda, Tanganyika and Kenya, as well as the principal of the 
Veterinary College at Entebbe and a representative of the Uganda Department of 
Education. However, it was the outbreak of the Second World War that presented 
the East African Governors with a golden opportunity to test the prospects of 
regional co-operation in these few areas. 
 
3.2.1 Regional Co-operation and WW II 
The outbreak of the Second World War in 1939 had a direct impact on regional 
integration in East Africa. It created an opportunity for regional co-operation, 
which subsequently revived hopes for regional integration by demonstrating that a 
lot could be achieved if the three East African colonies worked jointly. 
Germany’s demand for the return of Tanganyika (which had been taken away 
from Germany as punishment for starting the First World War and was made a 
trusteeship territory of the League of Nations during the Peace Treaty of Paris 
signed in 1919) encouraged white settlers in Kenya to increasingly embrace the 
idea of closer union with the other two territories. One of their fears of these white 
settlers was that if Tanganyika became a German colony once again that would 
bring Germany closer to them thus threatening their freedom. In fact, there was no 
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guarantee that once Germany had taken full control of Tanganyika she would not 
want to expand her sphere of influence to the other two neighbouring territories. 
Thus, Kenya’s settlers decided to kill the plant before it blossomed. They fostered 
the concept of a white British dominion of Eastern Africa because “they were 
infuriated by German insistence that Tanganyika’s mandate status should not be 
endangered by closer association with the British Colony and Protectorates” 
(Hughes, 1963:219). 
 
East Africa was one of the discussion points in the British Parliament during this 
time. Mr. Lewis, one of the British MPs, asked Mr. George Hall, the Under-
Secretary of State for the Colonies whether, with a view to the more efficient co-
ordination of defense in Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika he would consider 
appointing a Governor-General with executive powers over the three East African 
territories for the duration of the war. Mr. Hall responded by stating that the 
conference of East African Governors had been reconstituted for the duration of 
the war. He also mentioned that the Governor of Kenya had been appointed as the 
Chairman of the Conference and that Sir Philip Mitchell relinquished his position 
as Governor of Uganda to become the deputy-chairman. He concluded by stating 
that it was felt within the British Government that efficient co-ordination would 
be secured by such arrangements (Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons 
(UK), Vol.364, Col.1145). 
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As the war progressed in 1940, the Governors of Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, 
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland agreed to establish a Joint Economic Council 
with its own secretariat. The envisioned Council, they thought, would adapt the 
different territories to the idea of being a community. The guiding assumption 
was that the entrenchment of economic integration would then pave way for 
political integration, which was the ultimate goal. The conference resolved to 
establish inter-territorial boards whose task was to deal with such matters as 
manpower, wartime production, industrial management, and price control. 
Subsequently, the following ad-hoc regional institutions were set up: East African 
War Supplies Council, East African Research and Development Board, and East 
African Refugee Administration. 
 
What is evident from the discussion thus far is that British authorities in Britain 
and their representatives in East Africa (especially the Governors) had no 
intention whatsoever to involve the local East African leadership in the 
discussions. As mentioned above, even in 1931 when the Joint Select Committee 
on Closer Union went to East Africa, it only interviewed East Africans as 
‘outsiders’ in the process. In fact, this was the case until the establishment of the 
EAHC in 1948. As stated in the introduction above, East Africans started taking 
an active part in the discussions in the 1950s when they were preparing for their 
political independence from Britain.    
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In 1942, Harold Macmillan, another MP in the British parliament, reminded the 
House of Commons about the state of affairs in East Africa, telling them that the 
Governors’ Conference was, in his view, doing a fantastic job under the 
prevailing circumstances. He continued to say that the Conference Secretariat was 
the focus where the common East African war effort was coordinated. Macmillan 
buttressed this assertion by pointing out that the Conference Secretariat conducted 
the affairs of the East African War Supplies Board and the Civil Supplies Board 
and that these Supply Boards exercised general control over the dispatch of East 
African produce to the Middle East (Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons 
(UK), Vol.380, Col. 2012). 
 
Macmillan’s only concern was that whatever functions the Governors’ 
Conference in both East and West Africa may have performed up to that point 
were not suitable for war purposes because “they are not in a position to make 
decisions on the spot, because they have no statutory or executive powers or 
responsibilities” (Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons (UK), Vol.380, 
Col.2012). In a way, the war shifted the focus of the integration plan somewhat. 
But it should be noted that at the same time the war presented British authorities a 
golden opportunity to see if regional projects that brought together Kenya, 
Uganda and Tanganyika could in fact work. For this reason, it could be argued 
that the Second World War assisted Britain in sustaining plans for regional 
integration – even if by default.   
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Towards the end of the Second World War the question of the East African region 
became even more popular in Britain. Questions about the state of affairs in East 
Africa became common in both Houses of the British Parliament. Mr. Donner, 
one of the MPs, asked Mr. George Hall, Secretary of State for the Colonies, if he 
was in a position to make a statement on the subject of the inter-territorial co-
ordination in East Africa. In part, the Squadron-leader wanted to know the 
prospects of inter-territorial co-ordination in East Africa once the war had ended. 
Hall answered by stating that after consultation with the Governors of Kenya, 
Uganda and Tanganyika His Majesty’s Government decided to issue proposals for 
the future management of the inter-territorial services in east Africa as a basis for 
public discussion. He reminded the House that the existing organization of the 
East African Governors’ Conference had already grown up gradually over a 
period of years to meet the growing need for co-ordination of policy between 
Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika in peacetime, and that it had recently enabled the 
territories to make their maximum contribution to the war effort. However, he 
regretted that there was still no permanent constitutional basis for the common 
services and no effective means of securing the backing of public opinion for their 
operation (Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons (UK), Vol.417, Col. 568).  
 
When the war ended in 1945 the focus shifted from mobilization to finding a 
standard formula to be followed by the different East African territories when 
demobilizing the African corps that had participated in the war against Germany. 
Subsequently, the Labour government took precautions not to give the Governors 
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too much freedom. Creech Jones, who had now become the new Colonial 
Secretary, issued Colonial Paper No.191 of 1945 in which he stressed the need for 
inter-territorial co-operation. While recognizing the work done by the Governors’ 
Conference, he insisted that they could not take decisions independently but in 
consultation with their national government.5 It was in this context that the British 
government – after consulting its Governors – issued ‘Proposals for the future 
management of the inter-territorial services in East Africa’. One of the proposals 
contained in that document was the creation by an Order-in-Council of a 
permanent body, a single executive authority, the EAHC. This Commission was 
to be assisted by inter-territorial advisory boards and advised by a Central 
Legislative Assembly (CLA) with the power to administer certain specified 
common services on a regional basis (Banfield, 1963). These proposals were 
further discussed amongst British authorities both within and outside Britain. 
 
In 1946, Creech Jones, the Secretary of State for the Colonies toured East Africa 
to familiarize himself with the area and to see things for himself. Like his 
predecessor, Winston Churchill, he dreamt of a united East Africa under the 
British control. He thought about establishing an East Africa High Commission 
that would ensure that the region was run as a single unit, thus easing Britain’s 
administration and serving her money and personnel as stated above. By this time 
East Africa had caught the attention of many people. It was in this context that 
one of the East African Commissioners unabashedly stated that “whatever the 
                                                 
5 Pressure from Kenya’s white settlers forced him to change his tone. Subsequently a different 
version of his views appeared in Paper No. 210 giving more powers to the Governors to make 
certain decisions on regional matters. 
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reason, there can be no question that the present degree of interest in East Africa 
is without parallel in the past” (Report by Creech Jones, 1947:1). In March 1947 
some amendments were made to the initial proposal and subsequently the EAHC 
was officially established on 1 January 1948. This marked a watershed in the long 
drawn out struggle for the establishment of a regional institution in East Africa. 
 
The Headquarters of the EAHC were located in Nairobi, Kenya. The High 
Commission’s Secretariat comprised the Administrator, a Commissioner for 
Transport, a Postmaster General, and a Legal Secretary. Its legislative powers 
were stated as follows: 
 
• Appropriations providing for expenditure on those services for which it 
was responsible 
• Customs and excise, general provisions and administration 
• Income tax, general provisions and administration 
• Defense, including the East African Navy 
• Railways and Harbours 
• Civil Aviation 
• Research 
• Posts and Telegraphs 
• Telephone and Radio Communications 
• Staff Matters and 
• Makerere College 
 91
 
The picture painted by these legislative powers is that the EAHC was a complete 
federation. But in fact, at this stage it would be hard to consider this a fully-
fledged federation because basic political and administrative powers still 
remained with each of the territorial governments. Moreover, the EAHC still did 
not have a police force of its own, nor did it have its own courts. For that reason, 
it could not enforce its laws; its powers were limited and its operation somewhat 
contained.  
 
But despite all these limitations the EAHC still managed to register a few 
achievements soon after its formation. For example: (i) it amalgamated two rail 
systems; (ii) it firmly established the East African Airways Corporation; (iii) it 
also succeeded in making the Posts and Telecommunications Department both 
commercial and independent; and (iv) it established research services where 
medical, agricultural, and veterinary research would be conducted. Another 
important development was that the East African Currency Board and the Court 
of Appeal for Eastern Africa were both linked to the East African High 
Commission by interlocking members of their Boards. Therefore, although the 
EAHC faced many challenges, its formation was a significant moment in the 
history of regional integration in East Africa. It marked the completion of one 
phase in that history. 
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Chapter Summary 
This chapter has outlined the early stages in the history of regional integration in 
East Africa, starting from the early 1920s when British authorities conceived the 
idea and ending in 1948 when the first regional institution, the EAHC, was 
established on 1 January 1948. As shown in this chapter, the establishment of the 
EAHC was the culmination of quite a number of processes that began with the 
appointment of the East Africa Commission in July 1924. The main point made in 
this chapter is that the EAHC that was established in 1948 was the brainchild of 
the British Government and its representatives in East Africa. Although there 
were power dynamics between the center (Britain) and the periphery (East 
Africa), they all shared the idea that East African territories had to be brought 
closer to one another somehow. The chapter has demonstrated that at this stage, 
the East African leadership and the general public did not embrace the idea at all. 
They feared that through the envisaged regional integration project (economic or 
political), Britain wanted to sustain her hegemony in the East African region. 
 
An attempt has also been made in this chapter to demonstrate the role played by 
the Second World War in facilitating regional integration in East Africa by 
default. The war presented British representatives in East Africa (especially the 
Governors) an opportunity to test the possibility of making the territories they 
were based in work together as a unit. They had to plan their role in the war as a 
region, not as separate political entities. When the war ended, they had to come up 
with a regional strategy on how they would disband the soldiers who had been 
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participating in the war. Therefore, although this was not part of the initial plan, 
the Second World War contributed to the regional integration cause. The analysis 
of British parliamentary debates illustrates this point elegantly. 
 
Another point worth reiterating at this juncture is that the integration process that 
was discussed between the 1920s and 1948 was mainly dominated by British 
authorities in Britain and the Governors based in East Africa who were brought 
on board at a later stage. Personal relationships within the East African leadership 
had not yet become evident at this stage. As discussed above, the Report of the 
Joint Select Committee appointed in 1931 stated that those East Africans who 
were interviewed were opposed to any form of closer union, cooperation, or 
integration in East Africa mainly because they were concerned about the potential 
sustenance of British hegemony in East Africa. But even this resistance was not 
yet coordinated as would be the case much later. 
 
The question then could be phrased as follows: why did the East African 
leadership have a change of heart and embrace the idea of regional integration in 
the 1950s and 1960s? Also, to what extent did personal relationships between 
East African leaders shape the developments that took place in the region soon 
after the establishment of the EAHC in 1948? The following chapter addressed 
these questions directly.    
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CHAPTER 4 
The East African Leadership and the Establishment of the EAC, 1950s-1967 
 
0. Introduction 
The 1950s witnessed a change of mind by the East African leadership. Although 
they had vehemently opposed any form of closer union in their region fearing that 
it would extend and sustain British hegemony, they now embraced the idea. The 
main reason for this change of mind was the fact that Tanganyika, Zanzibar and 
Uganda were moving towards independence. Although Kenya was still lagging 
behind in this regard, the prospects of gaining independence in the near future 
were already discernible. Therefore, East Africans felt that time was ripe for them 
to pursue the idea of regional integration. They felt that they could integrate on 
their own terms and make Britain dispensable. President Nyerere was the first to 
appreciate this change. He was very conscious of the fact that the chances of 
having real development in East Africa would almost certainly be retarded if each 
of the four territories set up its own state apparatus and formulated separate 
economic policies (Hatch, 1976; Delupis, 1969; Mugomba, 1978). The EAHC 
provided a platform from which East Africans could plan their future. 
 
But by the 1950s, British white settlers were still in control of East African affairs 
through the EAHC where their interests were highly represented. Although 
everything was done to ensure that East Africans also had representatives in this 
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regional institution (Delupis, 1969) they were few in number to make any impact. 
For this reason, they could not lead the EAHC to the direction they wanted. Some 
of the white settlers who were the founding members of the EAHC in 1948 were 
still heavily involved in its affairs in the 1950s. In 1952, Sir Philip Mitchell, one 
of the East African Governors, recalled that he had presided at the inaugural 
meeting of the Assembly on the 6th of April, 1948 but did not know at the time 
that he would have another privilege of presiding at the same forum four years 
later. He then contextualized his joy by stating that he regarded the Assembly as 
being of the greatest possible importance for the future of East Africa (EAHC. 
Proceedings of the Central Legislative Assembly, Official Report, 1953, Col. 6). 
 
To a large degree, the EAHC still paid allegiance to the British Government as a 
result of white settler dominance in the leadership positions. This can be deduced 
from the opening message written by the chairman of the EAHC and read by Mr. 
Scott, an EAHC executive member who served as the chairman of the meeting in 
1952. The message read thus: 
The members of the East African Central Legislative Assembly, meeting 
for the first time in its second term, present their humble duty to His 
Majesty the King and desire to assure His Majesty that they are fully 
sensible of the responsibilities imposed on them, and gladly accepted, in 
continuing to promote the well-being of all three East African Territories 
and all His Majesty’s subjects in them. They are resolved to direct all their 
activities, in so far as it lies within their powers, to the fulfillment of this 
trust (EAHC. Proceedings of the Central Legislative Assembly, Official 
Report, 1953, Col.4). 
 
But East Africans were already calling for changes in the composition of the 
EAHC, especially in the leadership positions. The end of the Second World War 
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in 1945 had ushered in a new political phase in Africa in general, including East 
Africa. The spirit of nationalism rose in an unprecedented manner and the call for 
political independence from colonial rule became louder across the entire African 
continent. As this happened the association of the EAHC with Britain and its 
domination by white British settlers became unsettling to the majority of East 
Africans who constantly questioned this state of affairs. Not only did the East 
African leadership call for the Africanisation of the EAHC so that it could reflect 
the views and aspirations of the African people, they also expressed their 
determination to achieve economic and political independence through regional 
integration.  
 
The unfolding of events at this time consolidated the relationship amongst African 
leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah from Ghana and Kenneth Kaunda from Zambia. 
In East Africa, Presidents Kenyatta, Nyerere and Obote came even closer to one 
another. This close relationship was demonstrated by the fact that they invited one 
another to address the East African masses on the need for joint effort against 
Britain. Whenever they felt that Britain was being unjust in treating one territory, 
they supported one another and criticized the British Government openly. 
Personal relationships within the East African leadership – both at the national 
and regional levels – increased the prospects of regional integration. 
 
The political relationship that existed between President Nkrumah and the East 
African leadership inspired the latter to follow on Ghana’s footsteps in seeking 
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their political independence from Britain. Many other African countries did the 
same, hence the view that: “during the 1960’s Africa was chaotic because these 
were the years when many nations ‘rushed’ into independence” (Marah, 1989: v). 
In East Africa, Tanganyika got self-rule in 1960, followed by full independence in 
December 1961. Uganda followed-suit and achieved her independence on 9 
October 1962. Then Kenya and Zanzibar completed the process in 1963. On 25 
April 1964, Tanganyika and Zanzibar agreed to merge and form Tanzania, 
following a revolution that had taken place in Zanzibar in January of that year 
(1964) and intense secret negotiations between Presidents Nyerere and Abeid 
Karume of Zanzibar (Nyerere, 1967; Smith, 1973). Personal relationships 
between the two politicians accelerated the pace of uniting their two territories 
and this in turn contributed to the integration of East Africa as a region.   
 
A close analysis of the sequence of events from 1960 paints a better picture on 
how personal relationships amongst the East African leadership changed the face 
of that region in the political scene. But a good starting point would be to look at 
the changes that took place in the EAHC during this time and how those changes 
brought East Africans closer to one another and inspired them to embrace the idea 
of regional integration to which they had been opposed for so long. 
 
4.1 The Formation of EACSO 
As mentioned above, Presidents Nyerere, Obote, Kenyatta and other East African 
leaders were not happy about the composition of the EAHC because it did not 
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reflect the African outlook and did not have African interests at the top of its 
agenda. They then decided to Africanize the EAHC. Because the three leaders had 
a good working relationship amongst themselves, they found it easier to speak in 
one voice on how the EAHC could be revamped. The pressure they exerted on 
their white counterparts resulted in the replacement in December 1961 of the 
EAHC by a new East African regional institution called EACSO. This change 
occurred despite the fact that the EAHC had already registered quite a few 
achievements within just a single decade by putting in place regional services in 
different fields.  
 
Commenting on the replacement of the EAHC by the EACSO, the report of the 
EAC (Vol. xiv, No.2, 1962:344) pointed out that it was a paradox that the 
achievement made by this institution was in part responsible for its anticipated 
demise at the end of 1961. However, the report perceived the new organization as 
symbolizing the desire of the peoples of East Africa for more popular 
representation in the administration of the common services that would fall under 
its ambit. It was not surprising therefore that the new Legislature would bear 
almost the same name as the previous one. The High Commission had no doubt 
whatsoever that the traditions which members of the EAHC had evolved so well 
over the years would be welcomed and adopted by the new East African 
legislature. 
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Before changing the EAHC, the East African leadership held discussions with 
their British counterparts in London and eventually reached an agreement that the 
EAHC should change its name and be expanded and Africanized. Indeed, after 
working out the logistics, the EAHC was changed to EACSO. The agreement for 
this change over was subsequently published as General Notice No.10 of 1962 in 
the EACSO Gazette dated 1 January 1962. The report of the London discussion 
was published as Colonial Command Paper Number 1433, ‘The Future of the 
EAHC Services’ (EACSO Annual Report, 1962:1). Prime Minister Nyerere, 
addressed the Tanganyika National Assembly after the paper had been published 
moving that it be resolved that the House welcomed the proposals contained in 
Command Paper 1433 and invite the Tanganyikan Government to enter into an 
agreement with the Government of Kenya and Uganda along the lines proposed in 
the Command Paper as soon as possible after Tanganyika became independent. In 
his view, it would be folly to break up the unity of these common services, which 
could in fact be run more economically and efficiently as a whole than as separate 
entities (Assembly Debates (Hansard) Tanganyika National Assembly, Official 
Report, 1961, Cols 30-31). 
 
Nyerere told the House that it was on the basis of these considerations that he and 
his colleagues from East Africa went to London in June 1960 to discuss the future 
of their region after the independence of Tanganyika. He concluded by saying that 
these talks were distinguished by the cordial and co-operative atmosphere in 
which they were conducted, emphasizing that they were in complete agreement in 
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the way in which general regional interests could best be served by different 
stakeholders once Tanganyika was independent. As events unfolded, the East 
African leadership strengthened their relationships by speaking in one voice on 
many issues when dealing with Britain. 
 
The EACSO was larger in scope than its predecessor organization, the EAHC and 
was therefore more representative than the former regional body. In addition to 
the services rendered by the EAHC, EACSO took charge of the currency, customs 
regulations, tariffs, and taxes for the entire East African region thus maintaining 
its regional outlook. In her analysis of the differences that existed between the two 
organizations. Banfield (1963) made a few observations which could be 
summarized as follows: 
 
1. Unlike the High Commission (EAHC), the EACSO was not a creature of the 
British government but was created by the terms of an agreement entered into 
by the three East African governments and was therefore called into being at 
their request. 
2. The EACSO constitution provided for a local executive responsible not to an 
overseas or foreign government as were the Governors, but to the three 
governments. 
3. The constitution could be amended by local arrangement and, as a result, 
EACSO was able to meet changed and changing political situations and needs. 
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4. EACSO continued to control the policy of and administer the common 
services which for many years had proved to the satisfaction of the East 
African governments, to be valuable, efficient and useful and which 
notwithstanding the attainment of independence by the three East African 
sovereign states, were better administered by the common authority [the 
Regional Legislative Assembly] rather than three.   
 
4.2 De-colonisation and the New Central Legislative Assembly 
As it became evident that the national flags in East Africa would eventually 
replace the Union Jack, the citizens of Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda talked 
about freedom and federation at the same time (Stabler, 1979:33-4). They 
invested their time and effort in reconfiguring regional politics, more especially 
with regards to continuing to work closer with one another after independence. 
Subsequently, the Central Legislative Assembly of East Africa changed its 
outlook significantly, with more East Africans coming on board and occupying 
leadership positions. The East African leadership cited the pre-colonial African 
way of life as their guiding principle in whatever they were doing. They stated 
that unity was part of the social fabric amongst Africans and therefore had to be 
demonstrated and sustained through regional institutions. When President 
Kenyatta wrote his book Facing Mount Kenya, he argued that to the Europeans, 
individuality is the ideal of life but to the Africans the ideal is the right regulations 
with, and behavior to, other people (Kenyatta, 1965; Government of Kenya. The 
National Assembly, House of Representatives, Official Report, 1963, Col. 418).  
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East African leaders were in constant touch with one another planning how they 
would move their region forward once they were in charge of their destiny. 
During the meeting of the first Central Legislative Assembly under the EACSO 
convened on 22 May 1962, the East African brotherhood was even more evident. 
The address by Kenyatta captures the mood elegantly and therefore will be quoted 
at length. He stated: 
Mr. Speaker, honorable Members, on behalf of the Authority I bid you 
welcome to this, the first meeting of the Central Legislative Assembly set 
up in terms of the East African Common Services Organization 
Constitution. My colleagues on the Authority, the Prime Minister of 
Tanganyika, Mr. Kawawa,6 and the Prime Minister of Uganda, Mr. Obote, 
join with me in extending to all of you our congratulations on your 
appointment to this Assembly whose membership can now be said to 
reflect public opinion throughout Africa. We welcome this fact and look 
forward to your expression of opinion which will be ventilated here on the 
major issues which now confront East Africa as a whole. From the very 
outset this will require from you a sense of statesmanship, in as much as 
you will need to look at the problems from an East African point of view 
and not from the point of view only of what is best for your own Territory. 
 
I want to emphasize that this Assembly is a completely new body. It is 
true that there was a former legislature which had very nearly the same 
name, but in fact there is really no connection between that former 
legislature and this one. On the other hand, I say to you, profit from the 
experience gained in the former legislature but do not be afraid to 
introduce into this one your own customs and procedures where it would 
be right to do so (EAHC. Proceedings of the Central Legislative 
Assembly, Official Report, 1962, Col.3). 
 
Implicit in this address was that initially East Africans had a very little voice in 
the EAHC and thus had no full interest in it. Furthermore, there were certain 
customary practices that were not accommodated under the old order. In the new 
                                                 
6 Rachidi Mfaume Kawawa was appointed by Nyerere to become Tanganyika’s Prime Minister on 
22 January 1962 when Nyerere himself resigned from that position as a tactical political strategy. 
See Nyerere (1967:157-158). 
 103
Central Legislative Assembly, such customary practices were welcome because 
East Africans were the custodians of this organization. By this time there was no 
doubt that the East African leadership was united and all the regional leaders were 
determined to take charge of their own affairs. The existing personal and political 
relationship accelerated the development of events in East Africa during this time. 
For example, the good relationship that Kawawa had with Nyerere and Kenyatta 
created a conducive atmosphere for regional integration to take place. Kawawa 
“cooperated closely with the TANU and entered a long-term partnership with 
Julius Nyerere” (Wiseman, 1991:106). 
 
As seen above in the case of Tanganyika’s willingness to delay its independence 
for the sake of Kenya and Uganda and as shall be seen later in this chapter, the 
political understanding and personal relationships amongst East African leaders 
continued unabated even after Uganda had achieved its political independence in 
October 1962. The two countries put more weight behind Kenya so that the 
process leading to the latter’s independence too could be accelerated. The Kenya 
African National Union (KANU) expressed its willingness to ask for a meeting of 
East African leaders shortly after the elections to discuss plans for the future of an 
independent East Africa. KANU had a stern belief that after the elections the way 
would be clear for Kenya to enter into meaningful discussions with its two 
counterparts with a view to creating closer economic and political relations in the 
East African region (The Sunday Post, 5 May 1963). 
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Political and economic developments in East Africa in the 1960s shaped, and 
were in turn shaped by personal relationships amongst East African leaders. The 
Sunday Chronicle (31 July 1960) commented about the relationship that existed 
between Nyerere and Kenyatta, stating that once Nyerere became Tanganyika’s 
Prime Minister and once Kenyatta was released from prison, they would both 
work towards the East African federation. The only problem at this stage was that 
the independence of these East African countries would not come at the same 
time. The writing was already on the wall that Tanganyika would achieve its 
political freedom earlier than Uganda and Kenya. As mentioned earlier in this 
chapter, East African national governments, colonial Governors in the region, and 
the British government generally felt that this would have serious repercussions 
for the envisaged regional integration, hence the meeting that was held in London. 
It was at this meeting that preliminary plans for the post-independence era were 
made. 
 
In fact, this was a major concern even before the London conference. Once 
Tanganyika obtained self-rule in 1960, a need arose to make further plans for the 
region. To this effect, the British Colonial Office in London convened a 
constitutional conference in Dar es Salaam from 27 to 29 March 1961 to discuss 
the procedure that would be followed to usher in Tanganyika’s independence 
from Britain. At the end of the conference it was agreed that 28 December 1961 
would be the date for Tanganyika’s independence. The prospects of Tanganyika 
getting self-rule in 1960 and independence in 1961 had limited the chances of 
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ever achieving regional integration in East Africa without any glitches. The 
confirmation of the date when Tanganyika’s independence would begin made the 
fears of being unable to secure regional integration even more real. As an 
independent state, Tanganyika would enjoy certain rights that Kenya and Uganda 
did not have at the time because they were not yet free from British domination. 
Hughes (1963:225) recalled this moment by stating that the possibility of ever 
achieving federation in the future hung in the balance as a result of Tanganyika’s 
pending independence from Britain. There was a possibility that the whole pattern 
of practical inter-territorial cooperation might be destroyed if Britain failed to take 
all the necessary precautionary measures (see also Southall, 1974:15). 
 
However, as a result of the good relationship that existed between Nyerere and his 
counterparts from Kenya and Uganda, the former expressed his preparedness to 
delay Tanganyika’s independence if Britain presented a clear timetable for the 
other two countries’ independence. Nyerere stated: 
If the British Government is willing to amend their timetable for the 
constitutional changes of the other territories and then those territories 
expressed a desire for federation, I would be willing to ask the people of 
Tanganyika to join that Federation with the others (Nyerere, 1964:40; 
Nyerere, 1967:86; Hatch, 1976:130).  
 
Certainly, no greedy and egoistic politician would have made such an offer. Also, 
if Nyerere was not in good terms with Obote and Kenyatta he would have 
proceeded with the plans to secure Tanganyika’s independence without thinking 
about what that would mean to Uganda and Kenya and, therefore, to the plans for 
regional integration. There was confirmation from Nyerere that in a situation 
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whereby Tanganyika achieved independence before its two counterparts, regional 
brotherhood would still be maintained. During the constitutional conference 
referred to above, Tanganyika’s politicians expressed their desire to continue 
participating in the EACSO even after their country had achieved its full political 
independence from Britain  
 
The East African leadership from all three territories (and Zanzibar) expressed 
their willingness to resolve the question of regional integration, bearing in mind 
Tanganyika’s envisaged independence. From 19 to 27 June 1961, the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies convened a meeting in London to address some of the 
salient issues. Delegates at the meeting came from Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, 
the EAHC, and from the British Colonial Office. In addition to delegates from 
these countries, other delegates came from Zanzibar. The latter attended the 
meeting as observers. It was agreed at that meeting that although Tanganyika was 
entitled to her independence, it would be in the interest of all the territories in the 
region to ensure that whatever constitutional changes might take place in the 
future in East Africa, the already existing common services in the region should 
continue to be provided (Report of the London Conference, Cmnd.1433, 1961:4). 
Therefore, the independence of Tanganyika in 1961 did not in any way derail the 
regional integration process as had been anticipated. East African leaders 
remained close to one another. 
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4.3 The Raisman Commission 
Although there was general consensus on what needed to be done to accelerate 
the process, it was still felt necessary to map up a clear programme of action. To 
this effect, East African leaders asked Iain Macleod, Secretary of State for the 
Colonies to appoint a Commission of Enquiry that would examine certain aspects 
of the arrangements already in force in East Africa at the time for a common 
market area and economic co-ordination between the territories. Macleod 
accepted the request and appointed a three-member Commission in July 1960, 
chaired by Jeremy Raisman. The other two members of this Commission were: A. 
J. Brown and R. C. Tress. The Raisman Commission or the East Africa Economic 
and Fiscal Commission was guided by the following terms: 
 
(a) To examine arrangements at present in force in East Africa for a 
common market area, for economic co-ordination between Territories 
and for fiscal uniformity with regard to measures now taken –  
(i) To facilitate inter-territorial trade in products of local agriculture 
and manufacturing industries and to develop such industries in 
East Africa. 
(ii) To secure uniformity in fiscal and financial matters including 
methods used to allocate yields from customs, excise and income 
taxes between territories. 
(iii) To provide the East Africa High Commission with revenue 
necessary to meet the costs of services administered by the 
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Commission for the benefit of the Territories and to apportion the 
cost of such services between the Territories. 
(b) To consider the advantages and disadvantages generally of the present 
arrangements and whether or not these arrangements are economic and 
are fair to the interests of each of the individual Territories; and to 
make recommendations for any necessary adjustments, additions or 
modifications to them (Report of the East Africa Economic and Fiscal 
Commission, 1961:1, par.1). 
  
The Commission conducted its work as tasked and presented its report to the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies in January 1961. The latter presented the report 
to the British Parliament in February 1961 as Command Paper 1279. There was 
simultaneous publication of the report in East Africa.  
 
The Commission reiterated the need to administer regional services centrally so as 
to ensure quality and reduce all unnecessary expenses. For example, paragraph 
105 recommended that the addition of commercial legislation to the schedule of 
matters with respect to which the Central Legislative Assembly may pass laws 
should be considered by the Governments of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika and 
by the High Commission.  
 
The report of the Raisman Commission was discussed at length in the East Africa 
Legislative Assembly. Mr. Pandya, one of the Members of the East African 
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Central Legislative Assembly, commented that the report had brought out the 
importance of the economic co-ordination which East African territories had had 
since the last 12 years and that it had, after examining its function, come to the 
conclusion that the common market, the arrangements for economic co-ordination 
and joint services – “should not only be continued but should be further 
strengthened in the interests of East Africa as a whole” (EAHC. Proceedings of 
the Central Legislative Assembly, Official Report, 1961, Col. 237). The 
acceptance of the major recommendation of the Raisman Commission, that is, its 
emphasis on the need to do things in the regional context, augured well for the 
future of East Africa. It was thus another significant episode in the regional 
integration process (EAHC. Proceedings of the Central Legislative Assembly, 
Official Report, 1962, Col. 344).   
 
4.4 Declaration of Federation 
By the middle of 1963 all seemed to be going according to plan. There were very 
strong sentiments amongst the three East African countries for both economic and 
political federation. This was to be finalized at the end of the year when Kenya 
achieved her independence, at which point a regional constitution would then be 
drafted. These sentiments brought East African politicians even closer to one 
another more than ever before. On 5 June 1963, Presidents Kenyatta, Nyerere and 
Obote amicably agreed to sign a historic Declaration in Nairobi through which 
they made a commitment to one another on a number of issues. They vowed to 
work together as a region as soon as they were all free to decide the fate of their 
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respective countries. In fact, one of the major aims of the Declaration was to 
accelerate Kenya’s independence in the spirit of East African brotherhood 
(Southall, 1974:16). The Declaration of Federation remains one of the key 
documents in the entire history of regional integration in East Africa because it 
cemented the personal relationships that already existed amongst East African 
leaders while at the same time mapping up the way forward. For that reason we 
shall quote the Declaration at length. On that date (5 June 1963), the three 
Presidents agreed as follows: 
 
We, the leaders of the people and Governments of East Africa assembled 
in Nairobi on 5 June 1963, pledged ourselves to the political Federation of 
East Africa. 
 
Our meeting today is motivated by the spirit of Pan-Africanism and not by 
mere selfish regional interests. We are nationalists and reject tribalism, 
racialism, or inward-looking policies. We believe that the day of decision 
has come, and to all our people we say there is no more room for slogans 
and words. This is our day of action in the cause of the ideals that we 
believe in and the unity and freedom for which we have suffered and 
sacrificed so much. 
 
Within this spirit of Pan-Africanism and following the declaration of 
African unity at the recent Addis Ababa conference, practical steps should 
be taken wherever possible to accelerate the achievement of our common 
goal. 
 
We believe that the East African Federation can be a practical step 
towards the goal of Pan-African unity. We hope that our action will help 
to accelerate the efforts already being made by our brothers throughout the 
continent to achieve Pan-African unity. 
 
We share a common past and are convinced of our common destinies. We 
have a common history, culture, and customs which make our unity both 
logical and natural. Our futures are inevitably bound together by the 
identical aspirations and hopes of our peoples and the need for similar 
efforts in facing the tasks that lie ahead of each of our free nations. 
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In the past century the hand of imperialism grasped the whole continent 
and in this part of Africa our people found themselves included together in 
what the colonialists styled ‘The British sphere of influence.’ Now that we 
are once again free or are on the point of regaining our freedom we believe 
the time has come to consolidate our unity and provide it with 
constitutional basis (Kenya News. Press Handout No.525, 5 June 1963, 
Kenya National Archives). 
 
These leaders touched on a wide range of issues. They recalled previous attempts 
by leaders like President Nkrumah of Ghana to unite Africa. They then stated that 
KANU’s victory in Kenya gave them an opportunity to work together as three 
East African governments to promote African nationalism and Pan-African unity 
by first establishing a regional body that would later form part of African unity. 
President Nyerere stated: “We cannot create a continental government overnight, 
but we can start in East Africa” (Cited in Smith, 1973:88). The three leaders 
applauded the people of East Africa for resisting imperialist attempts to impose 
political federation on them since the 1920s. In their view, political federation at 
that time would have resulted to white domination because colonial authorities 
had their own agenda (to sustain their hegemony) that was different from that of 
the African leadership. Now that they were all independent territories, they felt 
that time was ripe to form a federation. Interestingly, they talked about both 
economic and political federation simultaneously. The kind of federation they 
aspired to have was not divorced from the broad idea of African unity that 
President Nkrumah dreamt about. This was captured in the last paragraph of the 
Declaration, which stated the following:  
 
We reiterate that our plans for the Federation of East Africa is the logical 
promotion of the spirit of Pan-African unity and wish to make it, therefore, 
 112
clear that any of our neighbors may in future join this federation (Kenya 
News. Press Handout No.525, 5 June 1963, Kenya National Archives).  
 
In this Declaration, East African leaders made their intentions clear. Some of their 
short-term and long-term goals could be gauged from the joint statement they 
released to the media afterwards, in which they stated, inter alia that their meeting 
on that day had been motivated by the spirit of Pan-Africanism and not by mere 
selfish regional interests. They continued by saying that: “We are nationalists and 
reject tribalism, racialism or inward-looking politics” (Daily Nation, 6 June 1963; 
see also: Daily Nation, 5 June 1963; Uganda Argus, 5 June 1963 and Tanganyika 
Standard, 24 January 1964). These passionate pronouncements meant that the 
East African leadership would henceforth play an active and leading role in the 
regional integration process, something they had been vehemently opposed to for 
about four decades. It also meant that they would work jointly in ensuring that the 
process succeeded.  
 
The signing of the Declaration was considered to be one of the milestones in the 
history of East Africa. It became the focal point in the National Assemblies of the 
different East African states. Mr. Bataringaya, a Ugandan opposition MP had the 
following to say about the Declaration:  
Mr. Speaker, I beg to move that this House do note with approval the 
declaration by the Heads of the East African Governments to form a 
political federation of East African territories this year…The purpose of 
my moving this motion from this side of the House is simple and that is, to 
show to Uganda, to East Africa and Africa that the Opposition in Uganda 
is meaningful and plays its role of construction and not destruction” 
(National Assembly Debates (Uganda), Official Report, 1963:858).   
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Mr. Ronald Ngala, an MP in the Kenyan parliament, proposed a similar motion in 
Kenya’s National Assembly. 
 
The British Government welcomed the news with warm hands because, as 
mentioned in chapter 3, they were the ones who initiated the process of bringing 
East African territories closer to one another. Duncan Sandy, Secretary of State 
for the Colonies during this time, reminded the House of Commons that the 
British Government had long believed that federation would do much to promote 
both the stability and prosperity of East Africa. Therefore, he stated that his 
government warmly welcomed the announcement by the President of Tanganyika 
and the Prime Ministers of Uganda and Kenya of their intention to establish a 
federation embracing their three countries and to invite the Government of 
Zanzibar, after its anticipated elections, to also participate in the preparatory 
discussions. He insisted that the decision had been made by the East African 
Governments themselves but that they could surely count on the fullest support 
and co-operation of the British Government in their efforts to bring the federation 
into being without any further delay in the process (Parliamentary Debates, House 
of Commons (UK), Report, Vol.679, No.127, 1963, Col. 1638). 
 
But as mentioned in the previous two chapters, official documents were not 
always specific on what they meant by certain terms. For example, in the above 
quotation, the Secretary of State for the Colonies did not specify what ‘stability’ 
entailed. Whether he meant security as the British had intended, or economic 
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stability remained unclear. The same applies to ‘prosperity’. But one could 
justifiably conclude that the vision that the British Government had about East 
Africa was to create a region that would have both economic and political 
stability, a region that would be prosperous in economic terms. East African 
leaders adopted this vision and nurtured it on their terms.    
 
The signing of the Declaration in June 1963, important as it was, only marked the 
beginning of a long journey towards regional integration. The next important 
challenge was to draft a federal constitution that would be different from the 
previous ones that were drafted and implemented by successive colonial 
administrators. If East Africans were indeed free from British colonial rule, they 
had to take charge of their own affairs in all spheres of life. Under the heading: 
‘Federal Constitution’, the East African Standard ran an article on this subject:  
Legal assistance is being obtained for the drafting of a constitution 
suitable to the projected East African federation. With the speed of 
political developments, there is no time to lose in getting all this 
preparatory work done. Colonial Legal experts have drafted all previous 
constitutions for the East African territories. When the sovereign 
Governments get together to form a federation, the responsibility for 
seeing the federal constitution properly drawn up will be theirs alone. 
Naturally, there is intense public interest in the kind of constitution to 
come. The notion of a loose confederation seems to have been rejected in 
favour of a fully fledged federation. This closely knit political and 
economic union is much more appropriate (East African Standard, 28 
June 1963). 
 
The signing of the Declaration revived the spirit of East African brotherhood. Dr. 
J. G. Kiano, Kenya’s Minister of Commerce and Industry, gleefully reflected on 
the events that had unfolded up to that time stating that the spirit of unity amongst 
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East Africans was stronger than ever before. He continued to say that: “We have 
embarked upon our ambitious plan….We are moving closer everyday” (Mombasa 
Times, 7 August 1964). Mr. Kiwanuka alluded to the long-term consequences of 
working together with other East African leaders, arguing: “we would be better 
served by one voice at the United Nations than the present three (Mombasa Times, 
26 August 1964). This reminds us of the conventional principles of co-operation 
guiding colonial subjects in general. In a nutshell, these principles could be 
summarized as follows: 
 
• Members join as human beings and not as capitalists, which involves an 
important feature, namely distribution of profits (…) according to business 
done. 
• They meet on a basis of equality, which involves another important 
feature, one man one vote. 
• The act of association is voluntary. 
• They join to promote the economic interests or advantage of members, not 
of non-members.  
 
In this sense, co-operation is seen as a method by which people are enabled to do 
things for themselves (Campbell, Memorandum on Co-operation in the Colonies, 
Kenya National Archives, K325.31CAM). 
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Presidents Nyerere, Kenyatta and Obote worked indefatigably finalizing any 
outstanding issues before the anticipated federation treaty could be signed. They 
also entered into negotiations with other Eastern African leaders to whom they 
sold the idea of a federation. Even if the other countries could not join 
immediately, the aim was to create a space so that if they wanted to join at a later 
stage they could feel free to do so. In doing that, they were guided in part by the 
position African leaders had taken in Addis Ababa in 1962, stating that the many 
complex problems confronting the African people in their efforts to advance 
themselves socially, politically, and economically would in fact be solved by 
Africans themselves (Sunday Chronicle, 25 February 1962; Daily Nation, 5 June 
1963).  
 
On 31 July 1963 the Kenyan cabinet read a paper [CAB (63) 54] written by the 
Justice Minister in which he reported on the progress already made regarding the 
East African Federation talks. The cabinet noted progress made by the Working 
Party set up to draft the constitution for the East Africa Federation (Memorandum 
by the Minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs and Minister of State, CAB 
(63) 81. GO/3/2/78, 13 August 1963:1. KNA). The brief to the Working Party 
“was not to decide on whether there should be a federation, they were specially 
instructed to produce a constitution for an East African Federation” (Working 
Party on Federation. GO/3/2/78. KNA). 
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By the mid-1960s the level of optimism about the establishment of a regional 
institution in East Africa had risen. As mentioned above, Dr. Kiano noted that the 
spirit of unity among East Africans had become stronger than ever before. He 
concluded: “the fact that we have not signed a Federal Constitution does not mean 
that we are moving apart. We are moving closer everyday” (Mombasa Times, 7 
August 1964). East African leaders made sure that they stressed the existence of 
strong ties amongst themselves whenever an opportunity presented itself. For 
example, when the backbenchers from Kenya and Tanzania met President 
Nyerere to ask him and his two counterparts from Uganda and Kenya to 
accelerate the process of finalizing the East African federation, President Nyerere 
assured them that there was a strong bond between himself and Presidents 
Kenyatta and Obote. He concluded his address by stating the following: “if Mzee 
Kenyatta decides to call a meeting to discuss the action proposed in your 
resolution, I shall certainly attend” (Nyerere, 1967:297) 
 
Mr. Mwai Kibaki from the Kenyan Parliament (later elected as President of 
Kenya in 2002), spoke after a conference of East African countries held in Addis 
Ababa and was optimistic about the prospects of regional integration. This 
optimism derived from the fact that seven out of twelve African countries had 
signed articles of association (The Standard Tanzania, 7 May 1966). In his view, 
if African leaders were prepared to unite at the continental level, East Africans 
had no excuse for not uniting regionally. After all, East Africans saw their 
regional integration project as a contribution to African unity. 
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4.5 The Treaty of East African Co-operation 
On 10 August 1965, President Nyerere addressed the Central Legislative 
Assembly in Dar es Salaam. One of the aims of his address was to quell the rumor 
that co-operation in East Africa was in danger. He stressed the already existing 
personal relationship between himself and his two counterparts from Uganda and 
Kenya as well as their individual countries as follows: “Kenya, Tanzania, and 
Uganda are as united in their objectives as they have ever been, and as determined 
to work together for the benefit of all the peoples in East Africa” (Nyerere, 
1968:60-61). Although some differences of opinion had already emerged here and 
there, President Nyerere did not see this as an anomaly. He conceded that there 
had, of course, been differences of opinion between their three sovereign nations 
in the past few months and insisted that it would be surprising if there had not. 
However, he added: “But there is no reason at all to believe that East African co-
operation is about to collapse. It is sustained by our overwhelming will for unity” 
(Nyerere, 1968: 61). 
 
Soon after the meeting the three Presidents met in Mombasa where they decided 
to appoint a Commission that would work out new machinery of regional co-
operation. Indeed, in 1966 the three East African leaders appointed a Commission 
under the chairmanship of Professor Kjeld Philip who was Denmark’s former 
Minister of Trade and Finance. They tasked the Commission to draft the treaty.7  
Professor Philip and his colleagues did as requested and presented the treaty to the 
                                                 
7 It should be mentioned that although Professor Philip was a European working for the United 
Nations, the Treaty did not lose its African flavor. He worked following a brief by East African 
leaders who later studied the final draft before adopting it.  
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East African leaders who in turn accepted it. Subsequently, the Treaty of East 
African Co-operation was signed in Kampala, Uganda on 6 June 1967. The 
Uganda Argus (7 June 1967) reported: “the presidents were smiling broadly at the 
signing, obviously happy with the achievement of the treaty, which was described 
by observers as a historic occasion for East Africa” (see also: Report of the 
Working Party on Higher Education in East Africa, 30 January 1969, par.1).  
 
It was this treaty that heralded the EAC, as reflected in Article 1, which stated: 
“By this Treaty the contracting parties establish among themselves an East 
African Community and, as an integral part of such Community, an East African 
Common Market.” One of the aims of the EAC contained in Article 2 was to 
strengthen and regulate the industrial, commercial and other relations of the 
Partner States “to the end that there shall be accelerated, harmonious and balanced 
development and sustained expansion of economic activities the benefits whereof 
shall be equally shared” (The Treaty of East African Co-operation, 1967).  
 
Coincidentally, the treaty was signed in June, the same month in which the 
Declaration had been signed in 1963. This coincidence did not elude the media 
(Daily Nation, 6 June 1967). The signing of the treaty was a very huge event. 
National and regional newspapers reported about this key moment in different 
ways. Headings included headings such as this one: ‘Treaty brings pleasure and 
relief’. According to one newspaper, the signing ceremony was the final triumph 
at the close of massive studies started by the Philip Commission which was 
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assigned to the task of finding ways and means of putting more muscle into the 
East African partnership (Daily Nation, 7 June 1967). Philip stated that the three 
East African countries had, in the past, shown a tendency to break apart but that 
the treaty changed this to a tendency of close co-operation. 
 
By signing this treaty, the three East African Presidents were committing 
themselves to a legally sanctioned transnational community. They put what had 
been a colonially inspired arrangement at first on the firmest footing ever dreamt 
of in East African history. The very people who had once expressed their strong 
resentment to regional integration had now worked tirelessly to ensure that the 
EAC became a reality, of course establishing it in their own terms. Wittingly or 
unwittingly, they subscribed to the notion that no matter how well-motivated a 
programme may be it cannot be effective in the 1960s as long as the inspiration 
comes primarily from outside the continent (Rothchild, 1968, Hatch, 1976). The 
EAC was propelled by East African politicians, they were its custodians. 
 
There were still technical issues to be attended to. For example, after the signing 
of the treaty, the Kenyan Government drafted The Treaty of East African 
Cooperation Bill, 1967, whose aim was to explain the changes that would 
subsequently take place. One of those changes was that the Common Services 
Authority’s property would go to the EAC when it was officially constituted on 1 
December 1967. Workers of EACSO would automatically become workers of the 
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EAC (Kenya Gazette Supplement Bills, 1967:381). The Bill repealed the EACSO 
Act signed in 1960. 
 
By November 1967 the writing was already on the wall that something big was 
about to happen. East African leaders were even much closer to one another than 
ever before as they worked out the final details. Newspapers were already 
reporting about the ‘End of an era for East Africa’. On 30 November 1967 the 
three East African Presidents met Mr. Dunstan Omari, EACSO Secretary-General 
in what the media described as ‘the somber setting’. The purpose of the meeting 
was to formalize arrangements for the organization’s historic conversion into the 
EAC. “If the setting was solemn”, observed one journalist, “the three Presidents 
appeared to be extremely pleased and looking forward to the official Community 
inauguration ceremonies in Arusha tomorrow”. Even the Presidents were over the 
moon to the extent that sometimes they made interesting jokes with journalists. 
For example, President Obote joked with a cameraman, saying: “You’re always 
taking pictures…but we never see them. One day I expect to get a complete set of 
complementaries from you…” (Daily Nation, 30 November 1967). 
 
On 1 December 1967 the process of regional integration in East Africa reached its 
zenith when an estimated crowd of 8,000 and no less than 500 delegates came to 
Arusha to witness the historic and colorful occasion of inaugurating the EAC. 
This institution was said to be the only one of its kind in Africa (Daily Nation, 2 
December 1967; Grace and Laffin, 1991:103). Presidents Nyerere, Kenyatta and 
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Obote, the ‘trio’ or ‘the Big Three’ as they were affectionately known, came 
down to the crowd to officially change EACSO to East African Economic 
Community (EAEC). This was later changed to EAC as is commonly known.  
 
Addressing the masses, Mr. David Scott, a representative of the British 
Government at the inauguration ceremony, expressed his government’s 
confidence that the establishment of the EAC would be a milestone in the 
development of fruitful co-operation between the partner states and of the 
prosperity of the East African region as a whole. In his ten-minute address, 
President Nyerere, the host, officially launched the EAC while his two friends and 
colleagues (Presidents Kenyatta and Obote) looked on. President Nyerere’s 
speech was constantly interrupted by big cheers from the crowd.  
 
Special events had been organized to mark the establishment of the EAC. One of 
them was the issuing of a special commemorative postage stamp, bearing the 
national emblems of the three nations in 22 carat gold. Another important 
arrangement was that 1 December 1967 was declared a public holiday throughout 
East Africa (Daily Nation, 7 June 1967; Daily Nation, 1 December 1967; Uganda 
Argus, 1 December 1967). At long last, the long-anticipated day had arrived. 
 
The significance of the treaty was reflected in Mwai Kibaki’s luncheon address in 
Nairobi. Speaking in his capacity as a cabinet member, Kibaki acknowledged the 
fact that personal relationships amongst the three East African leaders had played 
 123
a huge role in the process of bringing East Africa together. He then stated:  “East 
African countries no longer depend on a gentleman’s agreement, but on law” 
(Daily Nation, 12 July 1967). The treaty was seen as the culmination of official 
and individual efforts, since 1901, to bring about a greater social and political 
integration in the East African region (Iconoclastes [Bethwell Ogot], 1968:5).  
 
Personal relationships amongst East African leaders within and between 
territories played a huge role in the formation of the EAC. At the fore-front was 
the relationship amongst Presidents Nyerere, Obote and Kenyatta but these were 
not the only East African leaders whose good relations fast-tracked the successful 
establishment of the EAC. The relationship between Zanzibar’s President Karume 
and President Nyerere made it possible for Zanzibar and Tanganyika to unite and 
form Tanzania in April 1964. This was just one of the steps leading to regional 
integration. When President Karume was assassinated in 1972, Aboud Jumbe, his 
successor, strengthened the links between Zanzibar and the mainland. The good 
working relationship between Kenyan leaders like Thomas Joseph Mboya and 
President Nyerere and the working relationship Mboya had with President 
Kenyatta facilitated the process leading to the establishment of the EAC 
(Wiseman, 1991).  
 
But to what extent was the EAC different from predecessor organizations like 
EACSO and the EAHC? President Kenyatta’s speech in the Kenya National 
Assembly provides a tantalizing glimpse to the answer to this question. He 
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opined: “We inherited a useful instrument, but as yet, it did not represent the 
conscious work of the three states” (Kenya News, Handout No. 178, 14 June 
1967). Rothchild provides a pointed answer to this question, stating that even 
though there were wild rumours of a drastic institutional overhaul at the time 
Philip’s commission carried on its discussions, the Treaty as it finally emerged 
“reflects an emphasis upon continuity with the past rather than discontinuity” 
(Rothchild, 1967:12). The opinions expressed here are antithetical to each other, 
thus leading to the view that there are different possible conclusions to be drawn 
from the treaty that gave birth to the EAC. 
 
What is clear though is that unlike other regional institutions in Africa and in 
Europe, the EAC had both the economic and political elements at the same time. 
The East African Standard (8 June 1967) noted that the official name of the 
European Common Market is the European Economic Community. It then went 
on to ask what significance could be read into the omission of the word 
‘economic’ from the East African version. “Surely”, it stated, “it must be evident 
that there is to be a wider application in East Africa than plain economics, 
essential though this is as the bedrock for development.” Whether the EAC was 
similar to or different from other regional organizations is open to debate. But 
what is important to note is that the good working relationship between East 
African resulted into the establishment of the EAC in December 1967. 
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Chapter summary 
The main purpose of this chapter was to demonstrate African agency in the 
establishment of the EAC. It showed how the East African leadership embraced 
the idea of regional integration and which practical steps they took to ensure that 
this idea became a reality in the end. One of the key arguments is that existing 
personal and political relationships amongst East African leaders within and 
between territories played an instrumental role in facilitating the success of 
regional integration in East Africa. Although East Africans in general had been 
opposed to regional integration at first, by the mid to the late 1950s they realized 
that in fact they stood to gain both economically and politically through joint 
effort. It was in this context that they revisited their initial position and embraced 
the idea of regional integration. What facilitated this change of mind was the fact 
that East African territories were now moving towards independence and would 
therefore integrate on their terms; they would not be dictated to by Britain.   
 
The achievement of self-government by Tanganyika in 1961 marked a watershed 
in East African politics. This event left East Africans convinced that the freedom 
that had eluded them for so many decades was not a mirage. The sympathetic 
gesture demonstrated by President Nyerere and his people that they were prepared 
to delay their independence for the sake of the region brought East Africans even 
closer than ever before. They realized that through joint effort the whole of East 
Africa would eventually be free from British domination under which they had 
languished for many years. The Declaration signed in June 1963 should be 
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understood in this context. At independence, the East African leadership 
appropriated what had been a colonial initiative and used it to determine their fate 
as a region. The decision to sign the Declaration in Kenya and the 1967 treaty in 
Tanzania is reflective of the serious thinking by East African politicians about the 
importance of demonstrating their eagerness to maintain inter-territoriality. 
Uganda was equally active in ensuring that the regional integration project 
succeeded but as shall be seen in the next chapter, the relationship between Obote 
and the Kabaka of Buganda did not make Uganda a suitable place for the hosting 
of most of the regional events and institutions.  
 
In conclusion, the establishment of the EAC in 1967 was made possible by the 
existing good relationships that existed amongst East African leaders, which was 
demonstrated in part by the Declaration they signed on 5 June 1963. But the 
questions that arise are the following: why did the EAC collapse in 1977, just ten 
years after it was constituted? What happened to the good inter-personal 
relationships that had sustained inter-territorial ties for so long between and 
within territories? These questions are addressed in the next two chapters.  
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CHAPTER 5 
Personal Interests, Sub-nationalisms and the Collapse of the EAC 
 
0. Introduction 
It is a truism that all marriages have their ups and downs. So, “the East African 
Community, the marriage of convenience between Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, 
is no exception” (Weekly Review, 15 February 1975:6). In the previous chapter we 
saw how personal relationships between East African leaders paved the way for 
the establishment of the EAC in 1967. The present chapter demonstrates how 
personal interests and sub-nationalisms sounded the death knells for the EAC 
even long before it was officially constituted. Some of the problems that led to the 
demise of the EAC could have been avoided by the parties involved. However, 
others were so complex and almost inevitable because they were deeply ingrained 
in regional institutions in general (Report of the Commission on Closer Union, 
1929. Cmnd.3234:234). It should be mentioned upfront that the EAC started 
falling apart as it was being constituted. The present chapter develops this 
submission by tracing personal interests and sub-nationalisms from the initial 
stages of regional integration endeavours in the 1920s and 1930s right up to 1977 
when the EAC was finally dissolved. In other words, the argument here is that the 
EAC died a slow death over a long period of time. When new challenges emerged 
the EAC was easily shaken because it did not have a solid foundation.  
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Suffice to say personal interests and sub-nationalisms were bound to emerge in 
East Africa given the differences that existed amongst different territories. Mr. 
Campbell, one of the British appointees at the Colonial Office, once alluded to 
this problem in a broader context when he stated that the conditions in different 
colonies varied widely to the extent that it was even difficult to predict the way in 
which co-operation amongst those colonies could be harnessed for their 
improvement. However, he remained optimistic and argued: “There exist in many 
of our colonial territories customs of considerable antiquity which contain a 
definitely co-operative element” (Campbell, Memorandum on Co-operation in the 
Colonies, KNA.K325.31 CAM, pars. 5 and 7). Campbell reminded all parties 
concerned that co-operation is a long-term investment. In his view, co-operation 
would prevent unnecessary competition amongst different territories but could not 
in any way produce spectacular results instantly. The entire process had to be 
allowed to run its course. 
 
5.1 Sub-nationalisms and Regional Integration, 1930s-1950s 
Sub-nationalism is characterized by parochialism. This phenomenon looms large 
in regional integration in East Africa. For example, a native Ugandan owed his or 
her first loyalty to the kingdom before any other political unit. Uganda had four 
prominent kingdoms: Buganda, Bunyoro, Ankole and Toro. The most powerful of 
these was the Kingdom of Buganda (Allen, 2004). When Sir Andrew Cohen was 
appointed as the Governor of Uganda in 1952, one of the questions he faced was 
what to do with the kingdoms? This was a vexing problem to which there was no 
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simple answer. Dismantling them would have culminated in administrative chaos. 
Retaining them on the other hand meant that they could not be integrated into the 
Uganda protectorate. 
 
The Kingdom of Buganda was one of the earliest threats to the life of the EAC. 
As the territory of Uganda strived for independence from Britain, King Mutesa II, 
the last Kabaka of Buganda, did not see himself as part of Uganda. In his view, 
Buganda was a separate political entity that had nothing to do with the Uganda 
Protectorate. In 1953, he clashed with Cohen over the latter’s plan to unite 
Uganda. Consequently, King Mutesa II was sent into exile in England for two 
years. Wiseman (1991:154) sums up this episode in the following manner: 
In the colonial period Buganda had enjoyed a semi-autonomous status and 
Mutesa began campaigning for his Kingdom to become a separate 
independent state and not part of Uganda. He was exiled for a time in 
Britain in the 1950s because of his opposition to the inclusion of Buganda 
in Uganda, but eventually a compromise solution, whereby his Kingdom 
would have a degree of autonomy in the independent state of Uganda, was 
agreed. 
 
 
Relations between King Mutesa II and Obote deteriorated.  In 1966, the King 
ordered Obote to totally withdraw from Buganda. The latter responded by 
instructing the commander of his army, Amin to storm and shell the Royal Palace. 
King Mutesa II escaped and went into exile in Britain where he died in 1969.  
 
This sub-nationalism threatened the life of the EAC even before it came into 
being. Cohen was not the only one who was worried about Buganda, “Milton 
Obote, a Langi tribesman and leader of the independence movement, saw the 
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influence of Buganda in Ugandan politics as a potential obstacle to his own rise to 
power” (Allen, 2004:12). The Kingdom of Buganda was not only a threat to 
Obote but also to the regional integration project he aspired to promote. The 
personal relationships between the Kabaka and Obote were not good and this 
contributed in part to the former opposing regional integration. As far as the 
Baganda were concerned, if any benefits accrued from this venture, it would 
benefit the Uganda Protectorate, not the Kingdom of Buganda. To this effect, the 
Kabaka wrote a letter to W. Ormsby-Gore, the chair of the East Africa 
Commission, articulating his views and those of the Baganda – not of Ugandans 
in general. The Kabaka stated in the letter: 
I now pass on to the burning question of the federation. It is true no 
definite proposals have as yet been formulated upon which such federation 
would be based. It is feared, however, and quite naturally, that whatever 
form the proposed federation will ultimately take, there is no possible 
hope of any benefit accruing therefrom to the Baganda and the 
constitution of this kingdom (Kabaka of Buganda to Mr. W. Ormsby-
Gore, 1927, par.81). 
 
This is one example of how sub-nationalism played itself out. Amongst the 
reasons he provided was the fact that the Buganda Kingdom was very small and 
that it was overshadowed by the Uganda Protectorate, which some of the Baganda 
did not consider themselves to be part of. The Kabaka dug the history of Buganda 
demonstrating that it deserved more recognition than it was receiving at the time. 
He argued that Buganda had to occupy the most important place amongst the 
native tribes in the Protectorate. He feared that if the proposed federation of the 
British East African dependencies was effected as contemplated, the importance 
of Buganda would proportionately be diminished even if this was not what the 
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British Government deliberately planed to do. The Kabaka continued to say that 
any attempt to bring several smaller tribes under a federation would inevitably 
reduce Buganda’s status. He argued that such an attempt would nullify the 
Uganda Agreement of 1900, through which the British government recognized 
the Kingdom of Buganda (Kabaka of Buganda to Mr. W. Ormsby-Gore, 1927, 
pars.81-82). In a nutshell, although the Kabaka was convinced that forming the 
federation was not intended to destroy his kingdom, the reality was that there was 
no way of implementing this plan and still keep his kingdom intact.  
 
When the Joint Select Committee conducted its investigation in East Africa in 
1931, it became evident that East African leaders were thinking in personal and 
nationalist terms and did not demonstrate East African brotherhood that regional 
integration instilled in them. Serwano Kulubuya, Kosiya K. Labwoni, Chief 
Yekoniya Zirabamuzale and Samusoni Bazongere made a submission on behalf of 
their specific district, Busoga. Chief Zirabamuzale reminded the Committee that 
the people of Busoga had made a submission to the Hilton Young Commission in 
1928, and through a memorandum addressed to the Committee that they, together 
with other districts, were not in favour of any closer union. He continued by 
stating that the people of Busoga feared that if Uganda Protectorate was joined 
together with Kenya and Tanganyika “European settlers may come into Busoga 
and take away our land from us. Busoga is a small country, and there is room only 
for its inhabitants and the government officials.” (Joint Select Committee on 
Closer Union in East Africa, 1931, Cols. 550-553). 
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In essence, Chief Zirabamuzale addressed the idea of regional integration at three 
levels. First, he argued that it would not benefit Uganda to join the proposed 
union. Second, even if Uganda joined as a territory that would not mean that the 
Kingdom of Buganda should also join because he did not consider it to be part of 
Uganda territory. Third, and most importantly, he was particularly concerned 
about what Busoga would gain in all of this. In the 1960s and 1970s these sub-
nationalisms became more serious and contributed to the collapse of the EAC. 
   
Tanganyika was not immune to nationalist sentiments that were antithetical to 
regional interests. This became evident when Tanganyika made its submission to 
the Joint Select Committee. Chief Makwaia, K. M. Mwami, Francis Lwamugira 
and Hugh Martin Kayamba presented Tanganyika’s position. Chief Makwaia told 
the Committee that the people of Tanganyika spent a significant amount of time 
thinking about the possible consequences of a closer union amongst East African 
territories but could not see any possible benefits that would accrue to Tanganyika 
as a nation. He argued that they considered the developments that had taken place 
in Tanganyika since Governor Sir Donald Cameron took the reigns and concluded 
that they were better off under him than they would be in the envisaged regional 
institution comprising Tanganyika and the other two territories of Kenya, Uganda 
and the Zanzibar Island. Chief Makwaia summarized the sentiments of his people 
in the following manner: 
While all this is going on, they fear union with other countries. In their 
society every tribe has its own system of rule; and they fear that the same 
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applies to governments; and that, if they are joined with Uganda or Kenya, 
the rule of Uganda or Kenya will be imposed upon them, and that will 
bring difficulties to them….the fear of the Tanganyika people is because, 
for all purposes in so far as they comprehend them, the administration 
which has been established over them in Tanganyika suffices for all their 
needs (Joint Select Committee on Closer Union in East Africa, 1931, 
Col.476). 
 
As shown in this submission, Tanganyika was not thinking in regional terms, but 
in nationalist terms. The same happened with Kenya. Chief F. Koinange Mbiu, 
James Mutua and Ezekiel Apindi presented Kenya’s case to the Joint Select 
Committee. Their primary concern was the interest of the natives in Kenya. They 
argued that regional integration was not a priority for them. Instead, they called 
for the inclusion of the natives in the Legislative Councils so that they could have 
a voice on the issues that concerned them. As long as regional integration had no 
immediate benefits to Kenyans, it could not receive first priority. It follows from 
these submissions that even if East Africans could manage to suppress their sub-
nationalisms or territorial interests and at a later stage establish a regional 
institution, these sentiments would re-emerge at a certain point and threaten the 
life of that regional institution. Indeed, this is what happened in the 1960s and 
1970s.  
 
As the British continued with the process of bringing East African territories 
closer to one another, it became clear that cracks were already emerging amongst 
them. About two years before the establishment of the EAHC, East African 
authorities were very careful about what they said and how they said it because 
they were mindful of the different interests that existed in the region. Towards the 
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end of June in 1946 for example, S.W.P. Forster, Kenya’s Attorney General, 
responded to some proposals made by the Governor of Uganda on regional issues 
by stating that he agreed with the view that the concession, contended for by the 
Governor of Uganda, was more likely to result in a movement into Kenya from 
other East African territories than a movement from Kenya. However, he argued 
that it would make sense to accept the proposal in principle because the East 
African colonies would soon be unified anyway (Response from Kenya’s 
Attorney General, 26 June 1946, KNA.CS/2/6/3).  
 
Personal interests and sub-nationalisms continued to be the timed bomb in East 
Africa even in the 1950s when the East African leadership had already embraced 
the idea of regional integration. Territorial and inter-territorial interests were 
always in contention. At times this became evident during the sitting of the East 
Africa Central Legislative Assembly where Members of the House would 
advance national as opposed to regional interests. For example in 1957, Mr. 
Mulondo, a Member of the House from Uganda, focused his address largely on 
Uganda’s interests and identified specific areas where Uganda would be prepared 
to cooperate with other territories because it stood to benefit from such 
cooperation. He asked Members of the Assembly to rest assured that all Ugandan 
residents were very much interested in the regional services because they were 
affected by all the human problems of disease and the other demands that could 
best be addressed at the regional level. For example, he stated that Ugandan 
residents were interested in the East African Railways and Harbours because of 
 135
their cotton, minerals (copper), hides, skins and other products. Moreover, it was 
only by the East African Railways and Harbours that they could transport their 
produce and themselves to and from Uganda (EAHC. Proceedings of the East 
Africa Central Legislative Assembly. Official Report, Vol.X, No.1, 1957. Cols. 
441-442). 
 
Some people in Uganda were suspicious that regional integration was a British 
strategy to deprive them of part of their land. Africans from the Eastern Province 
suspected that Her Majesty’s Government wanted to remove the entire Eastern 
Province from Uganda and add it to Kenya, which was already dominated by 
white settlers. Of course, this suspicion was unfounded but the fact that it existed 
meant that when the EAC was finally constituted such national consciousness 
would keep re-emerging at certain moments.   
 
The competition between national and regional interests continued unabated in the 
1950s. In 1959, for example, Mr. Hinchey, the Financial Secretary of the EAHC 
had an exchange of words with Mr. Mntambo, one of the East African Members 
regarding the location of the regional research organizations. The latter was not 
impressed by the fact that these organizations benefited the country where they 
were located (in this case, Kenya) more than the other two counterparts. Mr. 
Hinchey on the other hand argued that distributing the research organizations 
territorially was not an option because they had been sited with a view to securing 
their maximum administrative efficiency. He concluded: “so far as I am aware 
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they are placed where it is felt that they will do the best work and where the 
maximum value will be derived from their services” (EAHC. Proceedings of the 
East Africa Central Legislative Assembly. Official Report, Vol. Xii, No.1, 1959. 
Col.94). These pronouncements did not augur well for regional integration.  
 
In fact, when the East African leadership decided to join hands with other states, 
they were mostly interested in what they would gain for their respective countries. 
President Kenyatta told Kenyans that if their country was to prosper, they had to 
create a sense of togetherness, a sense of national familyhood. He then “sought to 
strengthen Kenya’s economic position by joining with Tanzania and Uganda in a 
Federation of East Africa” (Archer, 1969:154). Therefore personal and national 
interests were the guiding principles in the discussions that preceded 
independence and the formation of the EAC. 
 
5.2 Personal Interests and Sub-nationalisms After Independence 
When African countries achieved their independence in the 1960s they wasted no 
time in outlining the negative effects of the partition of the African continent by 
European powers. However, they “were reluctant, if not totally unwilling, to 
support policies likely to restrain state sovereignty and, consequently, their 
power” (Bach, 1999:2). In other words they accepted the fact that they were 
sovereign states operating independently of one another. Almost forty years after 
independence, most of the boundary-lines inherited from colonial governments 
remained unchanged in many parts of the African continent in spite of the fact 
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that they intermittently induced intractable problems. In fact, African leaders 
fought hard to retain these artificial boundaries. While acknowledging the value 
of regional integration, these African leaders were particularly interested in 
ensuring that their personal political ambitions were fulfilled and national 
interests and sovereignty guaranteed. Bach (1999:4) cites the case of the Tuaregs 
of Niger, Mali or Mauritania and argues that it is worth noting in this respect 
because: “despite ways of life which carry a strong regional component, they have 
always expressed their political demands within their respective national 
contexts.” 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapters, the year 1960 is a significant signpost in 
East African political history. This is because that is when Tanganyika got self-
government. What is interesting is that even at this time when East African 
brotherhood had been entrenched, personal and nationalist interests were still in 
contention with each other as reflected in different forums. For example, during 
the Council Debates in Tanganyika, the Attorney General made a revealing 
statement that one way of achieving uniformity in East Africa was for Tanganyika 
to make her laws outstandingly good such that they could then be imitated or 
adopted by the other two territories. He concluded by saying that this was the 
policy Tanganyika would follow (Council Debates (Hansard) Tanganyika 
Legislative Council. Official Report, 1960. Col.355). Implicit in the utterances 
was the view that while determined to sustain regional unity, Tanganyika was still 
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vulnerable to nationalist sentiments and there was no guarantee that such 
sentiments would dissipate after the establishment of the EAC. 
 
At the beginning of 1961, just a few months before Tanganyika officially became 
independent, nationalist sentiments dominated the House. By this time East 
Africans were already talking in regional terms but some politicians in the 
National Assemblies of different East African territories alluded to the fact that no 
regional institution could overpower national interests. Mr. Tumbo, a Member of 
the House in Tanganyika, asked the Minister of Communications, Power and 
Works if he would urge the High Commissioner to stop the inter-territorial 
transfer of skilled railway staff and employ only Tanganyikans in all of 
Tanganyika’s branches of the East Africa Railways and Harbours. In response to 
this question the Minister stated that East African Railways and Harbours was an 
Inter-territorial service and that employees “are not normally transferred away 
from their country of origin unless it is for their personal benefit in the matter of 
promotion, which is not available to them in their home country” (Council 
Debates (Hansard) Tanganyika Legislative Council. Official Report, 1961. 
Col.23). 
 
By this time (the early 1960s), President Nyerere had already sounded a warning 
that the feeling of unity sweeping across East Africa could be whittled away 
almost instantly if each country got independence separately and became open to 
the temptations of nationhood and the intrigues of those who find their strength in 
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the weakness of small nations. Therefore the fact that each of the East African 
countries achieved independence separately meant that personal and nationalist 
feelings would dominate over regional sentiments (see chapter 6 below). 
 
One of the issues that would later cause disintegration in East Africa was the 
manner in which some politicians perceived the interests of their leaders and those 
of their respective countries. Dr. Kiano, referred to earlier in this study, was not 
impressed by what he called ‘cheap politics’ practiced by some of his fellow East 
Africans. He reminded them that when President Kenyatta called for a one-party 
system he was informed by the fact that Tanganyika had a one-party democracy 
and therefore wanted to bring synergy in the region. But he also continued to say 
that it was not up to Kenya alone to make the final decision as some seemed to 
believe. He continued to say that these people seemed to forget that Tanganyika 
had a parliament and Uganda too had a parliament and that both these two 
neighbours were independent sovereign states. He warned: “The date for the 
federation can only be decided upon by all the three sovereign states, just like the 
date of marriage must be agreed upon by both the bride and bridegroom” 
(Mombasa Times, 7 August 1964). In his view, formulating a federal constitution 
was necessary, but what was even more important was a meeting of the minds of 
all the people of East Africa, regarding the basic policies and principles as well as 
the ideologies that would govern the political system of the envisaged unity.                       
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It is not an exaggeration to say that from the moment the idea of regional 
integration was conceived up to the establishment of the EAC, East Africans did 
not share the same view on certain issues. For example, Benedicto Kiwanuka, 
Uganda’s former Prime Minister and President of the Opposition, traveled to 
London in the second half of 1964. While he was there he criticized Mr. Onama, 
another Ugandan Minister, for being pessimistic about the East African 
Federation. Kiwanuka maintained that Onama’s view was totally wrong and 
expressed his determination to rectify it as soon as he returned to East Africa. 
Kiwanuka went on to discuss the dangers caused by nationalist feelings to the 
regional integration project. He lamented that there was a lack of a true common 
objective. During that time it seemed as if each state wanted to get as much out of 
federation as possible for itself. He opined: “We do not want a federation and 
continue to be known as Kenyans or Ugandans or Tanzanians. My idea of 
federation is to make us into one new nation” (Mombasa Times, 26 August 1964). 
To be sure, not all East Africans had this conception of federation. These 
differences were bound to re-emerge later in the regional integration process. 
 
The comparison between economic federation and political federation was one of 
the factors that caused divisions in East Africa. Some leaders perceived economic 
integration as the means towards political integration. Others saw the two as 
separate issues with no relationship to each other. In Uganda, the Buganda 
Lukiiko or Council rejected political federation that would combine them with 
Uganda Protectorate as well as with Kenya and Tanganyika. However, the 
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Council supported economic co-operation in principle because it felt that this 
would benefit the Baganda.  
 
At the beginning of 1963, during the National Assembly Debates in Uganda, Mr. 
V. K. Rwamwaro asked Prime Minister Obote if he had received any formal 
letter(s) rejecting the idea of a political federation. In response, the Prime Minister 
indicated that there had been supporters on either side of the divide. He then 
concluded: “The government intends to co-operate fully with the other two East 
African countries in pursuit of whatever project is to the good of East Africa, 
provided such projects are not to the detriment of Uganda” (National Assembly 
Debates (Uganda). Official Report, Vol.6, 1963. Col.141). This meant that even 
after the EAC had been established these sub-nationalisms would re-surface 
intermittently. In the latter case, for example, what would be detrimental to 
Uganda was not clearly spelt out but this clause was crucial for Ugandans. 
Therefore, there was always the danger of having certain individuals who would 
argue that Uganda’s interests were not met in the federation and call for its 
dissolution, as it eventually happened.  
 
Uganda’s role in the demise of the EAC in the 1970s has been discussed 
elsewhere (Mngomezulu, 2003). A very quick analysis of Uganda’s behaviour 
from the outset demonstrates that personal and national interests prevailed over 
regional interests thus paving the way for the EAC’s collapse. Towards the end of 
1963 there were speculations that only Kenya and Tanganyika could form the 
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proposed federation and that Uganda might join later on. Joseph Murumbi, 
Kenya’s Minister of State in the Prime Minister’s Office, confirmed this 
speculation, stating: “I don’t know whether we will succeed in bringing about an 
East African Federation, but I think we will at least bring about a federation of 
Tanganyika and Kenya, and Uganda might come in at a later stage” (Uganda 
Argus, 25 October 1963. See also the telegram sent by Kenyatta to Obote, 29 
October 1963. KNA; Uganda Argus, 30 October 1963). In the telegram, President 
Kenyatta tried to convince President Obote about the need for the three East 
African territories to work together. Uganda’s politicians feared being swallowed 
overnight by the proposed federation. The independence euphoria had weakened 
relations between East African politicians who were now focusing their attention 
on national projects.                     
 
As argued in chapter 4, the signing of the Declaration in June 1963 demonstrated 
the commitment by the East African leadership to advance regional interests. 
However, that did not prevent personal interests and sub-nationalisms. In Kenya, 
Ronald Ngala, leader of the opposition party, Kenya African Democratic Union 
(KADU) wrote a letter to President Kenyatta. Amongst other things, he warned 
him about the dangers of leaving out the opposition party when signing 
agreements that would approve the establishment of the East African federation. 
His fear was that such agreements would not survive unless they received the 
blessings of all parties involved. Ngala concluded his letter by stating: “I am sure 
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I can rely on you to avoid binding decisions on this matter until you have had time 
to consider and act upon this letter” (The Sunday Post, 9 June 1963).  
 
Ngala also reminded President Kenyatta about sub-nationalism in Uganda where 
the Kingdom of Buganda was expected to demand an equal place in the federation 
as the price for agreeing to the scheme. In fact there were rumours that the 
Kabaka would be given the first presidency of the East African Federation to 
prevent him from becoming a stumbling block to the regional integration cause. 
On 29 June 1963, Presidents Kenyatta, Nyerere and Obote were scheduled to 
leave for Buganda to hold a meeting with the Kabaka to resolve outstanding 
issues (The Sunday Post, 16 June 1963). This was done with the understanding 
that unless Buganda’s sub-nationalism decreased and the Kabaka’s personal 
interests were met the future of regional integration in East Africa remained in 
limbo. 
 
Therefore, although the Declaration to work together had been signed on 5 June 
1963, personal and nationalist sentiments were still sustained. Mr. Muliro, a 
Member of the Kenya National Assembly, argued that to create the envisaged 
federation East Africans had to accept the already established traditions in the 
region. He stated boldly that he would hate to see a federation in which the 
Kingdom of Uganda would be muffled by a regional institution. Muliro’s other 
concern was that Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika and Zanzibar had national laws 
which might appear repugnant to some territories. These, he argued, had to be re-
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examined for the sake of regional integration (Government of Kenya. The 
National Assembly, House of Representatives. Official Report, 1963. Col.410). 
But for how long would each country be prepared to compromise its laws for the 
sake of regional integration? This remained a lingering question throughout the 
lifespan of the EAC once it was constituted. 
 
The conflict of opinion derived from personal and national interests continued to 
cast a cloud over regional integration in East Africa. The leadership articulated 
their views in the National Assemblies of each country and did the same at the 
East African Central Legislative Assembly. Others were published in national 
newspapers of each country. In Tanganyika, for example, P. K. Mushi, one of the 
newspaper readers, wrote to the Tanganyika Standard (8 January 1964) 
expressing his concerns about the long-term effects of some of the developments 
that had taken place up to that point. He supported the idea of uniting East Africa 
in principle but was worried about some technicalities, which, he thought, were 
the recipe for failure. He argued that bringing together people of different 
traditions and political outlook very hurriedly would create some difficulties. 
Mushi reminded his fellow East Africans that Tanganyika was a one-party state 
de fecto if not de jure, and that there was the Detention Act, 1962 in that country. 
Kenya on the other hand had regionalism underlain with some sectional feelings 
while Uganda, which had strong traditional feelings, had a ceremonial President 
and the Kabaka of Buganda. His main concern was that it was not clear as to how 
all these issues would be addressed without creating problems. 
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It must be acknowledged that despite the many similarities that existed, the three 
East African countries differed in many respects. Achieving independence at 
different dates compounded the problem because, as Nyerere had anticipated, it 
meant that national interests would take precedent over regional interests. One 
area in which this happened was in the economic sector. Economic disagreements 
between Kenya and Tanzania were amongst the principal causes of the collapse of 
the EAC (Davidson, 1964). To be sure, this view cannot be summarily refuted. 
However, it would be too simplistic to confine our analysis of the collapse of the 
EAC solely to the economic factors, important as they were. As seen above, and 
as shall be seen below, a combination of factors derived from personal and 
national interests brought the EAC to the ground. This dissertation seeks to 
identify those factors and demonstrate how each of them contributed to the 
demise of the EAC.  
 
One of the many issues that triggered national sentiments was the fact that not all 
three East African territories would get an equal piece of the cake. This became 
evident with the location of regional institutions. While the Kabaka of Buganda 
has thus far been singled out as someone who pushed personal interests whenever 
regional matters were discussed, Uganda as a whole was very much concerned 
that as the smallest nation in the region, it would have the least representational 
strength. Tanganyika, too, was beginning to have doubts about the federation. It 
felt strongly that Kenya, as the most economically developed country, braced by 
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heavy British investments, “would tend to dominate the others….” (Perl, 
1973:142). This skepticism inflicted a fatal wound on regional integration. In the 
mid-1940s Kenya had opposed the idea of amalgamating regional services under 
a Central Legislative Assembly fearing competition from Uganda and Tanganyika 
(Orwa, 1989:230). In the 1960s it was the latter that expressed fears about the 
impact of such a union. 
 
Contrary to the generally held view that in developing countries economic factors 
have a unifying role more than political factors, economic federation failed to 
unite East Africans. For example, the East African Common Market did not 
appeal to everyone. Uganda and Tanganyika argued that the whole enterprise was 
benefiting Kenya alone because Nairobi was the nerve center of economic and 
communication activities in the region – linking the whole of East Africa with 
metropolitan Europe and North America. In a way, this complaint had substance. 
The location in Kenya of most headquarters of the Common Services – although 
deemed largely desirable by some for administrative reasons – gave rise to the 
feeling that Kenya was getting a lion’s share. Indeed, Kenya was well advanced in 
industrial manufactures. Also, more Kenyans, compared to Ugandans and 
Tanzanians, were getting employment. Moreover, foreign investors tended to 
prefer Kenya to all East African territories, in part because it was home to white 
settlers. But this was Britain’s fault, not Kenya. 
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Such realities weakened relations between East Africans. As the international 
community hailed President Kenyatta the national hero for elevating his country’s 
status, Presidents Nyerere and Obote felt ignored and belittled. They were 
concerned about Tanzania and Uganda becoming the peripheries that supplied 
raw materials to be used by different industries based in Kenya. Orwa (1989:234) 
made the observation that: “Ideological differences that emerged among the East 
African states at the beginning of the second half of the 1960s can partly be 
explained by the failure to redress the economic imbalance.” This observation is 
true. As mentioned in the introduction, economic imbalances were amongst the 
factors that played a key role in the EAC’s demise. 
 
According to the terms of EACSO, goods between Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania 
were not charged duty fees in line with the spirit of East African brotherhood. 
Each of the three countries was also obliged to sell goods to its neighbours. There 
was a feeling from Uganda and Tanzania that Kenya had an upper hand because 
she allegedly sold goods to Uganda and Tanzania at higher prices than they would 
have paid if they imported such goods from outside the region (Perl, 1973). Had it 
not been for the binding terms of the EACSO agreement, the two countries would 
have considered importing goods from other countries at a much cheaper price 
than they were paying. In that way they would be saving a lot of money.  
 
What also made things even tougher for the two economically weaker countries at 
a later stage were the terms of the Treaty for East African Co-operation. Chapter 
 148
III, article 9(1) of the Treaty stated that partner states agreed that where customs 
duty had been charged and collected on any goods imported into a Partner State 
from a foreign country then such goods would not be liable for further customs 
duty on transfer to any other Partner State provided that where the rate of customs 
duty applicable to such goods in the receiving state exceeded that charged and 
collected in the importing state (Treaty for East African Co-operation, 1967; 
Kenya Gazette Supplement Bills 1967:397). 
 
These treaties meant that Uganda and Tanzania lost the revenue from customs 
duties that they would have been collecting from foreign imports had the 
agreements not been signed. In his assessment of regional economic co-operation 
in East Africa, Roe (1967:14) stated that Tanzania and Uganda had sustained 
some losses as the result of the Common Market arrangements because the 
imports which they would have purchased from abroad in the absence of these 
arrangements would have earned import duty revenues, “while the replacement 
imports from Kenya enter the country duty free.” As a result of this uneven share 
of the cake, Tanzania threatened to pull out of the regional institution. Obviously, 
East African politicians were aware of these problems but were more concerned 
about nurturing regional integration than anything else. However, as these 
concerns became persistent, they felt that something had to be done to address the 
situation before it escalated and caused more damage to the region.  
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Under these circumstances, East Africans had to either break up the Common 
Services arrangements or else try to devise a way of economic co-operation that 
would be acceptable to all three partners. Therefore, one of the terms of reference 
of the Raisman Commission mentioned earlier in this dissertation was to address 
this very sensitive issue. However, in its report, the Commission advised against 
ending both the customs Union and the Common Services but responded to 
Tanganyika and Uganda’s concerns by recommending that there should be fiscal 
compensation from Kenya to her two counterparts. This recommendation only 
pacified the two countries but failed to uproot the problem in its entirety.  
 
5.3 The Kampala Agreement 
As a result of continued dissatisfaction by Tanganyika and Uganda, the leaders of 
the three countries convened in Uganda in 1963 to deliberate on this issue with 
the hope of finding a lasting solution. Subsequently the Kampala Agreement was 
signed and came into full force in 1965. This Agreement suggested five methods 
that could assist in addressing the imbalances that existed amongst East African 
countries. These methods could be summarized as follows: 
 
1. Immediate action, with certain inter-territorially connected firm to increase 
production in a deficit country and thereby reduce imports from a surplus 
country; 
2. Agreement as to the immediate allocation of certain major industries; 
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3. The application of a system of quotas and suspended quotas whereby exports 
from surplus countries would be progressively reduced, and local production 
increased in the deficit countries according to the building up of the 
productive capacity of the deficit country; 
4. Increased sales from a country in a deficit to a country in surplus; and 
5. Early agreement within the East African Common Market on a system of 
inducements and allocations of industry in order to secure the equitable 
distribution of industrial development as between the three countries (the 
Kampala Agreement, 1965). 
 
Obviously, more thinking went into these suggested methods. But there was 
negligence in implementing them. For example, on many occasions there was 
evident failure to notify other member states before an action was taken on a 
specific issue (EACSO. Proceedings of the Central Legislative Assembly 
Debates. Official Report, Vol. IV, No.3, 1965. Cols. 1057-1064). Under these 
circumstances the conflict of interests persisted and the relations within the East 
African leadership weakened.   
 
The Kampala Agreement went a long way towards addressing some of the 
nationalist interests that were putting the regional integration project in limbo, but 
not before some squabbles erupted. Tanzania complained that Kenya did not want 
to ratify the Agreement thus raising questions about its legitimacy. This did not go 
down well with the Tanzanian leadership who felt cheated. They expressed their 
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frustrations by stating that Tanzania could not force Kenya to ratify the 
Agreement if she did not wish to do so and yet the Agreement imposed 
obligations and rights on all participants. In a way, this frustration was quite 
understandable. For a period of 19 months the Tanzanian Government had been 
acting as if it was bound by an Agreement which did not exist in any legal form. It 
had been accepting the obligations and restrictions of the Kampala Agreement 
without receiving any benefits from it. The main question was how much longer 
could Tanzania afford to adhere to an Agreement which Kenya did not honour 
(Nationalist, 2 December 1965). 
 
In a way, the Kampala Agreement seemed to be adding more problems than 
providing solutions to the pre-existing ones. Eventually Kenya ratified the 
Agreement, which provided that new industries for the East African Market 
should be developed in Uganda and Tanganyika and that companies with 
branches in all three countries should discontinue their operation in Kenya, thus 
shifting employment opportunities and commercial advantages to the other two 
partner states. From 1965, firms, which manufactured goods such as beer, 
cigarettes and footware relocated to Uganda and Tanzania. The Kampala 
Agreement also permitted an EACSO country with a larger trade deficit to restrict 
the intake of goods from another EACSO country (Delupis, 1969; Robson, 1967; 
Mungai, 1967; Perl, 1973; and Mugomba, 1978). It was felt that these measures 
would try to ease the tensions. 
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On paper, at least, this Agreement looked impressive but there is no doubt that not 
everybody was impressed by it. Naturally, Kenya was not happy because she had 
to make most (if not all) of the compromises although she was also aware of the 
fact that she had been gaining more at the expense of her two counterparts. But 
despite the inevitable challenges the Kampala Agreement succeeded in addressing 
some of the issues that were making East African politicians drift apart thus 
threatening the life of the EAC. 
 
The Agreement decentralized EACSO in many ways and addressed some of the 
national concerns. Except for the East African Railways and the air transport 
services, the rest of the regional services were removed from Nairobi. Postal and 
telecommunication operations and the Central Development Bank were relocated 
in Kampala. The control of harbours and shipping moved to Dar es Salaam. The 
EAC administrative headquarters were established in Arusha in the northern part 
of Tanzania. As mentioned above, according to a new trade agreement, an EAC 
country with a large deficit could now restrict goods from a sister country and 
could impose a transfer tax, which was previously prohibited.  
 
These new arrangements meant that Uganda and Tanganyika could now develop 
their own industries and sell their products domestically. In the mid-1960s 
Tanganyika resorted to unilateral import restrictions against Kenya (Robson, 
1967). As each of the three East African countries used this opportunity to 
redirect its economy, the idea of regional integration somewhat gave way to 
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nationalist sentiments. Subsequently, Tanganyika moved towards agrarian 
socialism; Uganda moved towards revolutionary Africanization of its business 
sector; and Kenya on the other hand moved towards what was dubbed ‘gradual 
Kenyanization’ of its economy (Perl, 1973).  Garba (1987:125) recalls that the 
rivalry, especially between Tanzania and Kenya played a key role in the collapse 
of the EAC. He states that this rivalry grew from the ideological orientation of the 
two. Tanzanians, with their ascetic and philosophical acceptance of the virtues of 
socialist development, “were usually contemptuous of Kenyans whose enthusiasm 
for free enterprise and capitalist development contrasted sharply with the 
Tanzania experiment.” Therefore, the Kampala Agreement did not provide a 
lasting solution to the East African problems with regional integration.  
 
5.4 Dissolution of the East African Currency Board 
During the budget speeches delivered in June 1965, the Finance Ministers of 
Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda made an announcement that their respective 
governments had taken a decision to end the East African Currency Board and 
start preparing for the establishment of separate central banks and national 
currencies in each country. These developments brought to the open the national 
interests people had been speculating about for some time and the weakening 
relationship in the East African leadership. The report of the East African 
Currency Board argued that the root cause of the failure stood out clearly. 
Overall, each had wanted to preserve the benefits of a common currency however 
there had been no collective and unqualified acceptance of what a currency union 
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required in terms of the sharing of sovereignty over a wide range of matters and in 
terms of the limitations which this sharing might impose on national economic 
policies and ambitions (Report of the East African Currency Board, 1965). 
 
Therefore, although, to some, the decision taken in 1965 was both disappointing 
and regrettable, it was a welcome decision because it addressed the realities East 
Africa was faced with at the time and ended a long period of wishful thinking and 
speculation. The decision exposed the danger of trying to operate a very loose 
system of central banking in the region when it was evident that national interests 
dominated over regional interests. These were some of the early signs that the 
envisaged EAC would not survive. 
 
In 1965, Professor W.T. Newlyn published an article in Transition (Vol.5(i), 
No.24, 1965) in which he commented about Tanzania’s legislation on the 
establishment of a National Bank of Tanzania. Subsequently, A. H. Jamal, 
Tanzania’s Minister of Finance published a letter in the same journal responding 
to Newlyn’s comments. Amongst other things he argued that the problem of 
finding the optimum rate of credit expansion is difficult for any country; but that 
in the case of East Africa the difficulty was compounded by the fact that there 
was no such country as East Africa. Instead, there were three countries, i.e. 
Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. Therefore, in his view, even if the Currency Board 
had decided to adopt a more positive monetary policy, this would have not 
worked given the political set-up in the East African region. 
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It should be reiterated that nationalist sentiments destroyed the EAC even before 
it was officially constituted. As discussed in chapter 3, the EAC was inaugurated 
in December 1967, following an agreement signed in June of that year. However, 
by the first quarter of 1967 the cracks amongst East Africans were already 
evident. Attempts to conceal or address them proved to be unsuccessful 
 
As shown above, East African Ministers of Finance resolved to dissolve the 
Currency Board and establish national banks. Tanzania was more instrumental in 
this regard. This was in part because of her socialist principles which could not be 
successfully implemented as long as the country remained a Member of the East 
African Currency Board. At one of the Press Conferences held around this time, 
journalists asked President Nyerere to comment on these new developments and 
wanted to know from him why Tanzania was reneging on her previous promise to 
promote regional interests. President Nyerere responded rather emotionally: 
You have already heard what is being said that now Tanzania is 
hammering the last blow on East African co-operation. Why? Why should 
East African co-operation be endangered because we own our banks! If 
the fact that we own our banks makes East African co-operation totter, 
then it totters only one-third. When Uganda will own her banks, it will 
totter two-thirds and when Kenya will own her banks, it will completely 
break up! If East African co-operation depends on not owning our banks, 
then we are saying we have interfered with it only 33 per cent, and 66 
percent is still there. But it is all rubbish! (Nationalist, 6 March 1967). 
 
The tone in President Nyerere’s response clearly shows that he was not impressed 
by the accusations leveled against him and his nation. As far as he was concerned, 
regional interests were important for the sake of African unity but national 
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interests were even more important and, therefore, had to receive first priority 
whenever regional issues were discussed. In his view, if he did not do this he 
would have failed his people as their head of state.       
 
Personal interests and sub-nationalisms dominated the debate sessions during the 
sitting of the East Africa Central Legislative Assembly as evidenced in the sitting 
of mid-1965. During that sitting, Mr. Makame, one of the Members of the House 
from Kenya, referred to a comment made by Mulira of Uganda during his address 
on the previous Friday whereby the former complained about the concentration of 
EACSO services in Nairobi. Mulira had referred specifically to the civil aviation 
services, arguing that it was not fair for Ugandan pilots to travel all the way from 
Uganda to obtain a license from Kenya. Mulira had concluded his address by 
suggesting that every effort be made to distribute EACSO services equally among 
the three member states to avoid conflicts emanating from national interests. In 
his view, this state of affairs was unfortunate and accidental. 
 
Makame sympathized with his colleague from Uganda, stating that these national 
sentiments were bound to arise since Nairobi was the headquarters of the EACSO 
secretariat. However, for him politicians from Kenya were not to blame for that. 
He posed the question: ‘who is to blame for this concentration of services?’ His 
answer was that colonialists, not Kenyans, were to blame. He qualified his 
assertion by reminding the House that the reason why colonialists did this was 
because they lived under the false impression that they would never leave East 
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Africa and thus concentrated these EACSO services in Nairobi because that was 
going to be the center of their activities. That was why, he argued, Nakuru, one of 
the village townships in Kenya, had a new better railway station than Dar es 
Salaam, although the latter was a capital city (EACSO. Proceedings of the Central 
Legislative Assembly Debates. Official Report, Vol. IV, No.4, 1965. Cols. 158-
159).   
 
The nationalist sentiments discussed thus far lead to the conclusion that both 
political and economic regional integration had more problems than its 
proponents wanted to believe. As shown above, these problems presented 
themselves in many ways and at different moments. However, other problems 
were suppressed by those who wanted to see East African integration become a 
reality. In their talks, they gave the impression that everything was going 
according to plan when in fact the opposite was true. Kiwanuka, Uganda’s 
opposition leader was one of these optimists. He once argued that the question of 
where the regional capital was to be located once political federation had been 
completed or who would take what “would be of no immediate concern but 
matters of detail” (Mombasa Times, 26 August 1964). But did Kiwanuka really 
believe what he said or was he just expressing his wishes? Evidence points to the 
latter. As shall be seen in the next chapter, when the Federal University of East 
Africa was established the question of the site was one of the key issues that 
raised national sentiments above regional plans. In fact, had the question of the 
site not been a major issue in regional plans, there would have been no need to 
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relocate EACSO headquarters and businesses from Kenya to Uganda and 
Tanzania as recommended by the Kampala Agreement. 
 
Banfield (1963) reflected on some of the problems the East African leadership 
wrestled with in the 1960s. Her views could be summarized as follows: 
 
• Territorial governments were reluctant to second their able men and 
women to service outside their own respective governments; 
• Young graduates were unwilling to forgo prestige and salaries offered by 
their own countries for a service with EACSO, which could not offer the 
permanency and status of the territorial services; 
• It was difficult to attract staff from all the territories in equal measure and 
to encourage those already employed to accept postings in other parts of 
East Africa; and 
• The great majority of the African staff headquarters were from Kenya but 
they were likely to be superceded when staff from the other two territories 
were promoted ahead of them, to rectify the existing imbalance. 
 
Schraeder (in Gordon and Gordon, 1996:142-143) argued that the problems were 
caused by:  
• The polarization of national development and the perception of unequal 
gains; 
 159
• Inadequacy of compensatory and corrective measures – a decision taken to 
rectify the situation mentioned above; 
• Ideological differences and the rise of economic nationalism; 
• The impact of foreign influence – Kenya was assisted by the Western 
bloc; Tanzania by the Eastern bloc; and Uganda was assisted specifically 
by the Soviet Union (see also Potholm (1979).  
 
Given this wide range of issues that faced East Africans at the time, it would 
indeed be impossible to envisage problem-free regional integration in East Africa, 
be it economic or political integration. In fact, it was not unexpected that national 
sentiments would arise at different moments in this regional integration process. 
President Nyerere alluded to this submission in one of his speeches delivered in 
the Tanzanian National Assembly when he argued that each of the three East 
Africa governments was answerable to the people of its own country and that 
each of them was beset with the urgent needs of one part of the total East African 
area. He maintained that in authority meetings, each member could look at the 
interests of East Africa as a whole only to the extent that such interests did not 
conflict fundamentally with the requirements of his nation’s immediate needs. 
President Nyerere then concluded by stating the following: “Ultimately we are not 
in fact ‘East African’ leaders, but leaders of states in East Africa; and regional 
loyalty has sometimes to come second to our national responsibilities 
(Proceedings. East Africa Central Legislative Assembly, 1965. See also, 
Iconoclastes [Bethwel Ogot] (1968:5). 
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Implicit in President Nyerere’s address was that no matter how hard East African 
leaders tried to forge unity, there were limits beyond which such unity could not 
go. In theory, they could say that East Africa was a single unit but in reality 
people still recognized the pre-existing geographical boundaries that constituted 
Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. It was to these clearly marked political institutions 
and geographical spaces that East African leaders were answerable first and 
foremost. Ogot (1968) shared Nyerere’s sentiments, arguing that they were not, in 
fact, East Africans, but citizens of different states in a geographical space called 
East Africa. Ogot argued that those who appealed to history to support the unity 
of East Africa were starting from a wrong premise because historically, East 
Africa had never been united. Instead, during the pre-colonial era, East Africa 
consisted of separate ethnic groups.  
 
However, as discussed in chapter 4, East Africans fought indefatigably until they 
managed to establish the EAC in 1967. But the official signing of the Treaty did 
not miraculously end all pre-existing national interests. Writing his book two 
years later, President Kenyatta provided an elegant analysis of what the Treaty 
meant for East Africa and what it did not mean. He reasoned: 
Together with our brothers in Tanzania and Uganda, we in the Republic of 
Kenya have now allied ourselves within a new East African Treaty of co-
operation. This instrument implicitly acknowledges that whether or not 
there might be political differences as between these states, or distinct 
national interests springing from historical background or contemporary 
realities, yet there will always remain issues on which a common front can 
carry us most swiftly over common ground. Completion of this Treaty 
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derives from the strength of our belief that human need must ultimately 
triumph over all else (Kenyatta, 1968:xi). 
 
Unfortunately, like earlier attempts before it, the EAC was overwhelmed by 
problems derived from both personal relationships and national interests. Some of 
the problems experienced in the 1960s were not new. But those related to 
nationalism, which had not taken a good shape in the 1920s and 1930s, took 
center-stage in the 1960s following the achievement of political independence by 
all three East African countries and Zanzibar. 
 
5.5 Personal Relations Amongst East African Politicians in the 1970s 
Developments at the beginning of the 1970s did not augur well for the survival of 
the EAC. By the end of 1970, relations between President Obote and his army 
General, Idi Amin Dada, had become sour, as the two leaders no longer trusted 
each other (Wiseman, 1991). The overthrow of President Obote by General Amin 
in 1971 brought the issue of personal relationships back into the limelight (Weekly 
Review, 15 February 1975). Mugomba (1978:268) shares this view: “The East 
African Community has tottered on the brink of collapse ever since the military 
coup that brought Idi Amin to power.”  This incident sounded the death knells for 
the EAC in many ways. First of all, Amin was not a signatory of the Declaration 
of intent signed in June 1963. Second, he was also not part of the negotiations that 
led to the formation of the EAC in 1967. Although the treaty bound Uganda as a 
state, he did not feel obliged to abide by it. Moreover, Amin did not become 
 162
president through the normal electoral process. Therefore, there was no guarantee 
that he would be accountable to the Ugandans who had not voted him into office.  
 
To make matters worse, the Baganda supported Amin when he ascended to power 
even though he had shelled them in 1966 on Obote’s instruction during the civil 
war. Amin claimed that his fourth wife, Medina, was a gift from the Baganda. 
This meant that Amin could count on their support should he decide not to 
embrace the EAC.  
 
As the Baganda rejoiced, “African leaders outside Uganda, such as Tanzania’s 
President Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, had no such illusions” 
(Allen, 2004:37). As a result of the 1971 coup, Amin’s relations with his two 
counterparts further deteriorated, more especially his relations with President 
Nyerere who had close ties with President Obote. These sour relations had a direct 
impact on the EAC. In January 1971, President Nyerere refused to recognize the 
regime of General Amin in Uganda, because it was a Government that had come 
to power by force. He blocked Amin’s appointment to top EAC positions and 
refused to convene the East African Authority as long as Amin was in power in 
Uganda. The effect of this refusal and the asylum given to ex-President Obote in 
Tanzania after the Ugandan coup, disrupted the whole East African Community 
for the better part of a year, and allowed a series of petty incidents on the 
Tanzania-Uganda border (Van Rensburg, 1981; Springer in Potholm, 1980). This 
continued in 1972 and 1973. 
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Major-General Joe Garba who served in different capacities in the Nigerian 
government recalled in his book titled Diplomatic Soldiering that one of the major 
causes of the breaking-up of the EAC was “the personality clash between Nyerere 
and Idi Amin” (Garba, 1987:124). Moreover, following his overthrow, President 
Obote went into exile in Tanzania and stayed there until 1979 when Tanzanian 
soldiers crossed the border into Uganda to fight Amin’s forces and reinstate him 
as President. These events led to the deterioration in relations between Uganda 
and Tanzania.  
 
The fact that Amin had strained relations with the people he was supposed to 
work with in the EAC meant that the days of this regional institution were 
numbered. Garba captures the mood succinctly when he states that the idea of 
sitting down with Amin “was personally revolting to Nyerere, who occasionally 
used unprintable language to describe his Ugandan counterpart. Amin himself did 
not help matters, using equally rude language to describe Nyerere” (Garba, 
1987:125).  
 
The way in which events unfolded did not come as a surprise. Presidents Nyerere, 
Obote and Kenyatta had established strong relationships over a long period of 
time. It would not have been easy for the two Presidents to abandon President 
Obote so easily and accept Amin as a colleague now that President Obote had 
been removed from office. Had he been removed through the ballot box, perhaps 
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the situation would have been a bit different. But under these circumstances 
chances of having good relations with Amin were very minimal. This state of 
affairs put into question the wisdom in retaining the EAC. 
 
It should be noted that President Nyerere was not the only one who had sour 
relations with Amin. President Kenyatta too, turned his back on Uganda when 
Amin ousted President Obote. In fact, so intense was the antipathy between the 
two countries during Amin’s years in office that the EAC, the strongest grouping 
in Black Africa at the time, broke up and “there were constant political squabbles 
between Kampala and Nairobi and also armed border confrontations” (van 
Rensburg, 1981:178). Furthermore, the coup ruined the hope of expanding the 
EAC by admitting other Eastern African countries like Zambia. When the OAU 
Summit held in Uganda in 1975 recognized Amin as President of Uganda, 
Presidents Kaunda and Nyerere boycotted subsequent meetings (Allen, 1972).  
 
From the discussion thus far there is no doubt that regional integration in East 
Africa was built on a shaky foundation; it was sitting on a timed-bomb. One of the 
problems emanating from personal relationships, according to E.M.K. Mulira 
from the Uganda National Assembly, was that Presidents Kenyatta, Nyerere, and 
Obote forged East African unity around their personal relationships and infused it 
to the masses. In his view, East Africans tried to build unity from the top. “We 
have aimed at building unity from the top”, he argued. “This is typical of Africans 
– to build from the top. If we try to build a federation this way it is bound to fail. 
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We cannot put on a roof without first laying the foundation” (The Standard 
Tanzania, 20 May 1966). Although Mulira did not specify what that foundation 
entailed, it is evident that he was opposed to high politics taking a casual 
approach to pertinent issues like regional integration whereby the future of 
national sovereignty was at stake. Also implicit in his comment was that 
Presidents Nyerere, Kenyatta and Obote were blinded by their good relationships 
and overlooked the fact that future leaders in all three territories might not have 
such relations. Indeed, when Amin came into the picture, the whole EAC project 
was put into question.     
 
5.6 The final phase 
By the mid-1970s the writing was already on the wall that the days of the EAC 
were numbered. At this time nationalist interests made it almost impossible to run 
regional institutions. The East African Airways (EAA) had been in operation for 
almost 30 years. The Kenyan government started demanding more money from 
the Airline (200 million shillings) for hosting it and servicing its planes. To make 
matters worse, British and American manufacturers wanted their aircrafts back 
unless they were paid the big sums of money they demanded. Kenya seemed 
willing to allow the Airline to close down. As far as Tanzania was concerned, this 
would benefit Kenya more than her two counterparts in the regions because even 
if the planes were to be divided amongst the three states, only Kenya could 
service them (Weekly Review, 7 February 1977:19-20). In the end, the EAA 
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collapsed. Tanzanian employees working for the EAA in Kenya were not allowed 
to leave; they were caught up in the political battles between their leaders. 
 
Hilary Ng’weno, one of the vocal Kenyans on regional integration issues followed 
the developments with a keen interest and wrote an article on some of these 
issues. Ng’weno reminded his audience that he had used the same columns to 
predict the eventual collapse of the EAC and that the time had come. He advised 
that the EAC should be dismantled as soon as possible, not only because of the 
recent collapse of EAA which proved that there was no common will to keep the 
Community going, but because in his view “a speedy process of dismantling what 
remains of the community is the only way of minimizing the human suffering and 
bitterness which are bound to follow the final demise of the community” (Weekly 
Review, 14 February 1977:4). 
 
According to Ng’weno, the collapse of the EAA was only a symptom of more 
serious problems that haunted the EAC. He advised the three governments to 
refrain from running around frantically trying to cure the symptoms through 
ineffectual meetings. Instead, he argued, they had to face the facts and deal with 
them directly. For him the facts were clear, national and personal interests had 
made it evident that no one seemed to care about the fate of the EAC. Ng’weno 
reminded his readers about speculations that in fact Kenya had wanted the EAA 
to disintegrate so that she could establish a national airline. According to 
Kenyans, Tanzania was doing the same thing rather surreptitiously. The fact that 
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the grounding of the EAA coincided with the celebration of the tenth anniversary 
of the Arusha Declaration did not make things any better. Tanzania believed that 
this was Kenya’s well orchestrated plan. The media in Tanzania reported that the 
EAA had died because of ‘nyang’au’ [hyenas] in Kenya whose primary goal was 
to set up private airlines. 
  
For its part, Tanzania refused Kenya’s heavy transport to use its highways thus 
bringing business operation into a halt. Also, Tanzania imposed a ban on Kenyan 
tourists unless they could abide by the changed (and still changing) regulations 
drawn by the Tanzanian government. Unlike in the past, all tourists intending to 
visit Tanzania from Kenya had to fly into Kilimanjaro or Dar es Salaam; they 
were not allowed to drive into the country using Kenya-based safari vehicles. As 
one magazine put it, tourists “will now do their touring of the great Serengeti and 
Ngorongoro game areas from bases in Arusha where the standards of hotels are 
much lower than those in Nairobi” (Weekly Review, 21 February 1977:1). 
 
When Tanzanian authorities decided to close their borders, they impounded about 
30 Kenyan trucks owned by the quasi-governmental company called Kenatco, 60 
other vehicles belonging to tour companies and 30 aircrafts belonging to Nairobi-
based firms. A Tanzania-Kenya meeting was convened in Kisumu, Kenya’s 
Western province, to try and resolve some of these issues. Geoffrey Kariithi, 
Principal Secretary (PS) in the Office of the President, chaired this meeting, 
which, unfortunately, did not produce any positive results (Weekly Review, 11 
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April 1977:10). Tanzania tried to sell the idea that their actions were necessitated 
by economic reasons – which were not clearly stated. Meanwhile, there was 
growing suspicion amongst Kenyan officials that “the real motives behind the 
Tanzanian government’s permanent closure of the country’s border with Kenya 
have more to do with politics than economics” (Weekly Review, 25 April 1977:3).         
 
In Uganda, Amin announced that he was going to sign an agreement with the 
Soviet Union, in terms of which Uganda would get assistance from the Russians 
to establish the largest military base on the African continent. In addition, Soviet 
assistance would enable Uganda to establish the most modern nuclear reactor 
(Weekly Review, 23 May 1977). These are some of the exogenous forces referred 
to by Potholm (1979). 
 
It is not an exaggeration to say that of the three East African countries, Kenya was 
the only one happy to see the EAC going down to the ground because there were 
prospects for her to reap some benefits from this collapse. The same could not be 
said for Uganda and Tanzania. In June 1977, Kenya recalled her citizens who 
were performing their regional obligations in Tanzania. The reason provided was 
that the EAC’s Finance Council had failed to agree on a venue for a meeting to 
discuss the budget for the next financial year of the general funds services, which 
included the secretariat of the EAC. Kenya also complained about Tanzania’s 
decision to impound her vehicles and to close her border. It should be mentioned 
that Kenya was the first country to admit that the EAC had collapsed while the 
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other two were still contemplating ways in which the life of this regional 
institution could be salvaged. The Weekly Review (11 July 1977) illustrated this 
point explicitly by recalling that there had been mud-slinging, name-calling, and 
confrontation politics for a long time, all of which were signs that things were not 
going well with the EAC. It then reported that the three East African states, which 
had been partners in what was regarded as Africa’s star example of regional 
cooperation, had eventually faced the reality and resolved to end the EAC. 
 
The EAC died a slow death. The nature of the relationships within the East 
African leadership had resulted into the establishment of the EAC but as personal 
and nationalist interests kicked in, and as strained relations developed amongst 
East African leaders, the future of this regional institution hung in the balance. All 
attempts to salvage the life of the EAC failed and eventually East African leaders 
conceded that the only remaining option was to dissolve it in 1977. Ojo 
(1985:159-171), one of the experts on regional integration attributes the collapse 
of the EAC to the following four factors: 
• The polarization of national development and the perception of unequal 
gains whereby Kenya’s share of intra-community trade increased from 63 
percent in 1968 to 77 percent in 1974 whereas Uganda’s share decreased 
from 26 to 6 percent during the same period. 
• Inadequacy of compensatory and corrective measures. 
• Ideological differences and the rise of economic nationalism. 
• The impact of foreign influences as a result of the Cold War . 
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Chapter Summary 
From the discussion in this chapter, it is clear that the collapse of the EAC was 
inevitable, either because East Africans tried to build unity from the top as Mulira 
intimated, or simply because from the very beginning the three East African 
territories had never been a single unit. As long as national interests predominated 
over regional interests the EAC was bound to fail. The Ugandan delegation had 
sounded a warning earlier on, arguing that bringing different states together was a 
new experiment for East Africa and that “every problem should be approached 
with an open mind, all possibilities being explored so that the working solution 
for our circumstances could be evolved for our peoples” (Comments by the 
Uganda Delegation. KNA. GO/3/2/78). Seemingly this did not happen. Pearl 
(1973) saw East African territories as dissimilar developing nations, each trying to 
define its present and map out its future. She continued by recalling that even the 
hope for a cooperative and constructive sharing in the post-independence years, 
based on common problems, proved to be a mockery. 
 
The purpose of this chapter was to demonstrate that although East African leaders 
were so determined to work together as a unit, national interests, and sometimes 
egotism, took precedence over regional interests. In the end, nationalism and sub-
nationalisms determined the fate of the EAC. The East African leadership felt that 
they were answerable to their nations first and foremost before they were 
answerable to their region. It was in this context that the location of a number of 
factories in Nairobi, Kenya, caused divisions within the region. As Nyerere had 
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anticipated, the achievement of political independence by these East African 
territories on different dates sounded the death knells for both economic and 
political integration in the region. The different economic paths taken by each 
country at independence compounded the problem even further. 
 
It is not an exaggeration to say that personal relationships amongst East African 
leaders played an instrumental role in the establishment of the EAC. Similarly, 
sour relations amongst these leaders, caused by ideological differences adopted by 
each country after independence, the overthrow of President Obote by Amin in 
January 1971, and other factors outlined by Potholm (1979), combined to bring 
the EAC to its knees.    
 
The sequence of events discussed in this chapter has shown how it was almost 
impossible to sustain the life of the EAC as much as it had been difficult to 
establish it in the first place. But so far the discussion has revolved around 
economic and political integration. Equally important in our analysis is the 
education sector. One of the reasons why the EAC was dismantled in 1977 was 
because regional integration in higher education had already failed when the UEA 
was dissolved in June 1970. The next chapter demonstrates the challenge of trying 
to sustain regional integration in other areas when it had already proved 
unsuccessful in higher education with the dissolution of the federal university.  
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Chapter 6 
Mission Impossible: The EAC and the Collapse of the Federal University8 
 
0. Introduction 
There is a direct link between the UEA and the EAC. Both institutions were 
established under similar conditions; they were part of the regional integration 
project in East Africa. Moreover, the political factor was the key driving motive 
behind the establishment of both of these institutions. As with the EAC, the initial 
idea of establishing a regional university came from British authorities who feared 
that if no such institution existed in East Africa students would be forced to travel 
abroad to further their studies. The possible negative impact of these travels was 
that the students might be exposed to political agitation and cause problems when 
they returned home after completing their studies in foreign countries.  
 
A District Commissioner in Lango, Uganda, was more explicit on this issue when 
he warned British education officers based in Uganda against sending the native 
abroad for further education. He confided that he not happy about the native going 
to a more advanced course abroad: “Certainly I feel that the political intrigues 
would be most…unfortunate for him and I feel that probably you would feel the 
results when he returned” (Cited in Okello-Oculi, 1967:15). The Governor 
anticipated that the students would come home with good qualifications and get 
                                                 
8 Most of the information used in this chapter was taken from my PhD thesis but was revised to 
suit the context of this dissertation. See Bhekithemba Richard Mngomezulu. 2004. ‘A Political 
History of Higher Education in East Africa. The Rise and Fall of the University of East Africa, 
1937-1970.’ PhD Thesis, Rice University, especially Chapter 5. 
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frustrated when they realized that certain jobs were reserved for whites, at which 
point they might cause political instability in the region. As a preventative 
measure, the idea of establishing a regional university was conceived.  
 
These were the political factors that led to the establishment of the UEA. As shall 
be seen later in this chapter, the reasons that led to the disintegration of both 
institutions were similar. Therefore, when the Federal University disbanded in 
1970, it was a foregone conclusion that the EAC would also not survive. In a way, 
the collapse of the EAC in 1977 did not come as a surprise. The purpose of this 
chapter is to demonstrate the similarities between the two institutions and to show 
that the demise of the federal University sounded the death knells for the EAC.   
 
6.1 The Establishment of the University of East Africa 
Although discussions about the development of higher education in East Africa 
started in the early 1920s, the actual process of establishing the UEA began in 
with the appointment of the De la Warr Commission by W. G. A. Ormsby-Gore, 
Secretary of State for the Colonies on 28 May 1936. The Commission was tasked: 
1) To examine and report upon the organization and working of Makerere College 
[located in Uganda] and of the institutions or other agencies for advanced 
vocational training connected with it in relation to (i) the society which they were 
intended to serve, and (ii) the educational systems of the territories from which 
the students were drawn; 2) To make recommendations for the development and 
administrative control of Makerere College and its allied institutions to this end; 
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and 3) In making such recommendations to consider: (a) the effect of the 
development of the College upon educational organization of the territories 
concerned; (b) the general interest and needs of the communities from which 
students were, or might in future be drawn, and (c) the educational needs of 
women (De la Warr Commission Report, 1937). 
 
On 2 September 1937 the Commission presented its report to the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies. Amongst its key recommendations were the following: 
We are proposing the establishment of a University College in the near 
future, and of a University at no very distant date. We are aware of the 
present very flimsy foundations of primary and secondary education upon 
which such institutions will need to be based, and realize the possible risks 
of too rapid advance and of top-heavy structure. Nevertheless were are 
convinced that the material needs of the country and the intellectual needs 
of its people require that such risks as they may be should be taken (De la 
Warr Commission Report, 1937, Chapter 10, pars. 118-119). 
 
The process of upgrading Makerere College began in 1938. An Inter-territorial 
Conference was held at Makerere from 21 to 24 May 1938. Its aim was to 
examine the practical steps that had to be followed in order to implement the 
recommendations of the Makerere Commission [De la Warr Commission] with 
regards to the proposed Higher College. Discussions about the envisaged Higher 
College were held both in East Africa and in Britain. During the sitting of the 
House of Commons, Mr. Barr, an MP, asked Malcolm MacDonald, Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, whether he would make any statement on the proposals for 
the establishment of a Higher College for East Africa as a whole. He also wanted 
to know if the inter-territorial conference resulted in any constructive proposals. 
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MacDonald responded: “I am glad to be able to state that the proposals for the 
establishment of the higher college have now reached an advanced stage, and the 
answer to the second part of your questions is in the affirmative” (Parliamentary 
Debates, House of Commons. Official Report, Vol. 337, Col. 1061). In November 
1938, the first Makerere Ordinance was drafted and scheduled to come to effect in 
1939. The Ugandan administration handed over the college to a Representative 
Council consisting of members from all three East African territories thus 
demonstrating that the college was a regional asset. 
 
Subsequent events included the Channon Memorandum of 1940, which contained 
proposals for a network of colonial universities that would train the leadership 
required for self-rule by British colonies – including those in East Africa. This 
was followed by the appointment of the Asquith Commission in 1943 which was 
mandated to consider the principles which would guide the promotion of higher 
education, learning and research and the development of universities in the 
colonies; and to explore the means whereby universities and other appropriate 
bodies in the United Kingdom might be able to co-operate with institutions of 
higher education in the colonies in order to give effect to these principles. 
(Asquith Report). The Commission submitted its report in 1945 recommending 
the establishment of University colleges that would have a relationship with the 
University of London. 
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In July 1955, Allan T. Lennox-Boyd, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
appointed the First Working Party under the chairmanship of Sir Alexander Carr-
Saunders, then Director of the London School of Economics. The Working Party 
was instructed: (i) To bring under review the existing provision for all post-
secondary education in East Africa taking into consideration the plan in view for 
the development of the existing higher education institutions; (ii) To bring under 
review the estimated requirements of higher education in East Africa for the next 
ten years; and (iii) To make recommendations arising out of paragraph (i) and (ii) 
(Report of the Working Party on Higher Education in East Africa, July/August 
1955). The Working Party submitted its report to the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies in January 1956, recommending that drastic steps be taken to accelerate 
the pace towards the establishment of the UEA. 
 
By this time the three East African governments had realized the urgent need to 
have a regional institution of higher education. They articulated their views in the 
White Paper on Higher Education in East Africa (1958). Subsequent to that paper 
they approached the Secretary of State for the Colonies and asked him to appoint 
another Working Party that would examine the proposals contained in the White 
Paper. This resulted in the appointment of a six-member Working Party under Dr. 
John F. Lockwood, Master of Birkbeck College and Vice-Chancellor of the 
University of London. This Working Party was mandated: (i) To examine and 
advise on the proposals for the creation of new institutions of higher education in 
East Africa and to advise on their desirability and scope and on the timing of their 
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establishment; (ii) To examine and advise on the pattern of future development of 
higher education in East Africa, and to examine the desirability and practicability 
of carrying out any such development within the scope of a single university or 
University College of East Africa of which all colleges situated in the region 
would be constituent units and (iii) To examine and advise on the additional 
facilities (if any) for higher technological as well as professional training required 
in East Africa (Report of the Working Party on Higher Education in East Africa, 
July/August 1958).  
 
The Working Party submitted its report to the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
on 26 November 1958. It confirmed the need for the establishment of a regional 
university that would best serve the interests of East African people on higher 
education. Some of the key recommendations of the Working Party are captured 
in paragraph 89, which states that: 
All the colleges should be interterritorial wherever they are located. The 
principle of interterritoriality is fundamental to our recommendations. It is 
not only that the financial support needed from Governments should be 
obtained from all the Governments – important as that is. There are other 
reasons for our emphasis. Unless the colleges are inter-territorial, there is 
bound to be needless and expensive duplication. It will be a long time, for 
example, before a second college will need or will be able to afford 
another medical school. Mulago can adequately serve all the territories. 
The college in Nairobi will be the centre for higher engineering courses in 
East Africa for some time to come. Apart from this, however, it is 
important that students all over East Africa should have a measure of 
choice as to the college at which they wish to study. Each college will 
develop individual characteristics; even in common faculties there will be 
difference of emphasis. A college in a territory other than the student’s 
own may suit his needs better. There is yet another reason for our 
emphasis. Both the senior and junior members of the college will profit by 
the wider and more varied outlook which interterritoriality involves. East 
college will be concerned with the needs of East Africa as a whole. 
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Reflecting on these recommendations, one newspaper had the following to say: 
“In general, the recommendations may be described as bold, imaginative and 
practical, for they clear away much that has tended to clog progress and 
development, and point to great potentialities” (East African Standard, 26 
February 1959). The implementation process of the recommendations contained 
in the Working Party began soon after the three East African governments and the 
EAHC had studied and accepted the report. One such step was the drafting of the 
Royal College, Nairobi Bill, 1960 by the East Africa Legislative Assembly. The 
estimated date for the establishment of a similar College in Tanganyika was 
1965/1966, or as soon thereafter as possible. However, for reasons to be discussed 
later in this chapter the anticipated college came into existence on 25 October 
1961. It started operating in a four-storey building used by President Nyerere’s 
Party, TANU. 
 
The last phases in the long and protracted struggle for the establishment of a 
regional university included the appointment by the East African Governors of the 
Quinquennial Advisory Committee in 1960 whose mandate was to study the 
Lockwood Report and give specific advice on the financial implications of its 
recommendations. The Committee had “to consider the proposals for, and the 
estimated cost of Higher Education in East Africa in the five years from 1961 to 
1966” (Report of the Quinquennial Advisory Committee, 1960, par.1). The 
Committee submitted the report on 28 July 1960. Paragraph 6 of the report stated 
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explicitly that there were very strong educational reasons for the establishment of 
a central university in East Africa with an inter-territorial college in each of the 
three East African territories, serving students on a regional basis. 
 
After further deliberations in East Africa and in Britain the Provisional Council of 
the University of East Africa was established in 1961. By the end of March 1962 
it was almost a certainty that the UEA would indeed be established in the middle 
of 1963 (Draft Letter. Provisional Council Minutes, 29 March 1962. University of 
Nairobi Archives. PUEA/IA/54). 
 
As part of its mandate the Provisional Council had to look into the manpower 
needs of East Africa. To this effect, it tasked Mr. Guy Hunter, a researcher on 
education and manpower requirements in East Africa, to conduct a manpower 
study in the region. Assisted by Professor Frederick Harbison, a European scholar 
who was linked to the United Nations research projects in Africa, Hunter carried 
out the study in 1962 and produced a report titled: ‘High-Level Manpower in East 
Africa: A preliminary Assessment’. The report was never published but was used 
in other studies (see Hunter, 1963).  
 
During the second half of 1962, the Provisional Coouncil appointed a Committee 
with the mandate to review the needs and priorities of higher education in the 
three East African University Colleges, “in view of new circumstances which 
have arisen since the Report of the Quinquennial Advisory Committee, of the 
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intention to establish a University College of East Africa” (Report of the 
Committee on Needs and Priorities, 1963). In 1962, the Governors-General of 
Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda – after getting advice and consent from the East 
African Central Legislative Assembly – enacted the University of East Africa Act. 
The Act stated inter alia that: “There shall be established, upon a day to be 
appointed by the Authority by notice in the Gazette, a university to be known as 
the University of East Africa, hereinafter referred to as ‘the University’” (EACSO 
Gazettes, 1963: 320-321). The Act officially set up the UEA with three 
constituent colleges: Makerere University College in Uganda; Royal College, 
Nairobi in Kenya and The University College, Dar es Salaam in Tanganyika. The 
UEA was inaugurated on 28 June 1963 at University College, Nairobi in Kenya 
with President Nyerere as its first Chancellor and Sir Bernard de Bunsen as its 
Vice-Chancellor. This marked the completion of a long and tedious process.  
 
Ogot (1999:254) divides the history of the UEA into three phases, which he states 
as follows: (i) the period from 1938 when the concept of a unitary University of 
East Africa considered in the context of other types of inter-territorial co-
operation, was still the colonial ideal; (ii) the period of the federal University of 
East Africa which started when the University was inaugurated in June 1963 and 
ended on 30 June 1970 when the Federal University eventually collapsed; and (iii) 
the period when each of the three independent states in East Africa had a national 
university but still co-operated within the context of the EAC.   
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But if the UEA came into being after such a long process of negotiation and re-
negotiation, why did it collapse? Secondly, what did its demise mean to the EAC? 
Lastly, what role did the East African leadership, nationalism and sub-
nationalisms play in this process? These key questions addressed below.      
 
6.2 Problems Experienced by the UEA and Their Impact on the EAC 
The collapse of the UEA in June 1970 was the climax of a number of problems 
that had haunted the University even before it was officially constituted in 1963. 
Ideological differences within the East African leadership pre-determined the 
future of the Federal University. Looking at the issue of the University from a 
broader perspective, the Asquith Report had anticipated that the great distance 
between the constituent colleges would mean that the UEA would only be a 
machine for conducting examinations and subsequently granting degrees to those 
who had passed; it would not be a community. The Report further argued that the 
Federal University would have no personality of its own. Instead, the colleges 
would influence both the character and outlook of the students, with each college 
having its distinct features.  
 
Indeed, when the university was established it experienced these problems. This 
became clear from the early stages when the heraldic device of the university was 
designed. It was not easy to decide what to include and what to leave out because 
the primary aim was to satisfy all three partners (Todd, ‘General Comments’. 
UON Archives, UEA University Council. PUEA/IA/8). The distance between the 
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constituent colleges presented another problem as the Asquith Report had rightly 
anticipated. James (1970:3) commented on this issue, stating that while it would 
certainly be difficult to prove that the physics of geography was the critical over-
riding factor in the eventual decentralization of the university, “there is data from 
the social sciences that suggests that physical distance affects formation of social 
systems in a far more subtle and pervasive sense than is commonly understood.” 
 
The UEA, like the EAC, died a slow death. There were endemic problems which 
saw the UEA disintegrating as it was being constituted. It would therefore be very 
useful to identify and discuss some of these problems so that we could have a 
better understanding of what each one of them meant to the EAC. 
 
6.2.1 Inequality Between The Constituent Colleges 
The mere fact that Makerere College was established long before the other two 
constituent colleges were even contemplated predetermined the fate of any 
regional co-operation in higher education in the region. National and regional 
interests were always in constant competition thus testing personal relationships 
between East African leaders. These inter-territorial tensions became evident soon 
after the publication of the De la Warr Commission Report in 1937. In 1938, the 
Chief Secretary in Kenya wrote a letter to the Acting Chief Secretary in Uganda 
stating that although some officials in Kenya were willing and prepared to vote 
for some money to be sent to Uganda to assist in the construction of Makerere, “it 
is not at all certain that they will be prepared to vote any considerable sums 
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towards a building which they have never seen and whose nature they imperfectly 
understand” (Chief Secretary, Kenya to Acting Chief Secretary, Uganda. KNA. 
ED.52/4/6/1).  
 
In 1949, Makerere became the only University College in East Africa and was 
already looking forward to becoming a full university for the region (Lonsdale, in 
Brown and Luis (eds) 1999). When the Royal Technical College (RTC) was 
established in Kenya, some commentators saw it as different from Makerere and 
therefore argued that the two should be kept apart not only because they would 
provide different educational services to the region but also because they were at 
different stages of development (Keir, 1954). When the RTC opened its doors to 
the students in 1956 it ended Makerere’s preeminence as the only institute of 
higher education in East Africa. But the two institutions could not compete. 
 
The second Working Party on Higher Education in East Africa captured this 
problem when it presented its report in 1958. It stated that one of the dilemmas 
facing East Africa at the time was the fact that in comparison with Makerere, no 
other college in East Africa could by 1966 be in a position to assume similar 
powers. Therefore, this inequality of stature meant two things. First, it meant that 
Makerere College had to wait for a greater measure of academic autonomy longer 
than would otherwise be necessary. Second, Makerere had to become the sole 
college working for East African degrees at a time when other colleges in the 
same area were working for University of London degrees in special relationship 
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(Report of the Working Party on Higher Education in East Africa, July/August 
1958, par.87). 
 
After the Second Working Party had presented its report, Makerere University 
Council stated that all the East African territories had a major role to play in the 
provision of higher education in the region. However, it continued, it would be 
wrong in principle to develop any College at the expense of another, as this would 
be harmful to the whole pattern of higher education. The Council stated it boldly 
that “it must be remembered that the newer Colleges will not be able for years to 
undertake certain work which Makerere is now able to do” (Response by 
Makerere College Council. UON Archives. UEA Makerere University College, 3 
(iv). PUEA/12/18). 
 
National interests superceded regional interests. This applied to both the academic 
and political leadership alike. What would have been acceptable to Makerere 
University Council and to the Uganda Government would be for the other two 
colleges to become constituent colleges of Makerere while the latter took 
University status. Obote articulated these views boldly when he addressed the 
Uganda Legislative Council on 13 November 1959. He argued that Makerere 
should be allowed to progress to university status and that London University 
should continue to guarantee Makerere degrees. With regards to the Nairobi 
College, his view was that it should either become a university College affiliated 
to Makerere or be a University College of London University. He was not 
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convinced about the need to establish a regional because he felt that such an 
institution would only be  an administrative body. Afterall, this would have meant 
that Makerere would have to wait for a period of between ten and fifteen years 
before the regional plan could be effected (Obote, cited in Southall, 1972). 
 
Naturally, Kenya and, later, Tanganyika, could not accept these proposals. They 
wanted Makerere College to wait for them until they reached the same level of 
development and then merge as equal partners to form the UEA. It should be 
remembered that similar debates ensued with regards to the EAC when 
Tanganyika and Uganda argued that Kenya should wait for them to develop 
before all three countries could join hands and form the EAC. Dinwiddy and 
Twaddle (in Hansen and Twaddle, (eds), 1988:195) concluded that the 
relationship between the three inter-territorial Colleges based in Kenya, Uganda 
and Tanganyika was in fact “a somewhat frustrating relationship for Makerere, 
because it had to mark time while the two newer colleges forged ahead in Kenya 
and Tanganyika.” 
 
One of the ramifications of this problem of inequality was the issue of the site 
where the proposed UEA would be located. As shown in the previous chapters, a 
number of the regional institutions were located in Nairobi. This did not go down 
well with the Ugandan and Tanzanian leadership. Similarly, given Makerere’s 
advanced status of development, it was an open secret that the central offices of 
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the proposed UEA would be based in Uganda, to the dissatisfaction of the other 
two sister countries. 
 
The Asquith Report anticipated this problem and discussed it broadly. Amongst 
its many observations regarding the choice of the site for a regional university 
was that the area must be of sufficient extent, not just in terms of size or 
population, but the capacity to supply an adequate flow of students able to profit 
from higher education. It then predicted that difficulties and even conflict would 
inevitably arise when the issue of the site was discussed and continued to state 
that as a result of legitimate local patriotism or proper educational ambition, each 
territory would end up establishing its own university. The Report maintained that 
the only instance where the territories might be willing to embrace the idea of a 
regional university would be when such a university would not be located in any 
individual territory (Asquith Report:13). 
 
Another ramification of the problems faced by the UEA was the distribution of 
funds. Here, too, unequal distribution of funds was inevitable given Makerere’s 
advanced status. A significant number of buildings were already in place in 
Uganda while the two constituent colleges in Kenya and Tanzania needed more 
construction. Also, Makerere had been able to build an endowment fund over a 
long period of time. The same was not true with the other two colleges. The Nicol 
Report, which was submitted to the Provisional Council of the University of East 
Africa in 1962 demonstrated its awareness of this problem when it recommended 
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that large sums of money be diverted from Makerere to Dar es Salaam – the least 
developed of the three colleges – and also to the Royal College in Nairobi. 
Obviously, Makerere was not impressed by these recommendations. Excerpts 
from a letter written by Frazer Murray, one of the administrators from Dar es 
Salaam to Donald MacGillifray, Chairman of the Provisional Council of the UEA 
speak directly to this issue. Murray expressed his feelings thus: 
I feel I should convey to you my disappointment, and indeed my dismay, 
over the Mitchell Hall episode. I believe that a grave error in University 
planning has occurred, the effect of which will be greatly to prolong, if not 
perpetuate, the imbalance between the colleges. This was consciously and 
deliberately done after the urgency of the need to bring the colleges to a 
state of approximate parity had been recognized and affirmed by those 
responsible….” (Frazer Murray to Donald MacGillifray. UON Archives. 
UEA. Minutes of the Provisional Council. PUEA/IA/58, Vol.3). 
 
Similar sentiments came from the Tanganyikan government side. El Haj A. S. 
Fundikira, Tanganyika’s Minister of Justice at the time, articulated the views of 
his government by saying that the Tanganyika Government greatly regreted that 
at a time of serious capital shortage and after the decision had been endorsed that 
there should be rapid development of the University College, Dar-es-Salaam, that 
another college should proceed to build a Hall of Residence “which in East 
African terms was a project of very low priority” (Statement by El Haj A. S. 
Fundikira. UON Archives. UEA. Minutes of the Provisional Council. 
PUEA/IA/58, Vol.3). There were many such debates which emerged in different 
forums. But inequality was not the only problem casting a spell on the UEA; there 
were other problems too. One of those problems was the issue of the University 
calendar, which all the Constituent Colleges would have to follow. 
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6.2.2 The University Calendar 
The question of the University calendar tested the working relationship within the 
East African leadership. Before the proposed merger, each country followed its 
own academic calendar. When these institutions were brought together there was 
no agreement as to when the terms should start and end. The Working Parties, 
especially the second one, noted that the academic years of Makerere College and 
the RTC did not coincide. Whereas Makerere’s academic year ran from July to 
April, that of the RTC ran from October to June. The Working Party proposed 
that this issue be addressed because it made regional planning very difficult. 
 
When the joint Government/University Committee met in Nairobi on 30 
December 1963 under the chairmanship of de Bunsen, it realized that the issue of 
the calendar could not be resolved easily. The RTC could not agree to a long 
vacation starting from April to June. Its argument was that the long rains during 
that time made it impossible for students to do fieldwork. The period was also 
said to be unsuitable for family holidays and travel (Memorandum on Proposals 
by the Joint Committee. UON Archives. UEA Academic Board. PUEA/3/10 (i)). 
 
According to Mr. T. W. Gee, Permanent Secretary in the Uganda Ministry of 
Education, his government rejected the proposed University calendar for three 
reasons: (i) the proposals conflicted with the government machinery in that the 
school year was geared to the local government financial year in each country; (ii) 
the proposals would create chaos in the school system. If the proposed change 
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was implemented pupils not in school would wait for the whole year before they 
were admitted to the University and this would create an unmanageable backlog 
of pupils; and (iii) the proposed calendar would create a two-term gap between 
finishing school and joining university. One fear was that some students could get 
bursaries and travel abroad to further their education (UEA File. PUEA/2B/5, 
UON Archives). The fact that Britain controlled secondary school examination 
compounded the problem in that East African Colleges had to fit their calendar to 
that of British institutions like the University of London, to which they affiliated. 
 
As late as the mid-1960s the calendar problem still lingered on and caused 
confusion. On 20 April 1966, representatives from the Head Office of the UEA 
met with the Tanzanian government to try and resolve the issue of the calendar. 
Tanzania was prepared to make compromises only if Kenya did the same. So, the 
calendar problem accompanied the UEA to the grave as shown below: 
 
Table 1: Calendar for the last session of the UEA, 1969/70  
 
College  Term 1   Term 2   Term 3 
Makerere 30 June-6 Sept. 1969 29Sept-6 Dec. 1969 5 Jan.-21 March 1970 
Nairobi 22 Sept.-5 Dec.1969  5Jn-20 March 1970 6 April-3 July 1970 
Dar-es-Salaam 7 July-13 Sept 1969 4 Oct.-6 Dec. 1969 3 Jan.-28 March 1970 
 
Source: UEA Calendar, 1969/70  
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6.2.3 Student Population 
The student population presented two sets of problems. Initially, there were fewer 
students to fill the three constituent colleges. Later, there were more students than 
the colleges could absorb. The first problem saw the colleges competing for 
students. The second problem meant that each country had to provide higher 
education facilities for its own students. In both instances continued integration of 
East African institutions of higher learning became questionable. 
 
6.2.3 (a) Small Student Population 
This problem presented itself during the early stages of the establishment of the 
UEA. Keir anticipated this problem even before the RTC admitted its first 
students in 1956. Writing in his report in 1954 he stated that the target of a total of 
1, 500 students at the RTC would take a long time to reach due to the shortage of 
students. A few years later, J. M. Hyslop, the College’s principal, talked about 
“the likelihood of unfilled places for the next few years in Makerere College and 
in the Royal College, Nairobi” (Memorandum by J. M. Hyslop, 6 March 1962. 
UON Archives. UEA University Council. PUEA/IA/53). When the Provisional 
Council of the UEA announced that there would be space for more than 250 
students at the UEA’s three constituent colleges, Ng’weno, editor of The Nation 
newspaper in Kenya, wrote: “These places are expected to remain unfilled for at 
least two years due to lack of properly qualified students” (Daily Nation, 20 April 
1963). Hyslop conceded in 1963 that indeed this was a problem (J. M. Hyslop to 
the Prime Minister of Kenya, 1 August 1963. KNA. KA/2/17). 
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This problem was compounded by divergent views in the region regarding 
entrance requirements. The University raised the bar in this regard. Its entrance 
requirements were higher than those of Western universities (Confidential 
Memorandum by R. C. Pratt, 5 December 1961. UON Archives. UEA University 
Council. PUEA/IA/53). The issue of entrance requirements was debated in the 
different legislatures of the three East African governments. While certain 
politicians argued strongly for raising the bar in this regard, others felt that time 
was not ripe for such an exercise in East Africa. 
 
National interests presented themselves on the issue of student admission at 
tertiary level. Those who felt that their students could gain more in overseas 
institutions and be of better service to their countries when they returned home, 
went ahead and sent those students abroad, sometimes breaking regional 
agreements. This caused tensions in the region and tested the relationship amongst 
East African leaders. Initially, the argument was that students were being sent 
away because there were no higher education facilities in East Africa. In a way, 
this was true. However, even after the UEA had been established individual 
countries continued to send their students abroad, especially the brighter ones. 
The table below shows the number of East African students who traveled abroad 
between the 1950s and 1966 to further their studies. 
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Table 2: East African Students Studying Abroad Between the 1950s and 1966 
 
Country Male  Female Total 
Kenya  815  128  943 
Tanzania 220  51  271 
Uganda 202  32  234 
TOTAL 1237  211  1448 
*Kenya was only second to Nigeria which had 1, 861 students 
Source: Jacpz (1967:49)           
 
6.2.3 (b) Increase in the student population 
It was a foregone conclusion that at some point the student population would 
increase in East Africa. It was also an open secret that when that time came, 
national interests would take precedence over regional interests and that once 
more the relationship amongst East Africans would be put to the test. East African 
territories developed faster than had been anticipated and therefore this problem 
came earlier than previously thought. Each country’s manpower needs proved to 
be more than the University could handle. In the meantime, there was increasing 
political pressure to provide places for all students who qualified (Court, in 
Thompson et al., 1977). Presenting his Annual Report for the academic year 
1965/66, the Principal of University College, Nairobi stated: “In 1964, enrollment 
at the college was 625. In 1965/66 it was 921 and in the last year of the triennium, 
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numbers are expected to reach 1, 179 – an increase throughout the triennium of 
about 86%” (UEA. University College, Nairobi, Annual Report 1965/66).  
 
In 1965, President Obote told BBC in London that proposals were already being 
examined for the creation of separate universities in East Africa. When a Nigerian 
student studying in Britain asked him why Uganda wanted to break Makerere 
away from the Federal University, he responded by saying that the assessment of 
the East African situation was not fair and blamed those who failed to interpret 
the situation correctly. He then stated that he had been asking himself as to how 
long a University College should take before it becomes a University – five, 10 or 
20 years? As he continued with his conversation, he regretted that East Africa had 
27, 000, 000 people, with only one university. He then disclosed that the East 
African leadership had been re-examining the problem, and the general feeling 
was that each of the East African colleges should in 1967 become universities so 
that the number of tertiary institutions could be increased. He concluded: “We are 
thinking in terms of 50, 000 – not 5, 000 –students” (Uganda Argus, 2 July 1965). 
 
President Obote’s statement was not without substance. By 20 May 1966, of the 
1, 994 applicants for the 1966/77 academic year, about 711 students had not yet 
been admitted to any of the three constituent colleges of the UEA. General 
population increase in East Africa had a direct impact on the student population. 
As student numbers soared, personal relationships within the East African 
leadership gave way to national sentiments.  
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Under these circumstances, each country started its plans for national 
development, some of which contradicted regional plans. This was caused in part 
by the fact that each college did not get the amount it had asked for from the 
central office of the Federal University. As these problems continued, questions 
started emerging on why it was still necessary to sustain the life of the UEA. In 
response, the East African Authority appointed a Working Party in 1968 in view 
of: (a) the increasing needs for expansion of facilities for higher education within 
East Africa; (b) the likelihood that at some time after the next triennium planning 
period (ending in mid-1970) this would lead to the natural growth of three or 
more separate universities in place of the present three constituent colleges of the 
Federal University of East Africa; and (c) the desirability of maintaining some 
types of co-operation between the three constituent colleges as they develop into 
separate universities in special matters of interest to the people of East Africa. The 
Working Party was chaired by Professor George D. Stoddard one of the renowned 
European scholars and began its work on 16 September 1968. It submitted its 
report to the East African Heads of States on 31 January 1969. 
 
Three of the Working Party’s recommendations were the following: (i) Each of 
the three University Colleges had to become a University on its own right; (ii) An 
inter-University Committee for East Africa had to be established by the East 
African Community to maintain co-operation among existing and future East 
African universities; and (iii) Each country had to constitute an independent ad 
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hoc University Grants committee to examine the existing financial needs of each 
university in the region and advise the national government accordingly. 
 
A few issues frustrated the East African leadership. For example, in 1969, the 
University College, Nairobi, informed both the University Council and the Senate 
that it would be compelled by shortage of accommodation to restrict student entry 
into the common faculties. There was also a Ministerial Policy regarding the 
distribution of students into Common Faculties in terms of which the three 
University Colleges were expected to have a more or less equal number of 
students. Benard Onyango, the University Registrar, looked at this situation and 
stated that the main question was whether the East African governments still 
wished the UEA to take in all qualified East Africans “in which case if Nairobi is 
compelled to restrict admission, whether Makerere and Dar es Salaam will be 
allowed to admit students in excess of the figures stipulated in the Ministerial 
Formula” (Bernard Onyango to the Permanent Secretaries of Uganda, Kenya and 
Tanzania (Ref. No. A. 4/15) 14 March 1969. UON Archives. Executive Senate 
Committee. PUEA/2A/16).  
 
By this time the student population in East Africa had increased significantly. It 
became obvious that the East African brotherhood that had kept them going for 
decades had reached a cal-de-sac. But although the writing was already on the 
wall that the life of the UEA was hanging in the balance, it was the spirit of local 
nationalism that put a stop to the regional plans. This point is developed below.  
 196
6.2.4 Nationalism 
As discussed in chapter two of this study, nationalism is, by definition, self-
centered. Members of a nation aspire to have all the good things, usually at the 
expense of other nations. In Africa, when many countries achieved their political 
independence in the 1960s they soon took charge of a number of institutions. 
They regarded national universities and airlines as status symbols which no 
independent country could afford not to have (Ngara, 1995). East Africa is no 
exception in this regard. As the spirit of nationalism swept through the region, 
each of the three countries began to make its national plans for both education and 
manpower. Each state made higher education plans without consulting the Federal 
University. In the midst of all that, the future of the UEA was left hanging in the 
balance as each state became suspicious of every action by another sister country.  
 
Nationalism played a dual role in East Africa. On the one hand, broadly defined 
nationalism on which East African brotherhood was premised united the different 
territories against Britain. However, once independence was achieved, each state 
reverted to parochialism or narrowly defined nationalism. Suddenly, the Federal 
University ceased to be a unifying force it had been assumed to be in the past and 
became a stumbling block to national sovereignty and development as much as 
the EAC was later purported to be. Like all other independent African states at 
this time, each of the three East African countries wanted to control its national 
university so as to make it more responsive to its national development plans 
(Ajayi, Goma and Johnson, 1996).  
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The fact that most African universities were (as they still are) heavily funded by 
the state made it more difficult to separate the two institutions from each other 
(Hyder, 1970). Solomon Eliufoo, Tanzania’s Education Minister, captured this 
reality during his address at the conference on the UEA held in Nairobi. He 
argued that University planning in a developing country is part of national 
planning and that his government was therefore justified in thinking along these 
lies. In his view, the government’s involvement in university affairs was not 
tantamount to the dictation of university policy. He believed that the government 
was operating within its official mandate (Eliufoo, 1967). 
 
Implicit in Eliufoos’s statement was that it would be inappropriate for the 
Tanzanian government to draft and implement national policies only to find that 
the University had its own plans, some of which contradicted national plans. A 
chronological analysis of the role played by nationalism in the disintegration of 
the UEA will assist our discussion and provide the context in which the demise of 
both the UEA and the EAC should be understood. 
 
6.2.4 (a) Nationalism and the UEA, 1961-1963 
To understand the role played by nationalism in the collapse of the UEA and, by 
extension, the EAC, we need to take a closer look at the independence period in 
East Africa, that is, the period from 1961 to 1963. This is the time when national 
sentiments became more evident. Initially, the Second Working Party had 
proposed that a University College in Dar es Salaam should start operating during 
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the 1965/1966 academic year. However, driven by the new spirit of nationalism, 
Tanganyika pressed for an earlier date. Even the compromise date proposed by 
Britain (1964) was seen to be too far away by the Tanganyikans who wanted to 
celebrate their independence and the establishment of a University College almost 
simultaneously. It was in this context that the University College opened in 1961, 
the same year that Tanganyika achieved its independence from Britain. This move 
was considered to be ‘educationally sound’ because the University College was 
going to produce lawyers desperately needed by the national governments (Pratt, 
1961). TANU hosted the University College in its new headquarters located in 
Lumumba Street in Dar es Salaam. This was a bad omen for the UEA and for the 
EAC. Southall (1974:55) concurs by stating that the opening of the Dar es Salaam 
College some three years earlier than the Quinquennial Advisory Committee had 
allowed for, “naturally called into question concurrent developments in Kampala 
and Nairobi, given the scarce resources available for higher education.” 
 
Tanganyika’s national sentiments became clear in the actions of politicians who 
pleaded with their countrymen serving in different parts of East Africa to return 
home to build their own nation. It was in this context that Wilbert Chagula, 
already earmarked for being the first African professor of Anatomy at Makerere 
University College was asked by his fellow Tanzanians to return home and serve 
as Registrar at the University College of Dar es Salaam, a request he accepted. 
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Earlier, Tanganyika had agreed to support the idea of a Veterinary School based 
in Kenya. But soon after achieving independence the government of Tanganyika 
reversed this position. Instead, it told the Provisional Council of the UEA that it 
would rather send its veterinarians abroad for training. Later, it turned out that the 
reason for this change of position was necessitated by the fact that the Rockefeller 
Foundation had promised to fund the UEA with a sum of $500, 000 to maintain 
the Veterinary School. Tanganyika was also receiving funding from the same 
institution and feared that the Foundation could be over-stretched and fail to meet 
Tanganyika’s financial needs. It was only after McGillivray, the Chairman of the 
Provisional Council, intervened that the issue was resolved – but not before 
cracks emerged in the East African academic and political leadership. 
 
Another incident was Tanganyika’s decision to open a medical school at the 
former Medical Training Center in Dar es Salaam where students with school 
certificate qualifications would be admitted. This was despite the fact that a 
similar inter-territorial school existed in Uganda. The government of Tanganyika 
stated that the proposed school would award diplomas, not degrees as the 
institution in Uganda was doing. Also, it was going to produce Assistant Medical 
Officers and therefore would not compete with the old school (Rankin, 1968. See 
also, Iliffe, 1998 and Tanganyika Standard 30 December 1961). But not everyone 
believed this defense mechanism. 
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Uganda achieved its independence in October 1962 and had its own national 
agenda, which did not always embrace regional plans. Dr Luyimbazi-Zake, 
Uganda’s Education Minister, was vocal on many educational issues during this 
time – he even challenged the recommendation of the Nicol Report regarding the 
development of higher education in Kenya and Tanganyika while Uganda waited. 
Even Obote’s government opposed the University Development Plan for the 
1963-1967 triennium.  
 
Thus, when 1963 began there was already a duplication of educational facilities in 
the region. This did not augur well for the sustainability of the UEA. Subsequent 
tensions emerged at the East Africa Legislative Assembly. Mr. Semei, a Member 
of the House, expressed his disappointment about the emergence of many 
faculties in the University Colleges whereas there had been an agreement that 
each would specialize in one area. In response, Chief Fundikira from Tanganyika 
stated that he was dismayed to note in the Hon. Member’s speech that he felt that 
there was this duplication: “This is not duplication, Sir, because the needs of the 
peoples of East Africa with regard to the basic faculties could not be met by 
Makerere alone” (EACSO. Proceedings of the Central Legislative Assembly 
Debates, Vol.11, May 1963. Cols. 96-98 and 119-120).  
 
In Kenya, Njoroge Mungai, who had just been appointed Minister of Health, 
reversed policy almost overnight (Iliffe, 1998). Without even bothering to consult 
the University authorities, he approached the World Health Organization (WHO) 
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and asked for all necessary assistance to open an undergraduate Medical School in 
Nairobi not later than 1966. This action put more pressure on Uganda, whose 
leadership was already showing a certain degree of uneasiness about sustaining 
the life of the Federal University to take further action geared towards ending its 
life almost instantly. All these developments reminded Nathan Mnjama (1988:7) 
about the following: “it has been argued that the collapse of regional co-operation 
in East Africa began soon after Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika gained 
independence.” By this time, East Africans’ vested interests in sovereignty had – 
as President Nyerere had anticipated they would – become well entrenched. 
Kenyan lecturers teaching at Makerere were persuaded to return home to build 
their university. It was at this point that academics like Dr. S. H. Ominde and, 
later, Bethwell Ogot returned to Kenya from Uganda (Ogot, 2003; Legum, 1967). 
Therefore, the achievement of political independence before the UEA and the 
EAC were established meant that both institutions were established on a very 
weak foundation. It was inevitable that they would both collapse.  
  
6.2.4 (b) Nationalism and the UEA, 1964-1966 
By 1964 it was already evident that the independence spirit had caused a huge 
dent on East African brotherhood in almost all fields. A commentary in the East 
Africa Journal (1964:27) stated that: “National aspirations have to be reconciled 
with the interests of the whole University, and all the numerous problems which 
normally characterize any federal set-up.” Naturally, federal institutions have 
problems. But what made the East African case even more complicated was the 
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fact that each of the three countries was a sovereign state. President Obote tacitly 
conceded that forging unity in East Africa after each country had achieved 
national independence was bound to fail. He reasoned: “our problems are 
different….Our political structure [in Uganda] is completely different to the 
political structures of Kenya and Tanganyika” (The People, 27 June 1964). Thus, 
it was obvious that adversarial views would bring the university to its knees. 
 
In 1965, Uganda decided to upgrade Kampala Technical College to offer English 
courses. Students from the other two countries were also welcome to join the 
institution but it was meant specifically for Uganda. Through the publication of 
Sessional Paper No10 on African socialism (Kenya Government, May, 1965), 
Kenya put it beyond any doubt that her national needs would henceforth 
determine the expansion of higher education in the Republic of Kenya; this 
included upgrading the University College, Nairobi. On 20 May 1965, Dr. 
Luyimbazi-Zake presented a Memorandum during the sitting of the University 
Council whereby he argued strongly that lately, the UEA had worked to the 
disadvantage of Makerere because it literally retarded the College’s development 
while at the same time promoting the other two sister Colleges.  
 
The Memorandum stated inter alia that “we cannot avoid the fact that each of the 
three constituent colleges of the University will have to be an autonomous 
University on its own sooner or later” (Luyimbazi-Zake, Memorandum laid 
before the University Council, 20 May 1965. UON Archives, UEA. 
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PUEA/IA/49). Ugandan authorities argued that since the priorities of each 
territory varied and the needs of each state were bound to be different, a federal 
University could not veto any government project. If it did, that would be 
tantamount to the limitation of political sovereignty (Amayo, 1977). 
 
As regional talks continued regarding the future of the UEA, Uganda’s position 
remained unclear on many issues regarding the University. Dr. Luyimbazi-Zake 
kept saying that he preferred not to make any decision on the subject because the 
Heads of States were looking into the matter. He could not even endorse the 
decision to appoint a Working Party to look into the future of the UEA (Minutes 
of the Special [Seventh] Confidential Meeting of the Council of the University of 
East Africa, 1965. UON Archives, UEA. PUEA/IA/49). By the time the meeting 
ended, the position was still almost the same as before it started; the future of the 
University remained undecided and was referred to the Heads of States for further 
deliberation (Southall, 1972). For people like Dr. Luyimbazi-Zake, the split of the 
UEA was practical, constructive and progressive (Uganda Argus, 6 July 1965; 
National Assembly Debates [Uganda], Vol. 49, 1965. Col.2732). By this time, the 
writing was already on the wall that very little (if anything at all) could be done to 
salvage the life of the UEA.   
 
For authors like Bell (1986) the situation outlined above is not surprising at all if 
we look at the general trend in the African experience with regional integration in 
general. Since independence, he argues, the ability of African states to act 
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collectively has proved to be difficult, if not impossible. His diagnosis of the 
problem is that political immaturity and internal disunity derived from different 
sources frustrated all attempts at national integration. This failure to unite at a 
national level reduced chances for supra-national or inter-territorial co-operation. 
The period from 1967 to 1970 finally put the issue of the University to rest. 
 
6.2.4 (c) Nationalism and the UEA, 1967-1970 
By 1967 there was no going back; all the signs were already showing that the 
UEA was on the verge of its collapse and nothing could stop that. The period 
from 1967-1970 was characterized by contradictions. For example, while still 
hoping to sustain the life of the UEA, The University College, Dar es Salaam 
opened the faculties of Medicine and Agriculture in 1968 and 1969, respectively. 
This was done through the incorporation of the Old Dar es Salaam School of 
Medicine and Morogoro Agricultural College. The implication was that Makerere 
University College could no longer be the only specialist in these fields.  
 
In 1968, the Working Party under Stoddard was appointed with the mandate to 
study the nature of the relationship between the three constituent Colleges of the 
Federal University following the achievement of political independence. It also 
looked at the possible implications of dissolving the UEA given the politics of the 
time. Making his submission to the Working Party, Wilbert Chagula said the 
following in a statement: “No rigid arrangement can be made to compel three 
independent universities and countries to follow comparable or unified standards 
 205
in regard to any of the items listed in the Terms of Reference” (Report of the 
Working Party on Higher Education in East Africa, 30 January 1969: 40). The 
Working Party concluded that there was no reason to try to sustain the life of the 
UEA at the end of the second triennium ending in 1970 given the prevailing 
circumstances. This view was later endorsed by the East African Authority, which 
was the administrative body of the EAC. It realized that trying to rescue the 
University at this point would be a futile exercise.  
 
One observer stated: “Now that each of the three East African university colleges 
is able to offer most of the wide range of degree subjects required in modern East 
Africa, it is expected that they will become separate national universities in 1970” 
(Mhina, cited in Tanzania Notes and Records, 1970:179). Indeed, in June 1970, 
the East Africa Authority took a decision to dissolve the UEA and allowed each 
country to take full control of and give shape to its own university according to its 
national interests (Mkude and Cookey, in Teferra and Altbatch, 2003). Thus, 
nationalism triumphed over East African brotherhood that had seen Presidents 
Nyerere, Obote, Kenyatta and many other East African leaders working together. 
If the UEA and the EAC were established under similar circumstances – as 
demonstrated above – what did the demise of the UEA mean to the EAC?   
 
6.3 The Impact of the Demise of the UEA on the EAC 
As argued on many occasions in this dissertation, the EAC started disintegrating 
as it was being constituted. We also saw that a combination of factors were 
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responsible for this disintegration, the most important of which was the changing 
personal relationships in the wake of nationalism. But for some time there were 
East Africans who had a stern belief that their region could still work together. 
However, to a large extent, the demise of the UEA in 1970 dashed all those hopes. 
It became clear that if East Africans could not sustain a regional university due to 
varying national priorities, it would be impossible to prolong the life of the EAC, 
which had been established on both economic and political grounds – these being 
largely more sensitive than education, important as it was. 
 
The disintegration of the UEA meant that Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania could 
each plan higher education in line with national manpower needs. Role-players 
like Dr. Luyimbazi-Zake who had been agitating for the prioritization of national 
needs could now go ahead and shape the curriculum in the manner that would be 
compatible with those needs. While this was good in national terms, it raised 
questions about the EAC. The reality was that not only the educational needs of 
each country were unique but the economic and political needs too. Therefore, 
addressing educational needs of the country without also responding to national 
political and economic needs did not make sense. For example, a country could 
train its students locally or abroad in order to boost the economy but as long as 
such an economy was tied to regional economies, the results could not be felt by 
the country in question. It became necessary, therefore, to dismantle the EAC 
once the Federal university had disintegrated so that national economic and 
 207
educational planning could take place concurrently. In a nutshell, the dissolution 
of the UEA heralded the demise of the EAC. 
 
For these reasons, there was a direct link between the collapse of the UEA in 1970 
and the disintegration of the EAC in 1977. It would have been impossible to 
sustain the life of the EAC after the collapse of the UEA because both these 
institutions had been created under similar conditions and were guided by the 
same philosophy, that is, to bring East African people together. In fact, East 
Africans should be applauded for trying hard to salvage the life of the EAC for 
seven more years after the collapse of the UEA. The mission was impossible. So, 
it did not come as a surprise when the EAC eventually collapsed in 1977. 
 
Chapter Summary 
The purpose of this chapter was mainly to draw a link between the Federal 
University and the EAC. It began by demonstrating that both of these institutions 
were established under similar circumstances. The main argument is that in both 
cases the achievement of political independence by the three East African 
countries before the two institutions were constituted was a bad starting point. 
National sentiments tested the personal relationships that had kept East African 
politicians closer to one another. 
 
The chapter also demonstrated the role played by each of the three East African 
countries in putting national before regional interests. As shown above, these 
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national interests came in different forms and at different moments. The site of the 
University, the University calendar and the funding of the three constituent 
colleges were used as examples to show how national sentiments prevailed over 
regional plans. Although the EAC survived for at least seven more years after the 
collapse of the UEA, this Chapter has argued that the mission was indeed an 
impossible one. Even these last seven years of the EAC’s life were not happy 
moments; they were characterized by protracted struggles which then culminated 
in the collapse of the EAC in Jun e 1977.  
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Chapter 7 
Summary and Conclusions: Learning From The Past 
 
0. Introduction 
A lot has been said in this dissertation in the preceding chapters. This concluding 
chapter has a dual purpose. First, it pulls together a few threads that are running 
through the discussion and reiterates the key points. Second, the chapter assesses 
the current EAC using the history of the first one as a source of reference. Based 
on the understanding of the first EAC, it extrapolates on the prospects of the 
current EAC, bearing in mind the changed and still changing political, social and 
economic environment. To be sure, a lot has changed in world politics (including 
East African politics) since the 1960s but there are continuities in certain areas 
and these need to be factored into the discussion. 
 
This exercise is very crucial because it achieves two objectives: (i) it helps us 
appreciate the value of history in the political analysis of our present situation; (ii) 
it enables us to make well informed extrapolations and thereby avoid repeating 
some of the mistakes made by our predecessors. Mugomba (1978:272) had this 
mind when he argued that the hard lessons of this unsuccessful venture “will need 
to be borne in mind in any future attempt at further regional unity and economic 
integration in Africa.” The survival of the current EAC depends on how the 
present East African leadership uses past experiences to avert and/or address the 
problems that led to the collapse of the first EAC in 1977. 
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7.1 Summary of the key points 
The first point that needs to be emphasized is that agency in the history of 
regional integration in East Africa cannot be confined to any single group or 
individual. As demonstrated in the preceding chapters, there were many role-
players, both black and white. The idea about regional integration in East Africa 
was first conceived by British authorities in London in the early 1920s. Their 
primary aim was to ensure easy administration of the East African territories. This 
phase reached its apogee in 1948 with the inauguration of the EAHC. Suffice to 
say throughout this period East Africans vehemently opposed any form of closer 
union in the region, fearing that such a union would increase British hegemony in 
the region. In other words, they did not want any form of closer union amongst 
East African territories to which they would have no say. That is why a few years 
later, when they were assured that their voice would be heard, they embraced it.  
 
The 1950s and 1960s marked a watershed in the history of regional integration in 
East Africa. During this time, East Africans welcomed the idea of regional 
integration with the hope that it would accelerate their political and economic 
emancipation. It is in this context that economic and political factors are accorded 
a similar status in this dissertation. What is evident about British authorities and 
East African politicians is that the actions of both constituencies were triggered by 
the anticipated outcomes of bringing the three east African territories closer to one 
another. Although the general picture painted by Britain was that of altruism, in 
actual fact, egotism was the driving force behind the actions of both parties. 
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Another point that needs to be reiterated is that the entire regional integration 
project was characterized by sustained tensions amongst different stakeholders. 
The locus of these tensions was mainly on the mode of operation to be followed 
and uncertainty on who would do what. First and foremost, British authorities in 
London clashed with their appointees in East Africa, especially the Governors. As 
British authorities based in London claimed to have a mandate to decide the fate 
of East Africa, Governors argued that they were close to the reality and therefore 
were better positioned to decide on what needed to be done and how. The second 
locus of the tensions was between colonial representatives and East Africans. The 
latter wanted to determine their destiny independent of British influence. Within 
East Africa, there were tensions between individual territories and amongst 
different stakeholders within each territory. Politicians, academics, whites, blacks, 
men, women, students etc. did not always agree on issues related to regional 
integration projects. Such disagreements were more pronounced at certain times 
than others. This is reflected in parliamentary debates at each National Assembly 
and at the East Africa Legislative Assembly. 
 
What has also become evident in this dissertation is the fact that some role-
players contemplated different forms of regional integration while others saw 
each form as just constituting one phase in the whole scheme of things. They 
toyed with the idea of economic integration, political integration and integration 
in higher education. It is in the latter context that the establishment of the UEA in 
1963 is considered as part of the broader regional integration project. As argued in 
 212
chapter 6, there was a direct link between regional integration in higher education 
and regional integration in the other spheres (economy and politics). 
 
In many instances, other role-players simply talked about East African Federation 
in a much broader sense. As a result thereof (a point discussed in chapter 2), the 
terminology used in written documents is sometimes confusing. But the common 
denominator in all different conceptions of certain terms is that there was general 
consensus that all East African territories had to be brought together somehow. 
This aim was then fulfilled in 1967 when the EAC was officially inaugurated. 
 
Chapter two demonstrated the complexities associated with each of the concepts 
discussed there. For example, the economic integration theorists identify four 
stages that must be followed before reaching full economic integration (Free 
Trade Area, Customs Union, Common Market and Economic Union). But what is 
even more important about chapter two is the close relationship it draws between 
economic and political integration. The view that economic integration is a 
precursor to political integration is at the core of the history of the EAC and of 
other regional organizations in different parts of Africa. The East African 
leadership saw economic integration as a means to an end, not an end in itself. 
They believed that once they had integrated their regional economies they would 
eventually strive for political integration.  
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But what is clear is that if there are problems with economic integration, the 
process towards political integration is either delayed or stalled. As a result of the 
disintegration of the EAC, political integration in East Africa did not materialize. 
ECOWAS was established as an economic union but as discussed in this 
dissertation, sometimes it tackles political matters without necessarily saying that 
there should be political integration of members of this institution. Thad dream 
would be difficult to realize. During the second week of February 2007, Nigeria, 
Togo and Benin signed a Memorandum of Understanding focusing specifically on 
economic integration (This Day, 8 February 2007). This is a demonstration that 
economic integration is easy to forge that political integration.  
 
The complexity of the term ‘regionalism’ was demonstrated in chapter two. The 
fact that regionalism can be a contributor or an obstacle to world order attests to 
the submission that it is indeed a complex concept whose effect varies from one 
situation to the other. Even the distinction between old and new regionalism is in 
a way an artificial distinction because there are remnants of old regionalism in 
what is purported to be new. But despite all the complexities outlined here, what 
is important to know is that regionalism is a mechanism through which states or 
groupings manage their environment. East Africans were determined to manage 
their geographical space and therefore perceived themselves as people of a 
specific region within the African continent.     
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The discussion on nationalism was revealing in many respects. First, it addressed 
the questions why and how people organize themselves into ‘a nation’. By 
addressing the different types of nationalism and the various stages or phases 
nationalism went through over the years, this dissertation has demonstrated that 
nationalism is not just a static concept that has always been there and therefore 
has a fixed meaning. It is clear from our discussion that the term ‘nationalism’ 
performs different functions. It unites and divides people at the same time. The 
fact that nationalism imposes homogeneity amongst individuals and polities while 
also ordering the political life of mankind means that it has both disadvantages 
and advantages at the same time. For example, the spirit of nationalism united 
East Africans against the British. This was black nationalism. However, territorial 
nationalism and different forms of sub-nationalisms left East Africa divided. 
 
Another theoretical concept discussed here is ‘community’, which is at the core of 
any discussion on the EAC. East Africans saw themselves as a Community. It was 
this mind-set that made them ignore any differences that might have existed 
amongst them. As Anderson (1991) maintains, communities imagine themselves 
as such even if they do not know one another. Thus, ‘community’ is an abstract 
concept and it refers to quite a number of things in different contexts. Sometimes 
the classical and modern usage of the term impacts on how it is construed. But 
regardless of how this concept is perceived, there is general consensus that it 
refers to togetherness or oneness. As far as East Africans were concerned they 
were a unit – a community. That is how the East African Community came about.  
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The disintegration of the EAC in 1977 ushered in a new phase in regional politics 
in East Africa. It meant that each of the three East African countries would 
henceforth follow its national programmes without being bound by any regional 
agreements. However, the subsequent revival of the EAC in January 2001 was an 
acknowledgement of the fact that despite previous failures, East Africans still had 
a stern belief that a lot could be achieved through regional co-operation, even if 
they did not form a single political unit immediately. But will the current EAC 
survive? Why or why not? These questions are addressed below. 
 
7.2 Prospects for the new EAC 
The survival of the current EAC depends on the political will amongst East 
African leaders to sustain its life. One way in which they could do that would be 
by ensuring that regional institutions and structures are kept intact and that leaders 
from all member states partake. The change of the leadership in Uganda was one 
of the key factors that resulted to the dissolution of the first EAC. The 
replacement of President Obote by Idi Amin meant that EAC meetings could no 
longer be held due to the sour relations that existed not only between President 
Nyerere and Amin but also between Amin and President Kenyatta. Amin’s coup 
also reduced the chances of expanding the EAC by creating sour relations with 
President Kaunda. The current leaders in East Africa are working together to 
sustain the EAC but there is no guarantee that their successors will do the same. 
This remains one of the key challenges regarding the future of the new EAC. 
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As a preventative measure, these leaders should ensure that the spirit of East 
African brotherhood is instilled amongst the people, not just the leadership. If 
future leaders embrace this spirit of East African brotherhood now, they are more 
likely to sustain it when they replace the current leaders. One of the concerns 
about the first EAC for example (as reflected in the parliamentary debates) was 
that it was built from the top. East Africans should be vigilant and ensure that the 
same thing does not happen with regards to the current EAC. 
 
The inequality of East African economies contributed to the demise of the first 
EAC. Kenya was the richest of the three territories and appeared to be dominating 
the EAC in part because it hosted a number of regional institutions. This meant 
that more Kenyans got employment compared to the other two countries. To a 
large degree, the situation remains the same today; Kenya’s economy is still the 
strongest in the region and this does not augur well for the EAC. In March 2004, 
the three East African countries signed a Treaty setting up a Customs Union for 
their region. The Treaty came into effect on 1 January 2005. According to this 
Treaty, only Kenya will pay duty on its goods entering Uganda and Tanzania at 
least until 2010 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/East_African_Community). Should 
Kenya feel that all three countries should be treated in the same manner the life of 
the EAC will be at risk. In this regard, East Africans should draw lessons from the 
EU on how it tackles this question. 
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Exogenous forces were highlighted as some of the causes of the collapse of the 
EAC. This is not as crucial now as it was in the 1960s and 1970s. Communism 
and its socialist principles collapsed in 1989. This ended the Cold War. Such 
developments augur well for the EAC. In the absence of socialism and the fight 
between the Eastern and Western blocs, the three East African countries are more 
likely to stick together. Furthermore, the fact that Africa now has the Pan African 
Parliament (PAP) and the fact that African leaders are currently pushing for the 
introduction of a single currency for the continent are good signs that regional 
integration will be encouraged throughout Africa. It is through regional 
integration that the unification of the African continent will be realized. 
 
However, East African leaders should read the face of history very well to ensure 
that they do not repeat the mistakes of the past. From the 1960s, the East African 
leadership rushed regional integration in order to oust Britain and faced the reality 
of unresolved issues afterwards. It would be a mistake for the current leadership 
to rush the process of bringing together regional institutions simply to accelerate 
AU and PAP progammes. Regional integration involves compromises by all 
parties and this should be taken into consideration throughout the process. 
 
Internal and external factors brought the first EAC to its knees. The current 
leadership should be vigilant at all times. Religious differences between Muslims 
and Christians pose a huge challenge. Only astute leadership can sustain the EAC.  
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